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The proper administration of the trust has proven to be fertile ground for academic 
study in South Africa. One aspect in particular, trustee independence, has 
contributed to divergent views in this respect. Of interest for this dissertation is the 
impact of trustee independence (or the absence thereof) on the validity and 
administration of the trust.  
It is well established that trustees have a duty to act independently, but the 
theoretical basis for this duty of independence remains the subject of debate. In this 
dissertation, two competing propositions, identified herein as the “establishment” and 
“fiduciary” propositions are examined.  
It is proposed that these propositions may be reconciled through the 
“independence duality model”, developed herein to provide a general theoretical 
basis for a trustee’s duty of independence. 
The dissertation commences with an analysis of the history of, and what is 
considered the motive for, the development of the trust form. From this analysis, the 
duality in trustee independence emerges that serves as the basis for the model 
introduced herein.  
The constituent parts of this model, the establishment proposition and fiduciary 
proposition, are further developed and it is proposed that this model serves as a 
sound basis to further explain the impact of a lack of trustee independence on the 
validity of a trust as well as the consequences that may follow where a trust, 
although valid, suffers from a lack of trustee independence. 
The dissertation concludes with an application of the independence duality model 
to practical trust problems, thereby illustrating the utility of the independence duality 
model in determining contemporary difficulties encountered such as “sham trusts” 







Die behoorlike administrasie van trusts bly ŉ vrugbare area vir verdere navorsing 
in Suid-Afrika. In hierdie verband het een aspek in besonder, naamlik ŉ trustee se 
onafhanklikheidsplig, aanleiding gegee tot uiteenlopende sienings. Van belang vir 
hierdie proefskrif is die impak van ‘n trustee se onafhanklikheid (of gebrek daaraan) 
op die geldigheid en administrasie van die trust. 
Dit is geyk dat trustees ŉ plig het om onafhanklik op te tree in die administrasie 
van die trust, maar die teoretiese basis vir hierdie plig bly onseker. In hierdie 
proefskrif word twee stellings wat poog om hierdie plig te verduidelik, naamlik die 
“geldigheid-stelling” en “fidusiêre-stelling, geïdentifiseer en verder ondersoek.  
Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat hierdie twee stellings versoenbaar is deur die 
ontwikkeling van die “tweeledige-onafhanklikheidsmodel”, ŉ model onwikkel in 
hierdie proefskrif om die teoretiese basis van ŉ trustee se plig om onafhanklikheid te 
verklaar.  
Die proefskrif begin met ŉ ondersoek na die geskiedkundige ontwikkeling, en 
beweegrede vir die ontstaan van die trustvorm. Hierdie ondersoek ontmasker ŉ 
tweeledigheid in die konsep van trustee-onafhanklikheid wat die basis vorm vir die 
tweeledige-onafhanklikheidsmodel. 
Die boublokke van hierdie model, die “geldigheid-stelling” en “fidusiêre-stelling”, 
word verder ontwikkel en daar word voorgestel dat dit ‘n verklaring bied vir die impak 
van ‘n tekort aan trustee-onafhanklikheid op die geldigheid van ‘n trust, asook die 
gevolge waar ‘n trust, nietemin geldig, steeds gebuk gaan onder ‘n tekort aan 
trustee-onafhanklikheid.  
Die proefskrif sluit af deur die tweeledige-onafhanklikheidsmodel te toets aan die 
hand van verskeie, praktiese, trustprobleme. Daardeur word die waarde van hierdie 
model om kontemporêre trustvraagstukke, soos “skyn trusts” (“sham trusts”) en 
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CHAPTER 1: IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH QUESTION AND DEMARCATION 
OF RESEARCH FIELD 
1 1  Introduction 
“A confidence reposed in some other…”. This phrase, adopted by Garton to describe 
the conceptual starting point of the trust,1 accurately emphasises, notwithstanding 
criticism,2  the reliance placed on the character of another to ensure the proper 
administration of the trust. 
The capacity of a trustee to do justice to this confidence, and the obligation to do 
so, form the basis of this research. As the discussion on the development of the trust 
in Chapter 2 reveals,3 the trust grew from a societal need for an institution that 
permits one party (the founder) to transfer assets to another (the trustee) to manage 
for the benefit of yet another party (the beneficiary). However, this confidence placed 
in the integrity of the trustee to be faithful to his charge raises the potential for abuse. 
In this regard, Cameron observed that: 
 
“A bunch of crooked trustees can easily ransack a trust dedicated to philanthropic 
purposes. As happens. Honesty lies at the mercy of vigilant and scrupulous fellow 
trustees, unassisted by governmental oversight. So, too, with many private benefit trusts, 
where it is up to the trustees themselves, spurred, if they exist, by watchful beneficiaries, 
to see that the trust is properly administered”.4   
 
It is against this background of potential for abuse that three main principles of 
trust administration have crystallised, namely:5  
 
 
1  J Garton Moffat’s Trust Law 6 ed (2015) 1. The phrase is from the sixteenth-century 
commentaries of Lord Chief Justice Coke, in reference to the “use”, the ancestor of the 
modern trust. The full quote attributed to Lord Coke reads:  
“A confidence reposed in some other, not issuing out of the land but as a thing collateral 
thereto, annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, 
for which cestui que trust has no remedy but by subpoena in the Chancery”. 
2  See FW Maitland Equity, also, the Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of 
Lectures (1909) 42.  
3  See part 2 2 in Chapter 2. 
4  E Cameron as quoted from the preface of E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon 
Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6 ed (2018) vi-vii. 





(i) that the trustee must give effect to the trust deed, properly interpreted, as far 
as lawful and effective;6  
(ii)  that the trustee must in performance of duties and the exercise of powers act 
“with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a 
person who manages the affairs of another”;7 and  
(iii)  that the trustee must, except as regards questions of law, exercise an 
independent discretion.8  
 
It is this third principle, independent trustee discretion, which forms the focus of 
this research.  
 
1 2  Research question 
This research is primarily concerned with independence as one of the basic 
principles guiding trustees in their administration of the trust. More specifically, it 
examines the nature and theoretical basis of a trustee’s duty of independence and 
considers whether it constitutes a fundamental requirement for the validity of a trust 
or derives from a fiduciary responsibility. 
Therefore, the overarching research question that this dissertation considers is: 
what is the theoretical basis of a trustee’s duty of independence?9 
Following from the examination of this question is the development of a theoretical 
model to explain two different, but complementary, aspects of trustee independence. 
Ultimately it is argued that this model, and its constituent parts, (which can replace 
 
6  Kalshoven v Kalshoven NO 1966 3 SA 466 (R) 469A. 
7  Section 9(1) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (“TPCA”). The Afrikaans text 
(which was signed into law) refers to “die sorgsaamheid, ywer en kundigheid wat 
redelikerwys verwag kan word van ŉ persoon wat die sake van ŉ ander hanteer”. 
Section 9(2) of the Afrikaans text varies the wording, unlike the English text, to read “die 
mate van sorg, kundigheid en vlyt soos in subartikel 1 vereis”.  
8  Ex Parte Bellinghan 1936 CPD 515 517; Ex Parte Knight 1946 CPD 800; Estate Gouws 
v Registrar of Deeds 1947 4 SA 403 (T); Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA) 
para 9. 
9  A reference to a “theoretical” basis or discussion may be understood as a reference to 
the philosophical framework or justifications for a given approach to legal principles. 
However, in this dissertation the term should be understood as a discussion regarding 





existing models) may also be applied in the examination of other aspects of trust law, 
such as the phenomena of “sham” and “abuse of trust”. 
 
1 3  Methodology 
The research methodology followed in this dissertation is of a non-empirical and 
doctrinal nature. It is comprised primarily of analyses of case law and legislation, as 
well as a selection of domestic and international journal articles, theses and books. 
Although the focus of the research is on trusts in the South African context, 
reference is also made to various international works to inform the South African 
perspective where appropriate. 
As appears from the discussion in Chapter 2, trusts from jurisdictions with a 
different approach to property law are by necessary implication conceptualised on a 
different theoretical basis.10 In considering trusts in a comparative legal context, I 
have therefore adopted the approach followed by Honoré and recognised the 
division of the global legal systems into common-law, civil-law and mixed 
jurisdictions.11 I am aware of criticism in characterising the legal families of the world 
in this manner12 but remain of the view that this distinction is the most sensible and 
appropriate in the context of trusts.13 
I draw from examples of three jurisdictions in examining the theoretical 
underpinnings of a trustee’s duty of independence. From common-law jurisdictions, 
material is primarily sourced from England. However, examples from the United 
 
10  See part 2 3 in Chapter 2. 
11  T Honoré “On fitting trusts into civil law jurisdictions” (2008) University of Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series 27/2008 3 <available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271079> 
(accessed 10-08-2019).  
12  Gordley described the distinction between common law and civil law as “obsolete” – J 
Gordley “Common law und civil law: eine überholte unterscheiding” (1993) 1 Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privaterecht 498. In addition, one of the principal architects of one 
such classification, Kötz, has questioned whether the time has come to bid farewell to 
legal family classifications – H Kötz “Abschied von der rechtskreislehre?” (1998) 6 
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privaterecht 493. See also N Garoupa & M Pargendler “A 
law and economics perspective on legal families” (2014) 7 Eur J Legal Studies 33. 
13  As discussed in Chapter 2, the civil-law and common-law trusts differ markedly in their 
theoretical underpinnings, especially in respect to the form of the rights enjoyed by the 





States of America (“the USA”); Australia; New Zealand; Canada, and Jersey are also 
referenced. 
Within the context of civil-law jurisdictions, reference is made to European 
continental authorities from Germany and Lichtenstein, as well as European Union 
legislation. 
South Africa, as an example of a mixed jurisdiction, offers the bulk of the research 
material from this type of jurisdiction, both in terms of case law examined and the 
review of academic commentary, but material and examples from Scotland are also 
referenced.  
 
1 4  Scope 
Trusts are extraordinary legal institutions. The trust’s most valuable characteristic 
has been identified as its versatility, which affords solutions to a myriad of legal 
problems – a proverbial legal wonder drug that solves “equally well family troubles, 
business difficulties, religious and charitable problems”.14 Apart from its “normal” use 
in, for example, the family and business contexts, trusts are also widely used to 
address vexing economic and social problems, such as charitable fundraising, black 
economic empowerment and off-shore investment. Unfortunately, the diverse use of 
trusts has also led to its widespread abuse.15 Often trusts are trusts in name only 
with an essential principle of trust law, namely the independence of trustees, 
neglected.16 
The early twentieth-century English historian and jurist, FW Maitland, was a 
particular admirer of the trust.17 He in fact regarded the development of the trust as 
the “greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field 
of jurisprudence”.18 
 
14  P Lepaulle “Civil law substitutes for trusts” (1927) 36 Yale Law Journal 1126. 
15  See S Cohen “Investec trusts continue to warn of ‘sham trusts’” (16-12-2006) ItiNews 
<http://www.itinews.co.za/companyview.aspx?companyid=22236&itemid=13E7229B-
A559-422A-9AC9-DF2EA592C466> (accessed 24-07-2018). 
16  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA); Tijmstra v 
Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 1 SA 459 (T). 
17  FW Maitland Equity 2 ed (1936) 23; FW Maitland Selected Historical Essays (1936) 129. 
18  FW Maitland “The unincorporated body” (1902) History of Economic Thought Papers, 






Garton suggests that it was not the ethical principles underlying the trust that 
excited Maitland, but rather its versatility and the dynamic nature thereof – evidenced 
through its development, “more in response to pragmatism than principle”.19 Garton 
also contends that this development in response to an ever-changing world shows 
no signs of slowing and while some branches of the law of trusts “have grown to full 
maturity … others have, as yet, scarcely sprouted, and a process of incremental 
development, usually gentle but at times more dramatic, is still occurring.”20 It is 
against the background of this continued development that he questions whether it is 
still appropriate to refer to the law of trusts in the singular, as opposed to “the laws of 
trusts in the plural”.21 
These questions simply emphasise that trust law is a rich and diverse branch of 
the law and that a limitation of the scope of this research is therefore essential. 
This research is limited to the South African trust, with its civil-law theoretical 
underpinnings. While it cannot be discounted that the propositions advanced in this 
dissertation may also be applied to trusts found in other types of jurisdictions, it is not 
intended to offer a defensible theory on the theoretical justification of a trustee’s duty 
of independence in that context.  
Similarly, the scope of the research is limited to trusts in the strict sense.22 While 
the positions of trustees in the strict sense may be compared to those of trustees in 
the wide sense, with inferences drawn from that branch of the law, the dissertation 
does not propose to justify the duty of independence of trustees in the wide sense.  
 
 
19  Garton Moffat 2. 
20  3. 
21  3. 
22  Trustees in the wide sense must be distinguished from trustees in the strict sense. A 
trustee in the strict sense refers to those trustees of trusts defined in section 1 of the 
TPCA. Trustees that do not fall within this definition, but who nonetheless are entrusted 
with the affairs of others and consequently control property on behalf of others, have 
been described as falling within the ambit of trustees in the wide sense. It is self-evident 
that an examination of this second type of trust, despite not being subject to the 






1 5  Examples 
The practical impact of the themes examined in this research may be illustrated 
through examples. Each example represents a practical problem concerning the 
establishment and administration of a trust.  
These examples relate to various aspects discussed thought this dissertation and 
are also drawn from case law discussed. The proposed outcome of each example 
will appear clearly from the discussion of the particular problem identified in the 
chapters that follow. In Chapter 7, I revisit these examples and offer an analysis of 
the, in my view, correct legal position against the background of the arguments 
developed in the preceding chapters. 
 
1 5 1  Example 1 
Assume an inter vivos trust where the founder does not intend to relinquish control 
over the trust assets. To achieve this end, he establishes a trust for the benefit of his 
children with three independent trustees and provides them with wide discretionary 
powers. However, he includes a provision in the trust deed to the effect that all 
decisions by the trustees are to be approved by the founder in order to be effective. 
What is the effect of this provision and does this arrangement qualify as a trust? 
 
1 5 2  Example 2 
The next example may, for the sake of convenience, be divided into part “2a” and 
part “2b” as the facts are identical, save for one key distinction. 
 
1 5 2 1  Example 2a 
A founder establishes an inter vivos investment trust. The trust deed contains 
detailed and prescriptive provisions relating to the trustees. They are to invest the 
trust assets only in shares identified in an annexure to the trust deed, and only in the 
ratio set out therein. 
The trust deed further requires that all proceeds from the investments be 
immediately re-invested in the same shares (and in accordance with the same ratio). 
It is expressly recorded that the trustees have no discretion in the investment of the 





On the twenty-first anniversary of the trust, the trustees are to immediately 
liquidate the trust assets, pay the proceeds to the founder’s surviving issue per 
stirpes and terminate the trust.  
There is accordingly no requirement that the decisions of the trustees be 
approved by the founder, but the trustees’ powers and duties are prescriptive in 
nature, with no discretion on their part. Does this arrangement qualify as a trust? 
 
1 5 3 2  Example 2b 
This example is identical to example 2a, with the only distinction being that the 
founder retains the power to amend the trust deed and, accordingly, the power of 
investment of the trustees. 
What is the significance of this distinction? Does it compromise the validity of the 
trust? 
 
1 5 3  Example 3 
Also consider the following example. A founder establishes an inter vivos trust and 
appoints three independent trustees. The trustees are granted absolute discretion to 
invest the trust assets as they wish, to pay the income from the investments to 
nominated income beneficiaries and, upon their death, to allocate the balance to 
nominated capital beneficiaries. 
To assist the trustees, the founder furnishes them with a letter of wishes 
proposing the manner of investments to be undertaken. The letter expressly records 
that the trustees are not bound by its content. 
However, the trust deed contains a provision to the effect that the trustees’ 
remuneration is to be determined by the founder on an annual basis, and that the 
founder may dismiss a trustee in writing. 
During the currency of the trust, the founder regularly determines the trustees’ 
annual remuneration in accordance with how closely they followed the suggestions 
in the letter of wishes. On one occasion and following from the trustees’ refusal to 
follow any of the proposals in the letter of wishes, the founder dismisses the entire 
board of trustees and replaces them with three other persons. 






1 5 4  Example 4 
A founder, a successful commercial farmer, donates the family farm and farming 
enterprise to a trust. He appoints five trustees, including himself, his wife, two sons 
and his accountant. The trustees are afforded unlimited discretion in the 
management of the trust assets and the beneficiaries are the founder and his family.  
From the outset it is clear that the other trustees never question the management 
of the trust by the founder. Where resolutions are required, they all submit to his will 
in habitual deference and never bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust.  
Does the conduct of the trustees imperil the existence of the trust? 
 
1 5 5  Example 5 
Consider the following alternative. The facts are identical to those of example 4, 
except that the trustees do bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust. At first, the trustees engage in robust debate surrounding 
the management of the trust assets and the enterprise as a whole, arriving at a 
decision (not always by consensus). With the passing of time, the founder’s eldest 
son starts to play an increasingly prominent role in the management of the trust 
estate. 
In time, the position develops where the remaining trustees simply permit the 
eldest son to manage the farm and farming enterprise as he sees fit and the 
remaining trustees come to simply submit to the will of the eldest son in habitual 
deference.  
What is the effect of this gradual deterioration of trustee independence? 
 
1 5 6  Example 6 
A founder establishes a trust with the stated purpose of conducting a second-hand 
car sale business. The trustees are the founder, his business partner and an 
independent accountant. The trust deed requires that all the trustees act jointly in the 
administration of the trust. However, in reality, the accountant is never involved in the 
administration of the trust and the remaining trustees conduct the business without 





At one occasion the two trustees, purporting to act on behalf of the trust, enter into 
a sale agreement of all available trust stock with a third party. When market 
conditions change prior to delivery, it is apparent that the trust could sell the stock to 
another party at a premium. In order to profit from this state of affairs, the two 
trustees refuse to honour the first sale agreement, invoking in their defence that the 
third trustee was not a party thereto, rendering the sale agreement void. 
What remedy, if any, does the third party to the first sale agreement have? 
 
1 5 7  Example 7 
A founder establishes various trusts to house his business, property portfolio, and 
investments. He is also the sole trustee and his children are the beneficiaries. He 
fails to ensure any functional separation between the various trusts and expenses 
are often shared. The maintenance of himself and his family is funded through the 
various trusts. 
Long after the establishment of the trusts, the founder commences a business 
venture in his personal capacity. Upon the failure of this business venture, his 
personal creditors seek to execute against the trusts. Would these creditors enjoy 
any prospect of success? 
 
1 6  Overview of constituent chapters 
Including this introductory chapter and a conclusion, this dissertation is comprised of 
seven chapters. 
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the material that is examined in 
the succeeding five chapters and identifies seven practical examples that are 
considered in the chapters that follow. These examples are revisited in the 
concluding chapter when the theoretical framework developed in the preceding 
chapters is applied to the examples identified herein. 
Chapter 2 explores the trust from a historical perspective. It examines theories 
regarding its genesis and the development of the modern trust in South Africa. 
Principally, its purpose is to identify and discuss the core elements of a trust to 
enable an in-depth examination in the chapters that follow. It is intended in this 
chapter to illustrate the emphasis placed on the integrity of the trustee and the 





In so doing, Chapter 2 highlights the core elements of the trust and explores 
recurring themes such as the importance of the concept of the office of trusteeship 
and of leading judgments such as that in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 
v Parker.23 
Chapter 2, therefore, provides the necessary background against which issues of 
trustee independence may be examined in the chapters that follow. 
Chapter 3 examines the theoretical basis for the principle of trustee 
independence. This chapter identifies and contextualises two theories (or 
propositions) for the requirement of trustee independence. As explained in that 
chapter these propositions, the establishment and fiduciary propositions,24 appear 
prima facie mutually exclusive. The chapter nevertheless proceeds to examine the 
bases for these propositions and a model in terms of which they may be reconciled 
is developed. This model, the “independence duality model”, forms the primary 
foundation upon which the propositions advanced in this dissertation are built. 
Significantly, the argument is advanced that the establishment and fiduciary 
propositions, independently, are insufficient to explain the requirement for trustee 
independence, but together provide a sound theoretical basis for the independence 
duality. 
Chapters 4 and 5 develop the “independence duality model” through a further 
examination of its constituent parts – the establishment proposition (examined in 
Chapter 4) and the fiduciary proposition (examined in Chapter 5). 
The central tenet of the establishment proposition is that the capacity for trustee 
independence is a pre-requisite for the establishment of a trust. In Chapter 4, the 
question is considered whether an arrangement where the trustees have no capacity 
to exercise any independent control over the trust assets can qualify as trust. In 
connection therewith, the question is also asked what type of control is relevant in 
determining the first question. In arriving at a proposition in this regard, the “control 
test” as developed and applied in the USA is examined and discussed. 
 
23  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA).  
24 The terms “establishment proposition” and “fiduciary propositions” are entirely my own. 
However, the positions adopted by the principal advocates for each proposition 
discussed in this dissertation are in keeping with the descriptions as formulated herein 





Chapter 5 explores the fiduciary proposition. As explained in Chapter 3, this 
proposition holds that the requirement for trustees to bring an independent mind to 
bear upon the administration of the trust is rooted in the fiduciary duties of the 
trustee. Against this background, the ambit of a trustee’s fiduciary duty is examined 
and the argument is advanced that it is this duty, flowing from the office of 
trusteeship, which requires a trustee to bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust. The consequences of a trustee’s failure to live up to this 
obligation are also considered, for example where co-trustees uncritically accept the 
propositions of a dominant trustee. 
Chapter 6 applies the independence duality model, and its constituent parts of the 
establishment and fiduciary propositions, in the context of sham and abuse of trust. 
In so doing, the establishment and fiduciary propositions developed in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 are applied to the contemporary difficulty of identifying and dealing with the 
abuse of the trust form. It is submitted that these propositions provide a sound 
theoretical framework against which sham and abuse may be measured and offer 
justification for either challenging the validity of the trust or disregarding the separate 
estate thereof. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, revisits the examples identified in this chapter 
and aims to provide an answer to the questions raised thereby with reference to the 
material examined in Chapters 3 to 6.  
 
1 7  Conclusion 
The analysis in Chapter 3 describes an academic controversy surrounding the 
theoretical basis of a trustee’s duty to be, and remain, independent. In that chapter, I 
propose a model that reconciles the two primary theoretical propositions offered to 
explain this duty.  
In the chapters that follow, these propositions are further examined and, for the 
reasons advanced in Chapter 6, I regard them as bringing significant clarity to 
contemporary trust difficulties. 
This research departs from the premise that trustees have a duty to be 
independent in the administration of the trust, and that where the trust deed does not 
provide for the capacity for such independence; the existence of the trust is 





capacity to be independent, the research investigates the consequences of a 






CHAPTER 2:  THE DEFINITION, NATURE AND KEY FEATURES OF THE TRUST 
2 1  Introduction 
 
“A trust is a legal institution in which a person, the trustee, subject to public supervision, 
holds or administers property separately from his or her own, for the benefit of another 
person or persons or for a charitable or other purpose”.1 
 
The above definition, with which Cameron et al open the introductory chapter of 
the sixth edition of their influential work on trusts, accurately encapsulates the 
essence of the trust institution and forms the basis from which its further 
development is to proceed.2 
This chapter identifies and examines the core elements of a trust. In doing so, it 
explores the nature and key features of the trust institution from a historical 
perspective. An examination of the historical context from which the trust emerged 
serves to contextualise its core principles and also facilitates a meaningful 
discussion of its future development. Such a contextualisation is of particular 
significance for this study, which has as its aim the development of a theoretical 
framework explaining the requirement of trustee independence. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore partly introductory and partly aimed at 
placing readers from different disciplinary starting points – common-law lawyers, 
civil-law lawyers, and legal historians – on a common ground. Some readers may 
well therefore be familiar with parts of the material.  
Central to this common ground is an appreciation of the core elements of the trust; 
the manner in which trusts, in both common-law and civil-law traditions,3 provide 
 
1  E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6 ed (2018) 
1. 
2  See Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
3  De Waal points out that reference to the “common law” and the “civil law” as two distinct 
and separate bodies of law is not wholly uncontroversial. See MJ de Waal “In search of 
a model for the introduction of the trust into a civilian context” (2001) 12 Stell LR 63 n 3. 
For an introductory discussion of the different “legal families” of the world, see 
R Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) 63. For criticism of 
characterising the legal families of the world in this manner, see J Gordley “Common 
law und civil law: eine überholte unterscheiding” (1993) 1 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 





limited liability without incorporation; and, most significantly, the principle that 
trusteeship is to be viewed not as a purely private-law obligation, but in reality 
constitutes a quasi-public “office”. 
What appears with increasing clarity as one progresses through this research, is 
that it is this last concept, trusteeship as an office, which is central to the explanation 
of many of the trust phenomena examined herein.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa v Parker (“Land Bank v Parker”)4  in which the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(“SCA”) gave significant direction on the theoretical basis and future development of 
the trust in South Africa, and without which no discussion on trust law is complete. 
  
2 2  Early development of the trust – trusts in the common law 
Maitland famously declared that the trust was “the greatest and most distinctive 
achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence”.5 The history of 
the development of the common-law trust is interwoven with that of equity as it 
importantly came to mould itself around the concept of split ownership permitted in 
equity. Some authors have gone as far as to equate the history of trusts to that of 
equity.6  
Therefore, the theoretical underpinning of the English trust (which is the ancestor 
of the South African trust) requires a brief elucidation of the development of “equity” 
as a legal concept in England.7 
 
 
questioned whether the time has come to bid farewell to legal family classifications – 
H Kötz “Abschied von der rechtskreislehre?” (1998) 6 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privaterecht 493. See also N Garoupa & M Pargendler “A law and economics 
perspective on legal families” (2014) 7 Eur J Legal Studies 33. See also n 11 in Chapter 
1. 
4  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
5  FW Maitland “The unincorporated body” (1902) History of Economic Thought Papers, 
McMaster University Archive <https://ideas.repec.org/p/hay/hetpap/maitland1902.html> 
(accessed 23-02-2019). 
6  F Sonneveldt “The trust – an introduction” in F Sonneveldt & HL van Mens (eds) The 
Trust – Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions? (1992) 2. 
7  E Cameron as quoted from the preface of E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon 





2 2 1  The development of “equity”  
To a South African lawyer, the term “equity” may connote a principle of justice or 
fairness, and to act “equitably” would be synonymous with acting “fairly”. However, in 
the context of English law, “equity” describes a particular body of law, with distinct 
rights and remedies that developed independently from the rest of the common law.8  
The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines “equity” as: 
 
“n. 1. That part of English law originally administered by the Lord Chancellor and later 
by the Court of Chancery, as distinct from that administered by the courts of common 
law.”9 
 
Equity can be traced back to 1066 and the Norman Conquest of Britain by William 
the Conqueror. Prior to this date, there was no developed government or judiciary 
operating throughout England and instead society was organised by a system of 
“custom” applied by diverse decision-making bodies ranging from the King’s Council 
to village meetings.10  
Custom varied according to geographical location and, after the Norman 
Conquest, the Normans introduced a new system of law that was meant to be 
common to the entire realm, rather than the uneven patchwork of tribal customs that 
was applied up to that point.11  
According to Jenks, it is wrong to assume that the new common law was in effect 
Norman law transplanted.12 As part of an apparent battle for the hearts and minds of 
his new subjects, William the Conqueror promised to respect the “law of the land” 
and the customs that governed English society. However, the fragmented nature of 




8  PH Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 10 ed (2009) 3. For a history of the development 
of equity see also: RA Pearce & W Barr Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable 
Obligations 6 ed (2015) 12 and A Hudson Equity and Trusts 9 ed (2017) 12. 
9  EA Martin The Oxford Dictionary of Law 5 ed (2002) 178. 
10  Pearce & Barr Trusts 4. 
11  Hudson Equity 13.  
12  E Jenks A Short History of English Law from the Earliest Times to the End of the Year 





“Whatever else the Norman Conquest may or may not have done, it made the old 
haphazard state of legal affairs forever impossible. The natural desire of the conquerors 
to make the most of their new acquisition, the exceptional administrative and clerkly skill 
of the Normans, the introduction of Continental politics, the rapid growth of the country in 
wealth and civilization, soon proved the old customs to be inadequate. For some time, no 
one could tell what was going to take their place. In the end, there emerged a new 
national law; some of it based on immemorial native usage, some of it unconsciously 
imported from foreign literature, not a little imposed by the sheer command of a new and 
immensely stronger central government. The precise share attributable to each of these 
sources will, probably, never be ascertained.”13 
 
The focus of this new common law was the Curia Regis, or King’s Court, 
reinforcing the notion that justice was the prerogative of the Crown. During the 
1180’s, Sir Ranulf de Glanville wrote a treatise on the workings of the King’s Court 
and produced “a coherent system of English law deriving ultimate authority from the 
King”.14  
In its early development, common-law judges had a wide discretion to do justice, 
and there was little need for a jurisdiction to remedy defects in the common law.15 
The discretion common-law judges enjoyed to serve justice was especially 
pronounced in the informal procedure characterised by informal “plaints” or “bills”, 
also referred to as “querelae”16 (as opposed to proceedings commenced by writ), in 
the General Eyre.17 The General Eyre was a form of circuit court that visited various 
counties between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to administer justice. 
These justices have been described as “the first men to begin to forge a law 
common to all England”.18  Visits by the justices of the General Eyre decreased 
during the thirteenth century as the functions performed by those courts were 
increasingly undertaken by other institutions. In 1294, on the eve of the outbreak of 
 
13  17. 
14  Baker JH An Introduction to English Legal History 2 ed (1979) 12, quoted by Pearce & 
Barr Trusts 13. 
15  Pettit Equity 2. 
16  From “querela” – a “complaint”; DA Simpson Cassell’s New Latin-English English-Latin 
Dictionary (1973) 495. For a general discussion of the nature of the plaints and bills, see 
C Burt “The demise of the General Eyre in the reign of Edward I” (2005) 120 The 
English Historical Review 1. 
17  Pettit Equity 2.  






war with France, the General Eyre was suspended indefinitely, never to be revived 
on a national scale again.19 
The Courts of Common Law, Common Pleas, Exchequer and King’s Bench had 
by 1234 evolved from the Curia Regis to become the de facto administrators of 
justice.20 In these courts, a plaintiff seeking to commence action needed to obtain a 
royal writ authorising the commencement of proceedings, as opposed to 
commencing proceedings by querelae. Writs were purchased from the King’s 
Chancery and plaintiffs could procure new writs in order to redress novel legal 
problems leading to further development of the common law. The development of 
the common law in this manner was brought to an abrupt halt in 1258 with the 
proclamation of The Provisions of Oxford, which prevented the issue of new writs 
without the express permission of the King’s Council. The effect of these provisions 
was to confine plaintiffs to only bringing cases within the terms of the existing writs.21 
In so doing, the common law’s ability to develop effective redress for new types of 
cases was effectively hamstrung, resulting in it becoming stultified and inflexible.22 It 
was this “straightjacketing of the common law” 23  and the, as yet unexplained, 
disappearance of plaints without writ that gave rise to equity as a branch of the law.24  
Notwithstanding the fact that remedies available under common law were 
confined to pre-existing writs, and that the common-law courts had become separate 
from the Curia Regis, it was still recognised that a residuum of justice vested in the 
King. Accordingly, any person who failed to obtain justice in the common-law courts 
could approach the King for a remedy. 25  These remedies were based on what 
appeared to be equitable in the prevailing circumstances of each case. From early 
on the authority to provide equitable remedies where the common law failed was 
 
19  Attempts to revive the General Eyre were considered and a commission, the Trailbaston 
commission, was established to assist in the re-establishment of the General Eyre. See 
Burt (2005) The English Historical Review 12. It is generally recognised that attempts at 
re-establishment were unsuccessful and that by the fourteenth century the General Eyre 
had ceased to be held. See, Pettit Equity 3. 
20  Pearce & Barr Trusts 4. 
21  4. 
22  Pettit Equity 3. 
23  3. 
24  Pearce & Barr Trusts 4. 





conferred upon the Lord Chancellor.26 As the practice of petitioning the Chancellor 
became more frequent, the Chancellor and his office, the Chancery, inevitably 
acquired the characteristics of a court.27  
The Chancellor dealt with cases on a more flexible basis and was more 
concerned with a fair result than with the rigid principles of law. The law pronounced 
by the Chancellor came to be known as “equity” and was intended to mitigate “the 
rigour of the common law”. 28  Hudson explains that the courts of equity did not 
necessarily concern themselves with strict legal rules, but instead focussed on 
inquiring into the defendant’s conscience. He cites the example of Chief Justice 
Fortescue who, in 1452, declared that: “We are to argue conscience here, not the 
law”.29 This resulted in two parallel judicial systems administered by separate courts 
and an inevitable struggle for dominance. 
The Lord Chancellor’s flexible approach caused concern among judges of the 
common-law courts. These concerns led Selden to proclaim that: 
 
“Equity is a roguish thing. For [common] law we have a measure … equity is [decided] 
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is longer or narrower, 
so is equity. ‘Tiss all one as if they should make the standard for the measure a 
Chancellor’s foot.”30 
 
Selden’s joke mirrored contemporary criticism that the measure of equity 
depended on the identity of the Lord Chancellor. Hudson explains this variable 
approach adopted by different Lord Chancellors on the basis that they were, first and 
foremost, politicians:  
 
 
26  Petitions addressed to the “Chancellor and the Council” are to be found as early as the 
reign of Edward I and accordingly coincide with the demise of the General Eyre – see 
Pettit Equity 1. 
27  2. 
28  Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1 per Lord Ellesmere LC: “to soften and mollify 
the extremity of the law”; Lord Dudley v Lady Dudley (1705) Prec Ch 241 244 per Lord 
Cowper: “Equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue which qualifies, moderates and 
reforms the rigour, hardness and edge of the law”. 
29  Hudson Equity 13. Hudson explains that he meant that the role of courts of equity at the 
time was to reach a morally correct result, without being concerned with precedent. 





“In truth, before Robert Walpole became the first Prime Minister in 1741, it was the Lord 
Chancellor who would have been considered the ‘prime minister’ to the Crown.”31 
 
With time, general equitable principles emerged and its jurisdiction, once flexible, 
had ossified into a body of precedent with fixed principles.32 The development of 
equity as a parallel judicial system intensified the friction with proponents of the 
common-law judicial system. This struggle came to a head during the reign of 
James I when the primacy of equity was confirmed. During this time it had become a 
feature of chancery courts to order so-called “common injunctions” ordering a party 
to a common-law dispute to either restrain his action, or to prevent the enforcement 
of a judgment obtained though the common-law courts. Refusal to obey these 
injunctions was regarded as contempt of court, attracting the threat of 
imprisonment.33  
The “common injunctions” therefore represented a real threat to the jurisdiction of 
the common-law courts, which adopted the approach that imprisonment for 
disobedience thereof was unlawful and ordered the release of those affected. The 
ensuing jurisdictional war was settled in 1616, when James I issued an order in 
favour of the chancery courts and the common injunctions. 
This order signalled the irreversible ascendancy of equity over common law and, 
notwithstanding attempts to reverse the trend, 34  the superiority of the chancery 
courts was well established by the end of the seventeenth century.35 
The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 reaffirmed the primacy of equity. These 
acts effected a restructuring of the English court system in terms of which the 
common-law courts and chancery courts were consolidated and merged to form a 
single “Supreme Court of Judicature”. A central feature of the reform was that all the 
courts of the Supreme Court of Judicature, irrespective of their history, were to have 
both common-law and equity jurisdiction.36 The Judicature Acts not only did away 
 
31  Hudson Equity 14. 
32  Martin Dictionary of Law 179. 
33  Pearce & Barr Trusts 6. 
34  For example, a bill introduced in the House of Lords in 1690 to restrain the courts of 
equity from exercising jurisdiction over disputes for which a remedy in common law was 
available was defeated. See Pearce & Barr Trusts 7 n 9. 
35  7. 





with the power to grant common injunctions, but also affirmed the supremacy of 
equity over the common law. In this regard, section 25 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act of 1873 provided that: 
 
“Generally, in all matters not hereinbefore particularly mentioned in which there is any 
conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law with 
reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.”37 
 
In that manner, equity was enshrined as “regulating the conscience of a person 
where the common law might otherwise allow that person to act unconscionably”.38 
This principle was re-asserted in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC39 where Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that: 
  
“Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a 
trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which 
the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him 
by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trusts).”40 
 
It is against this backdrop of equity as the conscience of a defendant and 
counterweight to the rigour of the common law that the birth of the trust institution in 
England must be viewed.  
 
2 2 2  The development of the “use”  
Understanding the development of the trust requires a basic understanding of the 
feudal system of landowning that prevailed in England during the medieval period.  
Since all land was owned by the King, individuals were granted “tenure” over land 
by a landlord, who in turn would enjoy tenure from another landlord. This gave rise to 
a tenurial system of tiered landholding – a pyramid of tenure with the King at its 
apex.41 This system resulted in reciprocal obligations between landlord and tenant. 
For example, a tenant would be required to perform some service for or on behalf of 
 
37  16. 
38  9. 
39  [1996] 2 All ER 961. 
40  988. 





his lord, who in turn owed the tenant enjoyment of the tenement as long as the 
service was maintained.42 
While tenure determined the terms under which land was held, the parallel 
“doctrine of estates” determined the duration for which a grant of tenure was to last.43 
An estate in fee simple, for example, was a grant of tenure in perpetuity, 44 and within 
the feudal structure the right to tenure of land in fee simple was tantamount to 
absolute ownership. Akkermans explains as follows:  
 
“This most extensive entitlement [in the estate in fee simple] is meant both in time and 
space. A holder of a fee simple is allowed to exercise his right to possession forever and, 
in principle, exclusively. The term ‘fee’ refers to the feudal grant, which is the origin of this 
estate. The term ‘simple’ refers to the fact that the estate will pass to the heirs of the 
holder, not of any particular category, as was the case with a fee tail or estate in tail.”45 
 
Upon the death of a tenant, the person who succeeded to the tenure (and 
acceded to the relevant position on the feudal ladder) was required to make payment 
to the direct landlord. These inheritance taxes, termed “feudal incidents”, provided a 
significant source of revenue for the feudal system and, ultimately, for the Crown.  
It is within this feudal context of landholding that the trust developed, but the 
precise origin of the trust remains unclear.46  
What is clear is that the trust developed from the earlier “use”; an arrangement in 
terms of which property was transferred to a person, for the use of another. Hudson 
points to an account that places the source of the use in the Middle East and the 
emergence of the “waqf”. The latter is a device used within Muslim communities to 
provide for property to be held by one family member for the benefit of other family 
 
42  These services may have included agricultural services, religious services, or the 
provision of military support. 
43  See Pearce & Barr Trusts 14 n 36 and the reference to Walsingham’s Case (1579) 2 
Plowd 547 555: 
“the land itself is one thing, and an estate in the land is another thing, for an estate in the 
land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and there are diversities of estates, which 
are not more than diversities of time …” 
44  Pearce & Barr Trusts 14. An estate in fee simple is to be distinguished from a “fee tail” 
(or “entailed interests”) which was only meant to endure for as long as the grantee had 
lineal descendants, and a “life interest”, which was to last only for the grantee’s lifetime.  
45  B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 346. 





members.47 The wafq is an unincorporated charitable trust and was developed to 
accommodate Islamic restrictions on the passage of property to heirs.48 
It has been suggested that in the twelfth century, Christian noblemen may have 
encountered the waqf while away on crusades 49  and brought the idea back to 
Europe.50 Upon returning to the front, such a knight would transfer his land to a 
trusted friend who would administer the land in his absence.51 The instruction was 
usually to transfer the land back upon the knight’s return, and failing such return, to 
transfer the land on to an identified beneficiary.52 
There are, however, other theories for the development of the use.53  
The first is that the use developed from the Roman fideicommissum, introduced to 
ameliorate the inflexibility of the ius civile, which prohibited certain persons from 
being named beneficiaries under a will.54 Through the fideicommissum, a testator 
could entrust property to another to be conveyed to a person that would otherwise 
have been appointed as a legatee, were it not for the prohibition. Albertus points to 
the example where a testator would, in view of a prohibition on making bequests to 
non-Romans, bequeath property to an individual who was capable of receiving it, 
with the request that the property be delivered to the named beneficiary, that is, the 
non-Roman.55 In this manner, property could be made over to one person, who 
would be obliged to deliver it to the ultimate beneficiary. 
 
47  Hudson Equity 38. See also H Lim “The waqf in trust” in S Scott-Hunt & H Lim (eds) 
Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (2001) 47. 
48  L Albertus “Comparing the waqf and the South African trust” (2014) Acta Juridica 268. 
Cameron et al Honoré 19, n 122. 
49  A controversial term, but one that historians nevertheless still use to describe this 
particular conflict. See J Theron & E Oliver “Changing perspectives on the Crusades” 
(2018) 74 Herv Teol Stud 12. 
50  J Garton Moffat’s Trust Law 6 ed (2015) 36. See also A Avini “The origins of the modern 
English trust revisited” (1996) 70 Tul LR 1139; S Herman “Utilitas ecclesiae: the 
Canonical conception of the trust” (1996) 70 Tul LR 2239. 
51  MM Corbett “Trust law in the 90s: challenges and change” (1993) 56 THRHR 262. 
52  MJ de Waal “The core elements of the trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South 
African trusts compared” (2000) 117 SALJ 548 553. 
53  For an insightful discussion on the differing theories for the development of the use, see 
F du Toit, B Smith & A van der Linde Fundamentals of South African Trust Law (2019) 
17. 
54  18. 





Another theory is that the use developed from the Treuhand, a Germanic 
institution of the Lex Salica, the civil code of the Salian Franks dating from the fifth 
century.56 The Treuhand permitted a third party, the salman (or “saalman”), to act as 
an intermediary in property transfers to third party beneficiaries. In terms thereof, 
property was made over to the salman, with the obligation to deliver it to a 
designated beneficiary upon the death of the initial transferor. 57  This theory is 
buoyed by proof that elements of Salic law were introduced into England through the 
Norman conquests.58 
This also appears to be the theory preferred by the South African Appellate 
Division, which declared in Braun v Blann & Botha NNO (“Braun”)59 that: 
 
“Uses and trusts were introduced into England shortly after the Norman conquest. The 
trust was developed by the English Court of Chancery from the Germanic Salman or 
Treuhand institution rather than from the Roman fideicommissum or other juridical 
institutions of Roman law.”60 
 
A further theory proposes that the use developed from a combination of Roman 
and German influences. In this sense, it has been suggested that the word “use” 
derives from the Latin word “opus”. “Opus” was encountered in England during the 
ninth century and can be traced to the records of early Germanic tribes such as the 
Franks and the Lombards.61 It has been proposed that medieval Franciscan friars 
employed the phrase “ad opus” to describe an arrangement which permitted them 
the use of property held by others, eventually culminating in the trust.62  
 
56  Du Toit et al Fundamentals 18.  
57  18. 
58  18. 
59  1984 2 SA 850 (A). 
60  859A. 
61  Du Toit et al Fundamentals 18.  





A further theory still is that the use has no continental ancestor and was simply an 
invention of the English courts of chancery to give effect to the maxim that “equity 
acts on the conscience” and is designed to temper the rigours of the common law.63 
The debate on whether the use descends from the Islamic waqf, the Roman 
fideicommissum, the Germanic Treuhand, or was an original development of English 
equity, may well remain unsettled. However, perhaps the value of this debate lies not 
in the ultimate unmasking of the use’s forefathers, but in the illustration that the 
desire to develop an institution “to protect the weak and to safeguard the interests of 
those who are absent”64 is a universal human need that transcends cultural divisions.  
 
2 2 3  From “use” to “trust”  
Whatever the historical roots of the use, it found expression in the chancery courts. 
In its most simple form, it was a structure in terms of which X would convey land to Y 
“for the use” of Z. In this example, Y was termed the “feoffee”65 (or “feoffee to use”) 
and Z the “cestui que use”.66 The common law courts did not recognise this “use” of 
land and regarded the feoffee, in whom the legal title was vested, as the absolute 
owner.67 
However, the chancery courts, rooted in equity, were prepared to enforce the use, 
requiring the feoffee to administer the property vested in him for the benefit of the 
cestui que use. The effect of this recognition was that, while Y became the owner of 
the land, he was compelled to apply it for the benefit of Z and was prevented from 
 
63  274, Smith proclaimed: “Though the English do not lay exclusive claim to having 
discovered God, they do claim to have invented the trust with two natures in one.” 
TB Smith (ed) International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (1976) 6 ch 2 para 262. 
64  T Honoré “Trusts” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 849, endorsed in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 19. 
65  From “fief” – “n. land held under feudal system or in fee; one’s sphere of operation or 
control” W Brandford (ed) The South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1987) 276. 
66  A shortened version of “cestui a que use le feoffment fuit fait” translated as “the person 
for whose use the feoffment was made”. See, Anonymous “Definitions for Cestui que” 
(2019) Definitions <https://www.definitions.net/definition/Cestui%20que> (accessed 07-
03-2019). 





treating it as his own.68 The use therefore shared an important central characteristic 
with the modern trust, namely that control over the property was separated from the 
right to enjoy the benefits arising therefrom.  
Initially the rights of the cestui que use were treated as a personal claim against 
the feoffee to use,69 with the property rights in question vesting in the feoffee.70 The 
recurring theme in equity that a conscientious obligation takes priority over a strict 
legal right gave rise to the recognition that the cestui que use’s right to compel 
compliance by the feoffee “constitutes an equitable estate in the property”.71 This 
recognition of proprietary rights in the hands of the cestui que use72 necessitated the 
recognition of a duality of ownership, or “double dominium”, with a distinction drawn 
between “legal” and “beneficial” ownership. Some English lawyers regarded this 
distinction in title as “the essential nature of the trust device”.73 
The use proved a popular mechanism for making over gifts to charities that were 
unable to own property. For example, as mentioned above,74 in the thirteenth century 
Franciscan friars, who were bound by an oath of poverty and thus unable to own any 
land, established monasteries in England. Owing to their inability to own land, a 
wealthy benefactor would transfer property to the local borough community for “the 
use of” the friars.75 Though technically the friars would not own the property, they 
were entitled to derive the benefit from such ownership. 
Another advantage (and presumably the driving force behind the popularity of the 
use) was that a landlord could avoid the strict rules of inheritance and feudal dues 
through the mechanism offered by the use. If land was vested in a group of feoffees, 
who would never die as a group, the legal title would never have to pass to a 
successor and feudal incidents payable on inheritance could be avoided altogether.76  
 
68  Pearce & Barr Equity 14. 
69  De Waal (2000) SALJ 553. 
70  Pearce & Barr Equity 23. 
71  Re: Transphere (Pty) Ltd 1986 5 NSWLR 309 311E-F. 
72  Gray & Gray Land Law 76.  
73  GL Gretton “Trusts without equity” (2000) 49 Int Com LQ 599 604. See also Saunders v 
Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115; Re Bowes (1896) 1 Ch 507; Baker v Archer-Shee 1927 AC 
844. 
74  See the text to n 61 above. 
75  Corbett (1993) THRHR 262. 





The widespread popularity of the use, and its subsequent ill effects on the royal 
treasury, resulted in the passing of the Statute of Uses in 1535 intended to put an 
end to uses.77 In cases where this statute applied, uses were “executed” by depriving 
the feoffees of their legal interest in the land and transferring such interest to the 
cestui que use in addition to the already held equitable interest. In this manner, the 
full ownership in the property was vested in the cestui que use.78 
The trust form was saved from extinction through the ingenuity of lawyers who 
found ways to circumvent the Statute of Uses. That statute did not apply to a use 
where the feoffee had active duties to perform, such as the collection and distribution 
of profits or the management of an estate. The use form could also be saved through 
the creation of a “double use”, termed a “use upon use”. In terms of this construction, 
land would be conveyed to “X, to the use of Y, to the use of Z”.79 The first use, in 
respect of which land was conveyed to X was executed, vesting the entirety of the 
property rights in Y, but the obligation of Y to hold the property for Z was recognised 
by the chancery courts. This second use was termed a “trust” to distinguish it from 
the first and formed the basis of the modern terminology.80 
The “use upon a use” developed into an important social tool that went further 
than merely the avoidance of taxes. For example, during the latter part of the 
sixteenth century the trust was employed to protect estates from spendthrift sons 
and to enable married women to enjoy property independently of their husbands.81 In 
this manner, the social utility of the trust institution emerged. 
 
 
77  De Waal (2000) SALJ 553. There appears to be some debate about whether the Statute 
of Uses intended to put an end to the use. Albertus argues that the aim of the statute 
was merely to remove the division between legal and equitable ownership: Albertus 
(2014) Acta Juridica 270. Irrespective of the intention of the statute, it is uncontroversial 
to state that it severely restricted the use.  
78  Garton Moffat (2018) 41. 
79  See also Garton Moffat 42 for a discussion of the revival of the trust through the employ 
of a “use upon a use”. 
80  Pearce & Barr Trusts 15; Akkermans Numerus Clausus 340. 





2 3  Trusts in a civilian context 
The distinguishing feature of the common-law trust, the splitting of ownership 
between legal and beneficial ownership,82 is a product of equity. This distinction is 
unknown in jurisdictions based on civilian principles of property law.  
However, this does not mean that the trust institution is incompatible with such 
systems. In two jurisdictions with civilian roots, in particular that of Scotland and 
South Africa, trusts have not only developed or been received, but have flourished.  
 
2 3 1  Scotland 
The exact origins of the trust in Scots law are uncertain.83 What is clear is that the 
Scottish trust does not comply with the split-ownership concept central to the English 
trust.84  
This is because the principle of duality of ownership is not present in a mixed 
jurisdiction such as that of Scotland where the law of property is founded upon 
civilian principles.85 In Scotland and, as is discussed below, South Africa, the trustee 
holds absolute title over the trust property and the beneficiary only has a personal 
right against the trustee for the due fulfilment of his obligations.86  
Gretton argues that the influence of the English trust in Scotland was minimal, and 
submits that it is entirely conceivable that the trust developed independently in 
Scotland.87 In support of this submission, he points out that trust-like institutions 
existed in Scotland well before the seventeenth century. These arrangements were 
 
82  Described as the “essence of the trust” by the Privy Council in Abdul Hameed Sitti 
Kadija v Da Saram [1946] 208 (Ceylon) 217, where it quoted with approval RW Lee 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 3 ed (1931) 372. 
83  GL Gretton “Trusts” in K Reid and R Zimmerman (eds) A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (2000) 1 480. 
84  Gretton (2000) Int Com LQ 619. 
85  A mixed jurisdiction has been described as one resulting from the “fusion of the two 
great legal traditions of Europe, of the civil and the common law ...”: see K Reid 
“National report for Scotland” in DJ Hayton, SCJJ Kortmann & HLE Verhagen (eds) 
Principles of European Trust Law (1999) 67. In both the cases of Scotland and South 
Africa, the law of property was born out of civilian principles, accounting for the rejection 
of the law/equity divide. 
86  De Waal (2000) SALJ 554. 





based on a concept akin to that of depositum, with the noted exception that not only 
possession, but also ownership, passed to the depositee.88 Where the depositee 
was also instructed to deal with the property in a particular manner, aspects of 
mandatum entered the fray. In this regard, Gretton points out that seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth century commentators described the Scottish trust as 
based on principles of depositum and mandatum.89 The fact that these institutional 
writers attempt to explain the Scottish trust on the basis of civilian principles as 
opposed to the, by then well known, common-law principles of duality in ownership 
is, for Gretton, indicative of the fact that the Scottish trust was not merely an English 
import.90 
However, it is the inability of civil-law jurisdictions to conceptualise the trust on the 
basis of equity’s principle of dual ownership that has led to severe criticism from 
common-law circles as to the authenticity of the civilian trust.91 Of particular concern 
to common-law lawyers is the fact that, not possessing rights in rem in the trust 
property, beneficiaries are particularly susceptible to the possible insolvency of a 
trustee. The concern is based upon the assumption that owing to the fact that the 
trust property only vests in the trustee, the trustee’s creditors will be able to lay claim 
upon such property flowing from obligations that do not bear any relation to the 
administration of the trust.92 
Gretton has convincingly shown that this concern is no bar to accepting the civil-
law trust as a “proper trust”.93 He points to the research of the French academic, 
Pierre Lepaulle, 94  who illustrated that the civilian tradition has always had 
 
88  489. 
89  These include Stair, Erskine and Bankton. See Gretton “Trusts” in Private Law in 
Scotland 489. 
90  Gretton “Trusts” in Private Law in Scotland 480 489:  
“The significance of the characterization, in Stair and other writers, of trust as being a 
combination of mandate and deposit is that it lends support to the view that trust cannot 
be regarded simply as a seventeenth-century import from England. There is a continuity 
going back before 1600.” 
91  See DJ Hayton “Trusts” in DJ Hayton, SCJJ Kortman, AJM Nuytinck, AVM Struycken & 
NED Faber (eds) Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements (1996) 3; 
Gretton (2000) Int Comp LQ 600 and the commentaries discussed there. 
92  Gretton (2000) Int Comp LQ 600. 
93  610 n 61. 





appropriate concepts to protect the interests of beneficiaries without being required 
to adopt the principle of dual ownership that developed from equity. Referring to the 
Digest, Gretton highlights that the principle of patrimony (or patrimonium) was not 
only familiar in Roman law but also allowed for an individual to have more than one 
estate. 
The concept of “patrimony” is well known in South African law, albeit under the 
style “estate”, and denotes the totality of a person’s assets and liabilities.95 Gretton 
shows how Lepaulle, using the concept of patrimonies (or estates) and the 
appreciation that one person can have more than one estate, developed a theory 
which could support the existence of the trust in a civilian context.96 According to this 
theory, each person has one, private, estate. However, where a person has been 
appointed as trustee a second, special, estate distinct and separate of the first arises 
– the trust estate.97 In this manner, the assets in the trust estate are segregated from 
the trustee’s personal estate. 
For Gretton, the key to understanding the civilian trust lies in the above concept 
which he explains as follows: 
 
“Thus the assets of the special patrimony are segregated from the general patrimony, and 
to some extent the civilian tradition has likewise accepted segregation of liabilities also. 
Real subrogation is the key to the doctrine of patrimony, and patrimony is the key to trust. 
In other words, a trust is a special patrimony.”98 
 
In instances with multiple trustees, the trustees are joint owners of the special 
trust estate.99 The specific type of joint ownership at hand, joint tenancy, accounts for 
what has been referred to as the “elastic” nature of ownership in trust property, as 
the removal of one trustee does not give rise to any formal or express transfer of 
ownership.100 
 
95  608. 
96  Gretton (2000) Int Comp LQ 610; De Waal (2000) SALJ 560. 
97  De Waal (2000) SALJ 560. 
98  Gretton (2000) Int Comp LQ 610. 
99  611. 
100  MJ de Waal “The strange path of trust property at a trustee’s death: theory and practice 
in the law of trusts” (2009) TSAR 84 91. For a discussion on this type of ownership, see 





The distinguishing feature of the Scottish trust (compared to the English trust) is 
therefore that the whole of the ownership in the trust assets vests in the trustees, 
albeit that it is held in a different, separate, estate. The beneficiaries, therefore, only 
have personal rights against the trustees for the proper administration of the trust. 
The point that deserves emphasis is that holding the trust assets in a special estate 
protects the trust from the claims of the trustee’s private creditors who are confined 
to satisfying their claims from the trustee’s personal estate. 
By necessary implication, the inverse position also holds true. A trustee’s personal 
estate is also isolated and protected from claims by the trust’s creditors who are 
confined to seek redress from the trust estate. In this manner, trusts provide the 
effect of limited liability also achieved through the incorporation of a separate juristic 
entity, with the notable distinction that a trust is not a juristic person.101 It is the abuse 
of this feature that forms the basis of the discussions in Chapter 6.102 
It is therefore clear that the principle of duality of patrimonies (or estates) is as 
central to the understanding of the civilian trust as the principle of split ownership is 
to the understanding of the common-law trust. 
 
2 3 2  South Africa  
The South African trust and its Scottish counterpart have been described as 
illegitimate siblings, but the origin of these two trusts is entirely dissimilar.103 While it 
has been argued that the Scottish trust developed independently from its English 
counterpart,104 there can be little doubt that the first trust to arrive on South African 
shores was an English trust.105  
During the early nineteenth century, English settlers and officials brought the trust 
to South Africa “as part of their legal and intellectual baggage”.106 The trust was 
imported into South African civilian life by the use of the words “trust” and “trustee” in 
 
101  See, BS Smith “Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on ‘veil’ 
piercing’ and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial 
property – Part One” (2016) 41 JJS 68 69. 
102  See part 6 4 of Chapter 6. 
103  E Cameron “Constructive trusts in South African law: the legacy refused” (1999) 3 
Edinburgh LR 341. 
104  Gretton “Trusts” in Private Law in Scotland 485. 
105  Cameron (1999) Edinburgh LR 348. Cameron et al Honoré 26. 





wills, deeds of gift, ante-nuptial contracts, and land transfers executed by these 
English settlers and officials. For nearly a century, the English trust was left to 
permeate through South African society, with its civil-law underpinnings, and only in 
1915 were the courts for the first time called upon to decide whether the trust formed 
part of South African law, and if so, upon what basis.107 
In Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee (“Kemp”)108 the then Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court was confronted by a will drafted by an English lawyer and 
expressed in English phraseology. In the will, the testator bequeathed the residue of 
his estate to trustees of various trusts, established for this purpose.109 A beneficiary 
to one such trust had died as an unrehabilitated insolvent and the question was 
whether her trustee in insolvency could lay claim upon her interest in the trust 
estate.110 
The matter turned upon the nature of the beneficiary’s right in the trust property. 
Significantly, Innes CJ held that the English law of trusts did not form part of South 
African law and that the dichotomy of split ownership was accordingly similarly 
foreign to South African law. This, however, did not mean that “testamentary 
dispositions couched in the form of trusts cannot be given full effect to in terms of our 
own [South African] law”.111 
The court held that the trust could be accommodated through the civil-law 
fideicommissum, and in particular the fideicommissum purum.112 The significance of 
holding that the arrangement created in the will was that of a fideicommissum was 
that the beneficiaries did not have any rights in rem in relation to the trust property, 
but their rights were confined to personal rights against the trustee. 
The view that a South African trust was a form of fideicommissum prevailed until 
1984, when the Appellate Division reconsidered the nature of the South African trust 
in Braun.113  
 
107  Corbett (1993) THRHR 262.  
108  1915 AD 491 498-506. 
109  Cameron et al Honoré 15. 
110  Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 493.   
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112  502.  





That matter concerned a testamentary trust in terms of which the trustees were 
afforded discretionary powers of appointment to select the income and capital 
beneficiaries from a designated group.114  The appellant, the testatrix’s daughter, 
challenged the validity of the trust on the ground that the conferment of discretionary 
powers of appointment on the trustees was invalid and unenforceable in law. 
Consequently, the appellant contended that the portion of the testatrix’s estate 
earmarked for the trust, was to devolve in terms of the rules of intestacy.115 
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that South African law did not permit the 
conferment of such discretionary powers on trustees who have no interest in the 
trust property on account of Roman law requiring testators to execute their wills 
personally.116 This matter therefore provided an opportunity to re-examine the nature 
of trusts in South African law.  
The court again acknowledged the existence in South Africa of the trust institution, 
but held that it was both historically and jurisprudentially wrong to identify the trust 
with the fideicommissum.117 Instead, the trust was described as “a legal institution 
sui generis”.118 Crucially, the court re-asserted that the dichotomy of dual ownership 
remained foreign to South African law and that beneficiaries only have personal 
rights against the trustee for the due fulfilment of their trust obligations.119 The court 
expressed itself as follows: 
 
“the English law of trusts with its dichotomy of legal and equitable ownership (or ‘dual 
ownership’ according to the American law of trusts) was not received into our law. The 
English conception of an equitable ownership distinct from, but co-existing with, the legal 
ownership is foreign to our law. Our Courts have evolved and are still in the process of 
 
114  856E. 
115  855C. 
116  856G. 
117  866B and 859B-C where the court expressed itself as follows:  
“Admittedly, many of the functions which the fideicommissum, either by itself or in 
conjunction with other devices of the Roman law, performed, could have been 
performed by the trust had the latter been known to the Romans, but the fact remains 
that historically and jurisprudentially the fideicommissum and the trust are separate and 
distinct legal institutions, each of them having its own set of legal rules.” 
118  859. 





evolving our own law of trusts by adapting the trust idea to the principles of our own 
law.”120  
 
The court ultimately held that the conferment of discretionary powers to select 
beneficiaries was permissible, and the appeal accordingly failed.121 
The Kemp122 and Braun123 cases dealt only with testamentary trusts and it is clear 
that as far as these trusts are concerned, the South African trust is a sui generis 
institution that is evolving on the basis of civilian legal principles. 
In relation to inter vivos trusts, South African courts have held in a series of 
judgments that such trusts are based on the civilian basis of the stipulatio alteri (a 
contract for the benefit of a third party).124 In this manner, the principle that the rights 
of trust beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust are also merely personal in nature was 
confirmed. 
Despite the differing histories of the South African and Scottish trusts, both 
jurisdictions refused to adopt the dichotomy of split ownership central to the English 
trust and instead opted to conceptualise the trust institution on the basis of the 
civilian underpinnings of their respective laws of property. The South African trust 
has therefore also adopted the principle of dual patrimonies vital to the Scottish trust, 
which serves to protect trust beneficiaries from the trustee’s personal creditors.125 
However, a comparison between Scots and South African law reveals one 
noticeable difference: Scots law requires, as a fundamental principle, that the trustee 
be the owner of the trust estate – there can be no other possibility.126 South African 
law also recognises the “bewind trust” where the trust estate is made over to the 
 
120  859F-G (emphasis added). 
121  866F-867F. The court, however, held that one of the provisions of the will, empowering 
the trustees to appoint capital beneficiaries, was invalid. Nevertheless, this invalidity did 
not stem from the power to appoint or select capital beneficiaries, but to establish further 
trusts in the event of a deceased beneficiary being survived by lawful issue. This was 
judged to amount to an impermissible delegation of will-making power: 867B-F. 
122  1915 AD 491. 
123  1984 2 SA 850 (A). 
124  Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656; Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Smollen’s Estate 1955 3 SA 266 (A) and Crookes NO v Watson 1956 
1 SA 277 (A). 
125  De Waal (2000) SALJ 561.  





beneficiaries with the caveat that control is placed in the hands of another, the 
trustee, who is required to administer the estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries.127  
The recognition of the bewind trust was not uncontroversial. The bewind trust was 
derived from Dutch law relating to administration and was introduced by Afrikaner 
settlers and practitioners.128 Honoré specifically recognised the bewind as a trust in 
the first edition of his book on trusts,129 which attracted an “angrily propounded” 
rejection by CP Joubert, later Judge of Appeal in the Appellate Division and the 
author of the judgment in Braun.130 Joubert referred to Honoré’s views regarding 
ownership of trust property as “verbysterend” (perplexing) and “kettery” (heresy).131 
Ultimately Honoré’s views prevailed and this form of trust, which has received 
legislative recognition in the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (“TPCA”), 
underscores an important principle – that “control by the trustee/administrator rather 
than ownership is the essential feature of a trust”.132  
 
 
127  Cameron et al Honoré 10. 
128  T Honoré “On fitting trusts into civil law jurisdictions” in Oxford 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2008 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270179> (accessed 04-08-
2019). 
129  AM Honoré The South African Law of Trusts (1966). 
130  E Cameron “Preface” to Cameron et al Honoré vii. CP Joubert “’n Kritiese opvatting van 
Honoré se beskouings oor die trustreg” (1968) 31 THRHR 124 and CP Joubert “Honoré 
se opvatting oor ons trustsreg” (1968) 31 THRHR 262. 
131  Joubert (1968) THRHR 131; MJ de Waal “Honoré’s South African law of trusts” in D 
Visser & M Loubser (eds) Thinking about Law: Essays for Tony Honoré (2011) 38 42.  
132  T Honoré & E Cameron Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 4 ed (1992) 4. The 
specific quotation above has been omitted from the fifth and sixth editions of this work, 
by its subsequent authors. However, the principle that it is the control over the assets 
that is the essential feature of the trust is explicitly endorsed. See Cameron et al Honoré 
(2002) 7 and Cameron et al Honoré (2018) 8. Erasmus, in his review of the third edition 
of Honoré’s book expressed Honoré’s influence as follows: 
 “From the outset, in the first edition, he stressed that the trustee or administrator in 
South African law need not be the owner, clothed with a bare legal title, of the trust 
assets. This viewpoint has at times elicited strong criticism but, in the end, the historical, 
jurisprudential and comparative analysis which underlies this conclusion is perhaps 
Honoré’s greatest achievement and most important contribution.” HJ Erasmus (1985) 





2 4  The core elements of a trust 
The existence, and flourishing, of South African and Scottish trusts disprove the 
contention that split ownership is a pre-requisite for the establishment of a trust. The 
principle of dual patrimony (or estates) has proven equally adept at protecting trust 
beneficiaries from the claims of creditors of the trustee’s personal estate. 
Against this background, De Waal attempted to identify the core elements of the 
trust and arrived, after a comparative analysis of the English, Scottish and South 
African trusts, at four core elements that must be present in order for an 
arrangement to qualify as a trust. These are: (i) the fiduciary position of the trustee; 
(ii) separation of estates; (iii) real subrogation; and (iv) trusteeship as an office. 
These core elements underscore the separation of control by the trustees from the 
benefit that accrues to the beneficiaries, which is a feature of the development of the 
trust discussed above. They are discussed below. 
 
2 4 1  The fiduciary position of the trustee 
De Waal points out that the terms “trust” and “trustee” imply an obvious and 
fundamental truth: that the position of trustee is one of trust.133 The fiduciary nature 
of the trustee obligation is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, but for present 
purposes, it serves to underscore that a core element of the trust is that a trustee 
stands in a fiduciary position of trust to the beneficiaries.134 
In England and Scotland, the law requires of a trustee in the administration of the 
trust to exercise “the same degree of diligence that a man of ordinary prudence 
would exercise in the management of his own affairs”. 135  In South Africa, the 
trustee’s duty appears to have initially been set somewhat higher. In Sackville-West 
v Nourse136 the then Appellate Division required that a trustee must use greater care 
in the handling of trust property that he might in dealing with his own. The TPCA now 
requires that a trustee “shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his 
 
133  De Waal (2000) SALJ 557, referencing N Jones “Trusts in England after the Statute of 
Uses: A view from the 16th century” in R Helmholz & R Zimmerman (eds) Itinera 
Fiduciae (1998) 173 193. 
134  Cameron et al Honoré 13. 
135  De Waal (2000) SALJ 559, referencing the House of Lords in Rae v Meek (1889) 16 R 
(HL) 558 569. 





powers act with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a 
person who manages the affairs of another”.137  
Du Toit et al describe the contemporary South African trustee’s duty as essentially 
entailing “that a trustee must undertake trust administration in good faith with the 
requisite care, diligence and skill to serve the best interests of the trust 
beneficiaries”.138 
 
2 4 2  Separate estates 
As discussed above, the distinction drawn between legal and equitable ownership in 
equity ensures that beneficiaries are protected from the insolvency of the trustee. 
However, notwithstanding the concept of divided ownership, it is arguable that it is 
the consequence of the separation of estates that is decisive.  
De Waal shows how the protection against creditors afforded to beneficiaries in 
English law is explained in terms of the “enduring equitable obligation concerning 
property”139 which the trustee owes the beneficiary. In particular, De Waal points to 
the use of the term “patrimony” in the following explanation offered by Hayton: 
 
“The equitable proprietary rights of the beneficiaries in the trust property prevent such 
property from becoming part of the trustee’s patrimony, so the beneficiaries’ rights are not 
affected by the insolvency, divorce or death of the trustee”.140 
 
It therefore appears that it is this necessary consequence, rather than the division 
of ownership itself, that is the source of the protection of trust beneficiaries in English 
law, since the trust assets do not form part of the trustee’s private estate. 
Likewise, the separation between a trustee’s private estate and the special trust 
estate in the civil law ensures protection from the insolvency, divorce, or death of the 
trustee. The separation of private and trust estates in South Africa has also received 
legislative approval in the TPCA which, in section 12, provides that: 
 
 
137  Section 9(1) of the TPCA. 
138  Du Toit et al Fundamentals 4. 
139  De Waal (2000) SALJ 560, referencing Hayton et al Principles of European Trust Law 
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“Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as 
he as trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property”. 
 
2 4 3  Real subrogation 
A further core element of the trust is the operation of “real subrogation”. Real 
subrogation refers to the concept that the turn-over in trust assets remains within the 
trust estate. De Waal explains this as follows: 
 
“once one accepts that there are two separate estates, there must be a mechanism to 
deal with the obvious eventuality of a replacement of (or turn-over in) assets in the trust 
estate. This mechanism is found in the concept of real subrogation. Real subrogation 
simply means that the proceeds of a trust asset (if the asset has been sold) or the 
substitute asset (if the proceeds have been used to buy something else) will also be 
subject to the trust. One could also say that the proceeds or the substitute, as the case 
may be, will form part of the trust estate. Real subrogation, therefore, ‘ensures the 
continuity of the trust estate’”.141 
 
From a South African perspective, the above principle is uncomplicated: the turn-
over, or growth, in assets held in the trust estate accrues to that estate. This is 
because in South Africa, real subrogation is limited to lawful transactions.142 It is 
when the principle of real subrogation is extended to unlawful transactions that 
matters become altogether more complex.  
In English law, real subrogation transcends lawful exchanges of trust property 
through a network of rules relating to “following”, “tracing” and “constructive 
trusts”. 143  The principles underlying tracing and constructive trusts make for 
interesting reading and the application thereof in a civilian context has been 
questioned.144 These principles however do not form part of the South African trust 
law145 and, consequently, fall outside the scope of this research. 
 
 
141  De Waal (2000) SALJ 564; T Honoré “Obstacles to the reception of trust law? The 
examples of South Africa and Scotland” in AM Rabello (ed) Aequitas and Equity: Equity 
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142  De Waal (2000) SALJ 564. 
143  Hudson Equity 487-582; Garton Moffat 22-26; Pettit Equity 190-200; Pearce & Barr 
Trusts 946-993.  
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2 4 4  Trusteeship as an office 
The concept of trusteeship as an office is credited to Honoré, the “principal architect 
of modern South African trust law”,146 and is in my view his single most significant 
contribution to the South African law of trusts.147 
As appears more fully in the chapters that follow, it is the appreciation that the 
trustee occupies a quasi-public “office” that distinguishes it from a purely private law 
institution and which forms the basis of the propositions advanced in this research.148  
The description of trusteeship as an office denotes that the trustee administers the 
trust in an official, rather than private, capacity.149 This means that, although the trust 
is not a juristic person, and the trust estate can only be bound by the conduct of the 
trustees, all acts of trustees occur through the office of trusteeship.  
The metaphor of a cloak is appropriate. The office of trusteeship is the cloak that 
is filled by the trustee’s person and which empowers the trustee to act. It is through 
this proverbial garment, attached to the trust deed, that the trustee’s powers and 
obligations flow – only persons occupying the office of trusteeship are empowered to 
act as such and compelled to exercise the obligations attaching to that office.  
The most significant manifestation of the office of trusteeship lies in the oversight 
role that the courts and the Master play in contrast to other private law 
arrangements. In Genesis Medical Aid Scheme v Registrar, Medical Aid Schemes150 
the Constitutional Court recognised the significance of this as follows:  
 
“Once established, a trust creates a legal relation of fiduciary obligation on the part of the 
trustee towards the beneficiary. That relation is distinct from a purely contractual or 
 
146  De Waal (2000) SALJ 565. See also Du Toit et al Fundamentals 25 where Honoré is 
described as “the leading light in the scholarly development of [South African] trust law”. 
147  Honoré died on 26 February 2019, but the impact of his contribution to South African 
trust law is set to remain indefinitely. In the latest Festschrift written in his honour (in 
total there were three) De Waal, commenting on the (then) imminent publication of the 
sixth edition of Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts wrote: “Since its fourth edition the 
title of Honoré’s book has been Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts. This is more than 
the title of a book: it is also a statement of fact. The South African law of trusts is and 
indeed will remain Honoré’s”. De Waal “Honoré’s South African law of trusts” in Thinking 
about Law 49. 
148  Cameron et al Honoré 14. 
149  Du Toit et al Fundamentals 3. 





commercial relationship. This is because a trustee occupies a fiduciary office that is 
subject to supervision and regulation by the courts. Even in a consensual trust, the 
trustee is not simply a contracting party, but assumes an office subject to court 
supervision and public control, as no contractant does.”151 
 
The supervision over the office of trusteeship is rooted in both common law and 
statute. At common law, a court has the power to remove a trustee from office if such 
removal is in the interests of the beneficiaries,152 or appoint replacement trustees in 
circumstances where the office has become vacant (through, for example, death or 
resignation).153 
The TPCA also contains several provisions that underscore the public nature of 
the office of trusteeship, for example: the requirement that trusts be registered with 
the Master;154 the provision that a person shall act as trustee only if authorised 
thereto by the Master;155 the provisions regarding the furnishing of security;156 the 
power of the courts to vary trust provisions and to terminate trusts;157 the power of 
the Master to call upon trustees to account, 158  and the power of the Master to 
remove trustees from office.159 
Honoré summarises the position as follows:  
 
“The court in the last resort will not merely see that remedies are granted for breach of 
trust – as it would for the breach of ordinary contracts – but that the necessary 
arrangements are made for trusts to be carried out according to their terms, something 
that it will not do for ordinary contracts.”160 
 
151  Para 30. 
152  Letterstedt v Broers (1884) 9 AC 371; Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516; Volkwyn 
NO v Clarke and Damant 1947 (WLD) 456; Tijmstra NO v Blunt-MacKenzie NO 2002 1 
SA 459 (T).  
153  De Waal (2000) SALJ 566. 
154  Section 4(1). Interestingly, the TPCA, including this provision, does not apply to oral 
trusts. Deedat v The Master 1995 2 SA 377 (A). 
155  Section 6(1). 
156  Section 6(2) and 6(3). 
157  Section 13. 
158  Section 16. 
159  Section 20. 
160  De Waal (2000) SALJ 566, quoting T Honoré “Obstacles to the reception of trust law? 







These powers of oversight distinguish the trust from any other private law 
institution. To place matters in context, it is unthinkable that a court could (or would) 
remove a party to a private agreement on account of breach; replace them with 
another party; or unilaterally vary the terms of an agreement to give effect to the 
purpose thereof. 
 
2 5  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 
Perhaps the most significant judicial commentary on the South African trust and the 
principles that underpin it to appear in the past three decades is the judgment by the 
SCA, written by Cameron JA (as he then was), in Land Bank v Parker.161 A cursory 
review reveals that it has been cited with approval (as of January 2019) in no less 
than 27 subsequent reported, and no doubt countless more unreported, 
judgments.162 
The judgment is significant because it confirms the functional separation between 
the control over and the enjoyment of a benefit as the “essential notion of trust law” 
from which its further development is to proceed.163 In addition, it gives valuable 
guidance on the significance of the trust deed, the joint-action rule, 164  and the 
dangers concomitant upon the abuse of the trust in family and business dealings. 
For those reasons, a brief review of Land Bank v Parker is a pre-requisite for any 
meaningful discussion on the further development, and theoretical principles, 
underpinning the trust.  
 
161  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
162  This number refers to the South African Law Reports. Land Bank v Parker has also, 
however, been referenced numerous times in the All South African Law Reports, and by 
the Southern African Legal Information Institute’s (SAFLII) online repository at 
www.saflii.org. When these references are included, the number of reported judgments 
relying on Land Bank v Parker (taking into account potential overlap) exceeds 27 by far. 
163  Para 22. See also Cameron et al Honoré 21. 
164  The joint-action rule dictates that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the trust deed, 
the trustees must act jointly if the trust estate is to be bound. This rule is described in 





The matter concerned the enforceability of a suretyship agreement concluded 
between the trustees of the Jacky Parker Trust (“the trust”) and the Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa (“the bank”).165 
The trust was a family trust established in 1992 by a commercial farmer, 
DW Parker (“Parker Snr”), for the benefit of himself and his wife, for whom the trust 
was named, and their descendants. The first trustees were the Parkers and their 
family attorney, Senekal, who resigned in 1996.166 
The trust deed contained a provision to the effect that there would at all times be 
no fewer than three trustees in office and that the remaining trustees would, in such 
event, be empowered to appoint a replacement trustee. Notwithstanding these 
provisions, the Parkers failed for almost two years after Senekal’s resignation to take 
any action and only informed the Master thereof in June 1998.167 
Between April and October 1998, the Parkers, acting alone, purported to bind the 
trust as surety and co-principal debtor in a series of agreements in terms of which 
companies associated with their farming enterprise obtained significant loans from 
the bank. By the time the last of these agreements were concluded, the Parkers had 
appointed their son, DG Parker (“Parker Jnr”) as a replacement trustee on direction 
of the Master. The evidence revealed that Parker Jnr played no part in the 
conclusion of this last agreement, which involved a loan of R30 million from the 
bank.168 
Eventually matters went wrong and the bank commenced sequestration 
proceedings against the Parkers and the trust. It obtained provisional sequestration 
orders against the trust and Parker Snr 169  during September 2000, which were 
 
165  Para 4. 
166  Para 2.  
167  Para 3. 
168  Para 4. 
169  The application against Mrs Parker was unsuccessful on the basis that the bank was 
unable to prove an advantage to creditors. In terms of ss 10(c) and 12(1)(c) of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (“the Insolvency Act”), a court may not grant a sequestration 
order unless “there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the 





confirmed on 27 October 2000.170 Since a clause of the trust deed provided that 
upon insolvency, a trustee’s trusteeship is automatically terminated,171 Parker Snr 
ceased to be a trustee upon his sequestration. However, he continued to act as 
trustee and sought leave to appeal in both his own capacity and on behalf of the 
trust, which was refused by the court of first instance. A petition to the SCA followed, 
and only the trust was granted leave to appeal to the Full Bench.172 
The primary contention on behalf of the trust in the Full Court was that the 
Parkers, on their own, did not have the power to bind the trust estate in concluding 
the suretyship agreements with the bank.173 This defence was upheld on the basis 
that, in the absence of three trustees as required by the trust deed, the trustees did 
not have the power to act.174 A petition by the bank followed and leave to appeal to 
the SCA was granted.  
The factual matrix required a distinction to be drawn between the scenario prior to 
Parker Jnr’s appointment and that after his appointment. In respect of the position 
 
170 The Insolvency Act distinguishes between “provisional” and “final” sequestration: A 
Boraine, JA Kunst & DA Burdette Meskin on Insolvency Law (SI 51 2018) 2-18 explain 
the rationale for the distinction as follows:  
“The reason for this is that not only the interests of the applicant and the debtor, but also 
the interests of all the debtor’s creditors, are affected when a sequestration order is 
granted: while, therefore, the creditor able to establish a prima facie case for 
sequestration, is to have the benefit of preservation of the debtor’s property, an 
opportunity is to be afforded to the debtor and all his other creditors to be heard in 
relation to the issue of whether a final order of sequestration should be granted.”  
171  Para 39. 
172  Para 5. 
173  Para 6. 
174 The appeal process was at this time regulated by the provisions of the Supreme Court 
Act 59 of 1959. In accordance therewith, an unsuccessful litigant was afforded an 
opportunity to apply for leave to appeal in the court of first instance, whereupon leave 
could either be refused or granted to the Full Bench or the SCA. The “Full Bench” refers 
to a bench of three judges in the court of first instance, appointed by the Judge 
President of the court concerned. If leave was refused, the unsuccessful litigant was 
permitted to deliver a “petition” to the SCA seeking leave to appeal. That court was 
similarly empowered to either refuse the petition, grant leave to the Full Bench, or itself. 
The Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 now regulates this position. This Act restructured 
the High Courts into divisions of a single High Court. The appeal process has however 
remained unchanged, save for a change in terminology. “Application” is now made to 
the SCA for leave to appeal to either that court or the “Full Court” of the relevant 





prior to Parker Jnr’s appointment, the bank relied on the general contention that all 
the trustees in office, acting jointly, could bind the trust. Regarding the position after 
Parker Jnr’s appointment, the bank contended that as the trust deed authorised 
majority decision making, the Parkers, representing a majority of trustees, could bind 
the trust without the co-operation of their son.175 
In rejecting the bank’s contentions, the SCA elucidated the correct approach to 
questions of trustee capacity. The first principle is that a trust does not enjoy 
separate legal personality but constitutes a collection of assets and liabilities 
arranged in an estate. Therefore, in order for the estate to be bound, action by the 
trustees is required. However, as the power of the trustees flows from the provision 
of the trust deed, which is described as “the constitutive charter” of the trust, a trust 
cannot be bound outside its provisions.176 
Therefore, where the trust deed required a minimum number of trustees in office, 
this constituted a so-called “capacity-defining” condition without which the trust could 
not act.177  The necessary implication was that, while the Parkers were the sole 
trustees, the body of trustees suffered from an incapacity and the agreements 
purportedly concluded by them during that time were therefore void. 
After the appointment of Parker Jnr, this incapacity was cured. However, as is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,178 it is a fundamental rule of trust law that 
trustees are to act jointly. As the Parkers did not in any way involve Parker Jnr in the 
conclusion of the relevant agreements after his appointment, those agreements were 
void for failure of the trustees to act jointly.179 
The bank’s submission that the Parkers constituted a majority of trustees and 
could hence bind the trust without the son’s concurrence, was therefore rejected. 
Central to the rejection of this argument was the principle that the majority of trustees 
formed only a complement of the whole. Therefore, while the majority could compel 
the trustees to act in a particular manner by virtue of the provision in the trust deed, 
this did not empower them to act alone.180 
 
175 Para 7. 
176  Para 10. 
177  Para 11. 
178  See the text to part 5 4 of Chapter 5. 
179  Para 18. 





Based on these observations it followed that the bank’s principal arguments had 
to fail and that the reasoning of the Full Bench was to prevail. There was however a 
single alternative argument – that the conditions in the peculiar case merited “going 
behind” the trust.181 It is perhaps in the discussion of this alternative that the SCA 
gave its most significant direction to the future development of trust law in South 
Africa. The SCA confirmed that:  
 
“The core idea of the trust is the separation of ownership (or control) from enjoyment. 
Though a trustee can also be a beneficiary, the central notion is that the person entrusted 




“The essential notion of trust law, from which the further development of the trust form 
must proceed, is that enjoyment and control should be functionally separate. The duties 
imposed on trustees, and the standard of care exacted of them, derive from this 
principle.”183 
 
Ultimately however, this argument was not followed through as it was not the case 
presented by the bank. The bank relied and also failed on the argument that the 
Parkers, acting alone, could bind the trust estate.  
However, while the trustees’ argument was accepted, there was an ironic, but just, 
twist. Due to the principle that the trustees could only act in circumstances where 
there were three trustees, it transpired that the application for leave to appeal to the 
Full Bench was defective. This was so because Parker Snr had automatically ceased 
to be a trustee upon his sequestration. The failure of Mrs Parker and Parker Jnr 
immediately to appoint a replacement trustee therefore resulted therein that the 
trustees were not empowered to prosecute the appeal to the Full Bench. The result 
was that the trust was therefore never before the Full Bench and that its decision 
was to be set aside. The (strictly speaking incorrect) decision of the court of first 
instance was therefore to be reinstated.184 
 
181  Disregarding the trust estate is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. See in particular the text 
to part 6 4. 
182  Para 19. 
183  Para 22. 





It followed that, in the end, the trust was held liable for the debts owing to the bank 
through the consistent application of its own argument.185 
 
2 6  Conclusion 
The historical development of the trust reveals a universal human desire for the 
establishment of a legal institution through which others can safeguard the beneficial 
interests of those that are not in a position to do so themselves. This is achieved 
through the functional separation between control and benefit. 
As a result of diverse historical developments, this functional separation is 
achieved differently in jurisdictions with a common-law based property regime as 
opposed to those with a civil-law property regime. 
The common law recognises a split ownership of trust assets, with legal 
ownership vesting in the trustees and the beneficial ownership vesting in the 
beneficiaries. This provides the basis upon which control over the trust assets is 
vested in the trustees, but also ensures that all benefit that arises accrues to the 
beneficiaries.  
Civil-law jurisdictions do not recognise the split ownership inherent in the 
common-law trust and the whole of the ownership of the trust estate vests in the 
trustee.186 However, the same separation between control and benefit (and ultimate 
protection of beneficiaries) is achieved as in the common law by recognising that the 
trust estate is separate from that of the trustee’s personal estate. 
The effect of the separation of the trust estate from that of the trustee’s personal 
estate is that the latter estate is protected from the trustee’s personal creditors, 
thereby also providing a mechanism that achieves the insulating effects of separate 
juristic personality in corporate law. 
There are four core elements of a trust, namely: (i) that the trustee is to stand in a 
fiduciary position; (ii) that there must be a separation of estates; (iii) the operation of 
real subrogation; and (iv) trusteeship as an office. 
Of these elements, trusteeship as an office provides the theoretical underpinning 
for the majority of the questions examined in this dissertation. 
 
185  Cameron et al Honoré 380-382. 






CHAPTER 3:  A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF 
TRUSTEE INDEPENDENCE – THE INDEPENDENCE DUALITY 
3 1  Introduction 
It is widely accepted that a trustee has a duty to exercise independent judgement in 
the fulfilment of his duties.1 However, the exact theoretical basis for this duty is 
uncertain and is a subject of debate.2 
This chapter identifies two principal propositions advanced for the theoretical 
basis of a trustee’s duty of independence namely the “establishment proposition” and 
the “fiduciary proposition”.3  It proceeds to show how these propositions are not 
mutually exclusive but, in fact, complementary in that each provides an accurate 
explanation for one peg of what is described as “the independence duality” model.  
The independence duality model emphasises that the evaluation of trustee 
independence is a two-step process. First, the trustee is to be afforded the capacity 
to act independently, and secondly, the relevant trustee must exercise this capacity. 
It is only when both these requirements are met that it can be said that a trustee acts 
independently. This model, and its relationship with the establishment and fiduciary 
propositions, provide the vital backdrop against which questions regarding trustee 
independence may be examined, including, significantly, the relationship between 
trustee independence and so-called “sham trusts”4 and “going behind the trust”, or 
as is discussed, “disregarding the trust estate”.5 
 
1  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers Union 2008 2 SA 351 (W); Afrisure CC v Watson NO 2009 2 SA 127 
(SCA); MJ de Waal “The liability of co-trustees for breach of trust” (1999) 10 Stell LR 32; 
F du Toit “A trustee’s duty of independence” (2009) 72 THRHR 637. 
2  L Theron “Die besigheidstrust” (1991) 2 TSAR 268; M Honiball & L Olivier The Taxation 
of Trusts in South Africa (2009) 253; PA Olivier Trustreg en Praktyk (1989) 37; Du Toit 
(2009) THRHR 637; PA Olivier, S Strydom & GPJ van den Berg Trust Law and Practice 
(SI 6 2018) 2-15. 
3  The terms “establishment proposition” and “fiduciary proposition” are entirely my own. 
However, the positions adopted by the principal advocates for each proposition 
discussed in this chapter are in keeping with the descriptions as formulated herein and 
attributed to them. 
4  The term “sham trusts” has been used to describe the position where the trust was used 
to merely mislead, see M Conaglen “Sham trusts” (2008) 67 CLJ 176. However, as is 






Before the independence duality model, its constituent parts, and the way they 
relate to the establishment and fiduciary propositions can be fully explored, the 
aforementioned propositions, as presented by their respective principal advocates, 
must first be investigated. 
Accordingly, the establishment and fiduciary propositions as they presently stand 
will be explored, after which the duality in trustee independence will be highlighted. 
Based on this duality, the manner in which each of the establishment and fiduciary 
propositions relate to trustee independence is examined. In this respect, it is argued 
that the establishment and fiduciary propositions are ineffective to the extent that 
they each purport to offer a comprehensive justification for the broad concept of 
trustee independence. However, in acknowledging the independence duality, these 
two propositions each underpin an important, but conceptually distinct, aspect 
thereof. 
 
3 2  The principal propositions 
A review of academic commentary relating to trustee independence reveals two, at 
first glance mutually exclusive, propositions. These propositions, the “establishment” 
and “fiduciary” propositions, approach the question of trustee independence from two 
different perspectives and both appear to find support in existing case law and 
academic commentary. 
In brief, the establishment proposition holds that trustee independence is a 
fundamental requirement for the validity of a trust. 6  Therefore, an arrangement 
where a trustee’s capacity to bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust is jeopardised, will not qualify as a trust. 7  The term 
“establishment proposition” is derived from this central tenet of this proposition.  
 
sham doctrine, and its South African counterpart the “simulation doctrine”, are ill-suited 
to the law of trusts and the establishment proposition is preferred to examine those 
cases where “trusts” are purportedly established only to deceive. See part 6 3 in 
Chapter 6 and the authorities cited at n 24. 
5  See part 6 2 of Chapter 6. 
6  JA Crane & AR Bromberg Crane and Bromberg on Partnership (1968) 174-176; Theron 
(1991) TSAR 268; M Honiball & L Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa (2009) 
253. 
7  See Theron (1991) TSAR 285 for examples where it had been suggested that a lack of 






The fiduciary proposition also recognises the importance of trustee independence 
but rejects it as a pre-requisite to establish a trust. Instead, proponents of this 
proposition suggest that trustee independence is a facet of a trustee’s fiduciary 
duty.8 Consequently, a failure by a trustee to bring an independent mind to bear 
upon the administration of the trust does not invalidate the trust but constitutes a 
fiduciary breach. It is accordingly appropriate to describe this proposition as “the 
fiduciary proposition”.  
The question regarding which one of these two propositions accurately provides 
the theoretical basis for the imperative of trustee independence is significant as it is 
determinative of the consequences that follow where trustee independence has been 
compromised. 
For example, if the establishment proposition is preferred and trustee 
independence is regarded as a pre-requisite for the validity of a trust, it follows that a 
lack of trustee independence would compromise the validity of the trust as a whole. 
Conversely, if it were to be accepted that trustee independence is not a pre-requisite 
for validity, but a constituent part of a trustee’s fiduciary duty, a trustee’s failure to act 
independently would not invalidate the trust, but may instead found a claim against 
the trustee for breach.  
It is consequently clear that the theoretical basis for trustee independence plays 
an important role in determining the consequences of a lack of trustee 
independence. 
At face value, these two propositions appear mutually incompatible. Either trustee 
independence is a requirement to establish a trust, or it is not. However, 
notwithstanding this apparent incompatibility, it is suggested that these propositions 
are not mutually exclusive, but complementary, and that each proposition provides a 
sound theoretical basis for two related, but significantly distinct, aspects of trust 
administration. Therefore, it is argued that there exists a duality in the concept of 
trustee independence that is overlooked by the principal advocates of each 
proposition. As mentioned above, this duality entails the principle of “independent 
trustee control” on the one hand, and the independent “exercise of trustee control” 
on the other. The acknowledgement of this duality permits the development of a 
theoretical model for understanding the underpinnings of trustee independence. 
 






Hence in this dissertation this model is referred to as the “independence duality” 
model. 
In terms of this model, the establishment proposition explains the theoretical basis 
for requiring that trustees be afforded the capacity for independent control, whereas 
the fiduciary proposition provides the same for the requirement that trustees exercise 
their control in an independent manner. The independence duality model, it is 
argued, therefore provides a basis upon which the broad concept of trustee 
independence can be explained and serves as a point of departure in any 
examination of trustee independence. 
 
3 3  The propositions explored 
The two propositions that form the basis of the independence duality model appear 
mutually exclusive on account of each seeking to clarify one, distinct, aspect of the 
independence duality. 
It is this difference in focus that accounts for the perceived conflict between these 
propositions and the manner in which each is employed. Once these propositions 
are examined within the context of the independence duality, it is clear that each 
provides a sound theoretical basis for one aspect relating to trustee independence. 
 
3 3 1  The establishment proposition  
As appears from Chapter 2,9 the development of the trust was premised upon the 
separation of control over the trust assets from the benefit derived therefrom, and it 
is this principle that lies at the centre of the trust institution.10 
It is now settled law that for a valid trust to be formed, the founder should divest 
himself from control over the trust property. 11  As also discussed in Chapter 2, 
Cameron JA in Land Bank v Parker12 described the separation of control over and 
enjoyment of the trust assets as the “core idea” of the trust. He continued by labelling 
 
9  See part 2 2in Chapter 2. 
10  Ex parte Leandy NO 1973 4 SA 363 (N) 368F; Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA); F Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 2 ed (2007) 62; Olivier et al Trust Law 2-14. 
11   E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6 ed (2018) 
21. 






trustee independence a consequence of this separation and considered it “an 
indispensable requisite of office”. 13  This reference to trustee independence has 
suggested to some that trustee independence must be viewed as an essential 
requirement for the validity of a trust.14 
In the third edition of his work on trust law, Honoré also lists “a degree of 
independence on the part of the trustee” as an element that is necessary for the 
existence of a trust.15 Subsequent editions of that work have resisted claiming that 
trustee independence is necessary for the existence of a trust, but in the latest 
edition, Cameron et al go as far as to state that a trustee must have “a certain 
degree of independence”.16  
The principal advocate for the establishment proposition, L Olivier,17 argues more 
directly that trustee independence is a pre-requisite for the validity of a trust.18 For 
her, trustee independence is an essential requirement of a trust and she argues that, 
where such independence is lacking, no trust comes into existence but that the 
arrangement is akin to that of agency.19 Cameron et al echo this submission and 
suggest that “[a] person who in administering property is bound by the instructions of 
another, for example the founder or beneficiaries, is an agent rather than a 
trustee”.20  
In support of this submission, Olivier points to USA case law suggesting that, 
where beneficiaries have effective control over the trustees and by implication the 
administration of the trust estate, a valid trust is not established, but that the trustees 
may be regarded as partners.21  
 
13  Para 22. 
14  Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts 248. 
15  T Honoré The South African Law of Trusts 3 ed (1985) 6. 
16  Cameron et al Honoré 14.  
17  Formerly Theron. 
18  Theron (1991) TSAR 287. 
19  285. 
20  Cameron et al Honoré 14.  
21  The cases cited by her are: Priestly v Treasurer & Receiver General 120 NE 100, 230 
Mass 452 (1918); Simon v Klipstein, DC NJ 1920, 262 Fed 823; Downey Co v Whistler 
(1933) 1988 NE 243, 284 Mass 461 and Brown v Bedell (1934) 188 NE 641 263 NY 177; 
Kadota Fig Association of Producers v Case-Swayne CO (1946) 73 Cal App 2d 796 167 
P2d 518; Engineering Service Corporation v Longridge Investment Co (1957) 153 Call 






The reference to a partnership as the alternative to a trust may be puzzling from a 
South African perspective, but this reference must be viewed in the context of the 
commercial arrangements prevalent in the USA during the early nineteenth century. 
One such arrangement is the so-called “joint-stock company”. The description 
“joint-stock company” is misleading. Depending on the jurisdiction, a joint-stock 
company is not a corporation or company at all, but a partnership. This is the case in 
the USA, but not in England.22 
The joint-stock company has its roots in England and in the conventional 
partnership where each partner brings into the partnership capital or skill. 23  In 
circumstances where the capital funding requirement for a particular venture 
required a large number of partners, a structure developed whereby the partners 
delegated management authority of the partnership to a smaller number among 
them (that is, a management committee).24 To make this structure more attractive, 
the interest therein was agreed to be freely transferable. 25  Accordingly, the 
joint-stock company has been defined as:  
 
“an association in which the capital is thrown into one mass employed for the general 
benefit, each member participating in the gain according to the proportion of stock or 
capital which belongs to him.”26 
 
 
Call App 2d 583 320 P2d 192. See also the discussion of the “control test” in the context 
of USA case law in part 4 3 in Chapter 4. 
22  Joint-stock companies were introduced to the USA through English law and, prior to the 
introduction of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, were also considered a 
partnership in the UK. 
23  R Bubb “Choosing the partnership: English business organisation law during the 
industrial revolution” (2015) 38 Seattle U L Rev 377 341. 
24  The structure of a joint-stock company is described in detail in: A Du Bois The English 
Business Company After the Bubble Act, 1720-1800 (1938) ch 4. See also LCB Gower 
Principles of Modern Company Law 4 ed (1979) chs 2-4 and R Harris Industrialising 
English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (2000) 110. 
25  The legality of transferring interests in these partnerships was confirmed in the 1840s. 
See Garrard v Hardey (1843) 5 Man & G 471 134 ER 648 and Harrison v Heathorn 
(1843) 6 Man & G 81 134 ER 817. 
26  W Wait A Treatise Upon Some of the General Principles of the Law: Whether Legal, or 
of an Equitable Nature, Including Their Relations and Application to Actions and 
Defences in General, Whether in Courts of Common Law, Or Courts of Equity; and 






Significantly, and unlike a trust, the liability of the beneficial members of a 
joint-stock company was not limited and they remained liable in general, as partners, 
to third parties to the full extent of the indebtedness of the collective.27 In order to 
facilitate matters, the property of the joint-stock company was vested in the name of 
one or more “trustees”. These trustees were so-called “bare trustees” who were 
subject to the direction of the management committee. It has been argued that this 
structure was the immediate ancestor of the modern corporation,28 but despite it 
being more complex in structure than a traditional partnership, the joint-stock 
company was nevertheless a partnership.29 
The key feature of the joint-stock company was that it provided a mechanism to 
source investment for return. For most of the period associated with the Industrial 
Revolution in England, the incorporation of a juristic entity could only be achieved 
through a petition to Parliament or the Crown. Potential competitors of such 
petitioners often raised objections on the basis of “public interest” and frequently 
successfully lobbied for the proposed incorporation to be rejected.30 
This difficulty concerning incorporation of companies resulted therein that 
joint-stock companies gained popularity to such an extent that they were regulated 
by statute.31 These statutes had the effect of deeming joint-stock companies, formed 
 
27  160. 
28  See RDM Flannigan “The control test of principal status applied to business trusts: Part 
I” (1986) 8 Est & Tr Q 37 41. 
29  See Playfair Development Corp Pty Ltd v Ryan (1969-70) 90 WN (NSW) 504. 
30  Bubb (2015) 38 Seattle U L Rev 377 342. See also A Schall “Corporate governance 
after the death of the King – the origins of the separation of powers in companies” (2011) 
8 ECFR 476 481. 
31  Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 (promulgated by statute 7 & 8 of Victoria, Chapter 
110) (“Joint Stock Companies Act”). The aversion against incorporation has its roots in 
the South Sea Bubble. In the period between 1690 and 1725 three chartered 
businesses which operated by virtue of Royal decree rose to ascendancy, namely: The 
East India Company; the Bank of England and the South Sea Company. In 1720, the 
South Sea Company collapsed resulting in the “South Sea Bubble”. In the wake of the 
ensuing financial collapse and market scandals, the English Bubble Act of 1720 was 
passed, rendering it illegal to trade in shares of unincorporated joint-stock companies. 
See R Harris “The Bubble Act: its passage and its effects on business organizations” 






and registered in a prescribed manner, quasi-corporations.32 However, in the USA, 
where there was no similar statutory regulation, joint-stock companies have retained 
their nature as a form of partnership.33 
Consequently, where an arrangement between “trustees” is identified as a joint-
stock company, as opposed to a trust, those trustees were personally liable for the 
debts of the undertaking in question.  
As is demonstrated in Chapter 4, a “control test” has been developed in the USA, 
the defining characteristic of which is that the trustee must have the capacity to 
exercise independent control over trust administration.34 This test ascribes liability for 
corporate conduct to the true controllers of a juristic entity or collective and has its 
origins in distinguishing between so-called “true trusts” and joint-stock companies.35 
To illustrate, L Olivier refers to the following passage in Crane and Bromberg’s work 
on partnerships:36 
 
“The distinction between the trust (in which there is no personal liability) and the 
partnership (in which there is) has been held to depend on whether the beneficiaries have 
power of control of management by the trustees. The concern is whether management is 
vested in the trustees as principals or as agents of the beneficiaries. Liability naturally 
follows if the beneficiaries are regarded as principals. What degree of control renders the 
beneficiaries principals is not altogether certain. Important factors are powers to instruct 
trustees, to remove them, to alter, amend or terminate the trust, to elect trustees 
periodically or fill vacancies. (Ironically, some of these are enjoyed by corporate 
shareholders without sacrificing their limited liability). Under this more liberal view, the 
terms of the trust instrument are important, although actual operation (as distinct from 
formal power) will be scrutinized in search for control.”37 
 
 
32  Section 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Act. The same section also included under the 
term “joint-stock company” all life, fire and marine insurance companies, and every 
partnership consisting of more than twenty-five members. See, T Parsons & WV Kellen 
Law of Contracts (1883) 162 n (a). 
33  For a brief description of the introduction and development of joint-stock companies in 
the USA, see MM Blair “Reforming corporate governance: what history can teach us” 
(2004) 1 Berkely Bus LJ 1 8. 
34  See parts 4 2 and 4 3 in Chapter 4. 
35  Williams v Inhabitants of Milton 215 Mass 1 102 NE 355 (1913); Frost v Thompson 219 
Mass 360 160 NE; Navarro Savings Association v Lee 446 US 458 (1980). 
36  Theron (1991) TSAR 285. 






In a more recent contribution on the subject38 Olivier, together with Honiball, again 
examined this test and considered whether it is compatible with South African law.39 
While the test has not yet been directly applied in South Africa case law, the authors 
point to the matter of Goodricke & Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 
(“Goodricke”)40 in support of their contention that trustee independence is a pre-
requisite to establish a trust. 
The facts of Goodricke were briefly that four natural persons entered into a deed 
of trust with the intention of creating a common investment fund. In terms thereof 
each undertook to pay a specified contribution into the trust fund which would in turn 
be applied for investments for the benefit of the trust fund. 
The four founders were all both beneficiaries and trustees of the trust and in 
addition a juristic person (“the company”) was co-opted as a fifth trustee to carry out 
the administration of the trust. The company’s appointment as trustee could be 
terminated at any time by a bare majority of the remaining trustees, in which event 
the trustees could nominate one or more from their number to function in its place.41 
The trustees undertook to apply the contributions paid into the trust fund to 
making a loan to a third party, which loan was to be secured by mortgage bond over 
certain immovable property registered in the name of the third party. However, the 
Registrar of Deeds declined to register the bond on the ground that, inter alia, the 
registration of the bond contravened the then still applicable section 54 of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937, which did not allow for the registration of a bond in favour 
of a person acting as the agent of a principal.42 
It was argued on behalf of the Registrar that the founders, being both trustees and 
beneficiaries, were in reality agents of one another and that the arrangement is really 
a partnership or joint venture for the mutual advantage of the four founders.43 The 
court rejected this argument on the basis that the company had been appointed as a 
 
38  Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts 253.  
39  248-254. 
40  1974 1 SA 404 (N). 
41  Goodricke & Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 1 SA 404 (N) 405C-H. 
42  407A-E. 






fifth trustee and could only be removed by majority decision of the remaining 
trustees.44  
Cameron et al describe Goodricke as “borderline on trustee independence” 45 and 
Honiball and Olivier interpret the reasoning therein to indicate that, had there been 
an absolute convergence of identity between trustees, a different conclusion would 
have been reached.46 On this basis they suggest that, while the control test may not 
yet have been formally incorporated into South African jurisprudence, a similar 
decision will be reached when the substance-over-form principle is applied.47 
Against this background, Honiball and Olivier submit that: 
 
“If in form the trustees have to act independently in the best interest of the beneficiaries, 
but in substance they are mere puppets in the hands of the beneficiaries, the substance 
of the agreement may well indicate that a partnership and not a trust was formed. 
Obviously, the other requirements for a valid partnership – namely that the object must be 
to make a profit, and that each party has to make a contribution to the undertaking and 
share in its profits – also have to be present. It is submitted that the mere fact that the 
express intention of the parties is to form a trust does not stand in the way of a court 
finding that in substance a partnership was formed.  
It may even be argued that any person who exercises a sufficient degree of control 
over a trustee may be held personally liable for trust debts on the basis that the 
substance of the agreement is that the trustee was his agent.”48 
 
This conclusion, it is submitted, is clearly premised upon the view that trustee 
independence is a pre-requisite to establish a valid trust. Honiball and Olivier’s 
submission regarding the convergence of identity of the beneficiaries and trustees 
resonates in Land Bank v Parker where it was held that: 
 
“Though a trustee can also be a beneficiary, the central notion is that the person 
entrusted with control exercises it on behalf of and in the interests of another. This is why 
a sole trustee cannot also be the sole beneficiary: such a situation would embody an 
 
44  410B. 
45  Cameron et al Honoré 92. See also B Wunsh “Trading and business trusts” (1986) 103 
SALJ 561 564-6. 
46  Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts 253. 
47  254. 






identity of interests that is inimical to the trust idea, and no trust would come into 
existence.”49 
  
It is on this basis, and the important principle of separation between control and 
benefit, that proponents of the establishment proposition may convincingly argue that 
a trustee’s capacity for independence is a requirement for the establishment of a 
trust. 
 
3 3 2  The fiduciary proposition 
The proposition that trustee independence is a requirement to establish a trust is 
rejected by the principal advocates for the fiduciary proposition, PA Oliver, Strydom 
and Van den Berg.50 In the predecessor of their work on trust law,51 PA Oliver also 
rejects the suggestion by Honoré that “a degree of independence on the part of the 
trustee”52 is an essential element of a trust as theoretically unsound.53 
For these authors, the duty of a trustee to act independently stems from his 
fiduciary position. PA Olivier formulates this view in the following terms: 
 
“Honoré regverdig sy standpunt [that a degree of independence on the part of the trustee 
is an essential element for a trust] deur te sê dat ŉ trustee nie in opdrag van iemand 
anders moet optree nie. Sy optrede moet deurgaans selfstandig wees. 
Alhoewel dit sekerlik belangrik is dat ŉ trustee deurgaans selfstandig optree, is dit ŉ 
eienskap wat verband hou met die inhoud van die pligte wat op ŉ trustee rus, 
voortspruitend uit die fidusiêre verhouding tussen hom en die begunstigde met betrekking 
tot die trustgoed. Myns insiens kan a degree of independence on the part of the trustee 
nie as ŉ essensiële element van ŉ trust beskou word nie, maar eerder as ŉ plig van ŉ 
trustee om selfstandig en sonder inmenging van buite op te tree.”54 
  
Du Toit appears to support this view and argues that: 
 
49  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 19 
(emphasis added). 
50  Olivier et al Trust Law and Practice 2-14. 
51  Published as a hardcopy. See Olivier Trustreg 36-37. 
52  Honoré The South African Law of Trusts 5. 
53  Olivier Trustreg 37. 
54  37 (emphasis added). See also W Geach & J Yeats Trusts: Law and Practice (2007) 91 






“compliance with the duty of independence ensures commensurate compliance with one 
of the facets of a trustee’s fiduciary duty.”55 
 
The establishment proposition, as advocated by L Olivier,56 is also the subject of 
criticism from the proponents of the fiduciary proposition. PA Olivier et al express 
themselves in the following terms: 
 
“Prof L Olivier also believes that the requirement of independence is essential to the 
office of trustee. She is of the opinion that, if trustees are subject to an effective form of 
control (other than by the courts) by either the founder or the beneficiaries of the trusts, 
we not are dealing with a real trust institution, but rather with another legal phenomenon, 
such as agency. Such a decision by a court would, in our view, be attributable to the 
substance over form principle, rather than the essential elements of a trust. 
In our opinion, the abovementioned requirement of independence is an accessory to 
the office of trustee and merely an indication of how the trustee should behave in 
administering the trust. In our view, it relates to the contents of the trustee’s duties. The 
essential elements of a trust relate to the basic concept of a trust, supplemented by the 
founder’s trust object.”57  
 
The proposition that a trustee’s duty of independence is rooted in his fiduciary 
position is echoed in PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, 
Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) (“PPWAWU”) 58  where 
Freund AJ drew a parallel between a trustee and a company director’s duty of 
independence. In that matter the court was called upon to deal with the position of a 
trustee of a pension fund, or trustee in the broad sense, in relation to the 
beneficiaries of the fund.  
Trustees in the broad sense must be distinguished from trustees in the narrow 
sense. A trustee in the narrow sense refers to those trustees of trusts defined in 
section 1 of the TPCA. Trustees that do not fall within this definition, but who 
nonetheless are entrusted with the affairs of others and consequently control 
property on behalf of others, have been described as falling within the ambit of 
 
55  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 642. 
56  Theron (1991) TSAR 268 32; L Olivier “Trusts: traps and pitfalls” (2001) 118 SALJ 226. 
57  Olivier et al Trust Law and Practice 2-14. 






trustees in the broad sense.59 It is self-evident that an examination of this second 
type of trust, despite not being subject to the provisions of the TPCA, can provide 
valuable perspectives on trusteeship in the strict or technical sense.60 
PPWAWU concerned a battle between the applicant pension fund (“the fund”) and 
the respondent trade union, CEPPWAWU, (“the trade union” or “union”). The fund 
was established by an earlier trade union, which later merged with other trade unions 
to form the respondent. 
The fund was administered by a set of ten trustees, three of whom were appointed 
by the employers participating in the fund and the remaining seven by the 
respondent trade union.61  Following from a string of resolutions adopted by the 
trustees of the fund, which attracted the displeasure of the trade union, the union 
adopted a resolution in terms of which those trustees appointed by it to the fund 
were required to obtain a mandate from the union in respect of all business 
conducted at the meeting of the fund’s board of trustees and to act in accordance 
with such mandate.62 The effect of this resolution was to compel the seven trustees 
appointed by the union to vote on the instructions of the union in fund matters.  
At issue was the enforceability of the resolution made by the union. As a point of 
departure, the court held that the trustees of the fund owed a fiduciary duty to the 
fund, its members and other beneficiaries63 and that, in terms of this fiduciary duty, 
they were required to exercise an independent judgement as to what constitutes the 
best interest of the fund.64  In this respect, it was held that the applicable legal 
principles are the same as those that apply to a director of companies:65  
 
 
59  Examples of such trustees are trustees of pension funds and administrators of insolvent 
estates. 
60  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 637. 
61  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers Union 2008 2 SA 351 (W) 354 F-I. 
62  Para 2. 
63  Para 20. 
64  Para 25. 
65  See Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 156 (W) at 163D-G, 
where it was confirmed that a director of a company owes a duty toward to the company, 






“The trustee’s obligation to exercise an independent judgment, regardless of the views of 
the trade union (or employer) which appointed him, is analogous to the director’s 
obligation to exercise an independent judgment, regardless of the views of any party 
which may have procured his or her appointment as a director.”66 
 
It accordingly followed that the resolution by the trade union requiring the trustees 
to act only in accordance with a mandate received from it, was contrary to law and 
unenforceable as this would obviate the exercise of independent discretion by the 
trustees in question.67 
The conclusion arrived at in PPWAWU, that a trustee’s duty of independence is a 
consequence of his fiduciary duty, is therefore in step with the theoretical basis for 
trustee independence advocated by the proponents of the fiduciary proposition.  
It is submitted that the fiduciary proposition offers a sound theoretical basis for 
holding that trustees are required to exercise the control afforded to them over trust 
assets in an independent manner and that they are required to bring independent 
judgement to bear on the administration of the trust. However, as is elaborated 
below, the criticism of the establishment proposition by the proponents of the 
fiduciary proposition is misplaced.  
 
3 4  The “independence duality” 
The perception that the establishment and fiduciary propositions are incompatible is 
in my view attributable to a failure to recognise a duality in the broader concept of 
trustee independence. The recognition of this duality enables a reconciliation of the 
establishment and fiduciary propositions and reveals that each of these propositions 
offers a sound theoretical basis for a component of trustee independence. 
For a trustee to act independently in the administration of trust affairs, two factors 
must be present. First, the trustee must be afforded the capacity to act independently 
by the trust deed. 68  Were a trustee has no independent power over the 
 
66  Para 27. 
67  Para 42. 
68  See E Cameron, M de Waal, B Wunsh, P Solomon & E Kahn Honoré’s South African 
Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 262 where the authors state that:  
“The trust instrument forms, as it were, the statute under which the trustee acts. 
Properly interpreted … it should be regarded as … ‘objektiewe reg’, though, of course, 






administration of the trust, it follows that there can be no question of that trustee 
acting independently in the administration thereof.  
Secondly, and where the aforesaid capacity is established, the trustee must 
exercise the capacity for independence. In instances where a trustee elects not to 
exercise the powers afforded independently, it can similarly not be said that the trust 
benefits from independent administration by the trustee. 
This duality appears clearly from the facts of Nel v Metequity (“Nel v Metequity”).69 
The respondents on appeal, two companies, Metequity Ltd (“Metequity”) and 
Investec Business Services Ltd (“Investec Business Services”), were the trustees of 
the Jan Nel Bond Trust (“the trust”), a trust established in order to circumvent the 
provisions of the Participations Bonds Act 55 of 1981.70 
In terms of the trust deed, the trust was established “for the purpose of providing 
an interest-bearing investment secured by mortgage of immovable property” 
advanced and settled upon trust. Practically, the founder, Metequity, paid R400 000 
into trust, with the sum advanced to a third party, NWN Eiendome (Edms) Bpk 
(“NWN”). This loan was secured though a mortgage registered in favour of the trust 
over immovable property owned by NWN and the appellants bound themselves as 
sureties and co-principal debtors to the trust for the obligations of NWN.71 Further, 
both trustees were subsidiaries of Metboard Ltd (“Metboard”) and had no functions 
other than those in terms of the trust deed. The trust deed provided that for as long 
as Investec Business Services was a trustee, it alone would exercise and carry out 
the powers and duties of the trustees. In addition, the income of the trust, after 
deduction of expenses, was payable to the beneficiaries – being Metequity and to 
any person to whom it may have ceded its rights under the trust deed.72  
 
This quotation has been replaced by a reference to Land Bank v Parker in the latest 
edition of this work. However, it is submitted that the characterisation of the trust deed 
as “objektiewe reg” remains sound. See also LI Coertze Die Trust in die Romeins-
Hollandse Reg (1948) 87. 
69  2007 3 SA 34 (SCA). 
70  Para 7. The Participation Bonds Act 55 of 1981 provided certain formalities in the event 
of the granting of a participation bond, such as that the bond be registered in the name 
of a nominee company (section 2). The Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 
of 2001 repealed the Act. 
71  Para 2. 






Upon default by NWN of its obligations to the trust, litigation ensued and, 
ultimately, the appellants were held liable based on the suretyships.73 
The appellants contended that the trust was invalid on account of an identity of 
interests between the trustees and the beneficiary. This contention was based on 
two grounds. First, they contended that the object of the trustees was simply to 
generate income for Metboard which amounted to an impermissible identity of 
interests.74 Secondly, that since the trustees are both subsidiaries of Metboard, had 
the same directors, made use of the same credit committee and appointed the same 
nominee to act on their behalf, the corporate veil should be lifted and the 
respondents treated as one entity.75 
The appeal was dismissed, but not on the basis that an identity of interests in the 
sense referred to in Land Bank v Parker is permissible. Rather, in dealing with the 
main grounds advanced by the appellants, Streicher JA held that the fact that 
beneficiaries and trustees have identical interests insofar as the object of the trust is 
concerned, is immaterial. In this respect it was pointed out that an identity of 
interests will invariably exist in relation to the fulfilment of the trust object as both the 
trustees and beneficiaries have an interest in that effect be given to the trust deed. 
What was envisaged in Land Bank v Parker was an identity of interest in the same 
person. 
Accordingly, the separate personalities of the corporate trustees, even where one 
is also a beneficiary, preclude an inimical identity from arising.76 
Concerning the second ground, it was held that the mere fact that a company has 
only one shareholder who is in full control thereof does not constitute a basis for 
disregarding the company’s separate juristic personality. What was required was for 
the appellants to show improper conduct on the part of the respondents in order to 
make out a case that the corporate veil should be lifted, which they had failed to 
do.77 
The court’s finding in relation to the question of identity of interest confirms that it 
is not the possibility of abuse that is determinative in whether a trust has been 
 
73  Para 3.  
74  Para 9. 
75  Para 10. 
76  Para 9.  






established, but whether the trustees, objectively speaking, have the capacity to act 
independently. Where the two corporate trustees failed to bring an independent mind 
to bear upon the trust administration, this would in my view have constituted a 
fiduciary breach. 
It is accordingly now clear that trustee independence has the two elements 
advocated for above, namely, the capacity for independent administration being 
afforded to the trustees, and the exercise of that capacity. If one or both factors are 
not present it cannot be suggested that a trustee is acting independently in the 
administration of the trust. These two factors may, for ease of reference, be labelled 
respectively “the capacity for independence” and the “exercise of independence”. 
The two factors are entirely distinct but connected to the broader principle of 
trustee independence and the establishment and fiduciary propositions each relates 
to only one aspect in turn. The establishment proposition succeeds in explaining the 
capacity for independence and the fiduciary proposition, it is submitted, relates to the 
question of the exercise of independence.  
The distinct nature of each of these two factors means that the test in respect of 
establishing the presence of each is also distinct. The question whether a trustee is 
afforded the capacity to act independently is an objective test that stands to be 
determined with reference to the trust deed. The measure or type of independence 
that is required in this respect is examined in detail in Chapter 4,78 but at this stage it 
bears emphasis that it is an objective question of law. The test for capacity for 
independence therefore evaluates the de jure status afforded to a trustee. In this 
respect, the key consideration is whether, objectively speaking, the trustee is 
afforded the capacity to act independently. This evaluation takes into account 
aspects such as the provisions of the trust deed, the wishes of the founder and the 
powers that have been afforded to a trustee, the beneficiaries or other third parties.79 
It is submitted that where a trustee has not been afforded the capacity to act 
 
78  See part 4 5 in Chapter 4. 
79  For an example where the trustees were not provided sufficient capacity for 
independence see Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd v Wait Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd 
v Wait ECHC case no 2896/2012 of 1 November 2016. For a discussion of this case see 






independently, the consequences are to be regulated with reference to the 
establishment proposition. 80 
In contrast, the determination of whether a trustee exercises independent control 
is a question of fact, and one that must be determined with reference to evidence 
relating to the particular trustee’s factual conduct.  
An evaluation of a trustee’s conduct in this regard, therefore, focuses on the de 
facto administration of the trust. Accordingly, the question whether a trustee 
exercises the control entrusted to him in an independent manner requires a factual 
evaluation of the conduct of the trustee in question and particularly whether the 
trustee has brought independent judgement to bear upon the administration of the 
trust. Where a particular trustee, notwithstanding being afforded the capacity to act 
independently, fails to exercise such capacity, the consequences are regulated in 
terms of the fiduciary proposition.  
It is against this background that the establishment and fiduciary propositions can, 
and should, be reconciled and, it is submitted, it is incorrect to label these two 
propositions as mutually exclusive or otherwise incompatible. 
The harmony between these two propositions also emerges from a discussion by 
Van der Linde and Lombard regarding Nel v Metequity. In discussing whether the 
court ought to have invalidated the trust in Nel v Metequity on account of a lack of 
independence, the authors, in my view correctly, submit that: 
 
“The question can thus also be asked: ‘How independent are the trustees?’ Although the 
trustees and the beneficiary shared identical interests in so far as the object of the trust is 
concerned, the court held (par [9] 38E) that it does not constitute an identity of interests in 
the same person, purporting to act in a different capacity. In casu, the trustee acted for 
the benefit of the beneficiary and gave effect to the trust deed as it is their obligation to do 
(par [9] 38F). There were no indication to the court to point out any improper conduct in 
the establishment or use of the corporate respondents or in the conduct of their affairs 
(par [12] 39C). In other words, from a trust law point of view, they did not only de iure, but 
also de facto, acted independently. De iure, there are two corporate trustees with 
separate personalities. One of the trustees is also the sole beneficiary. The fact that they 
have the same directors etcetera, does not change the juridical situation. No indication 
 
80  See Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts ch 10 for examples of how a founder may seek 
to limit the control that a trustee could exercise in the administration of a trust. This 
includes an over-prescriptive trust deed, the appointment of a protector or the conferring 






was given that the de facto situation was any different. Although dealing with the scope of 
a redistribution order, the court in Badenhorst, laid down the following test (par [9] 260H-
261B): 
 
 ‘To succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one of the parties to a 
marriage, there needs to be evidence that such party controlled the trust and but for the trust 
would have acquired and owned the assets in his own name. Control must be de facto and 
not necessarily de iure.’ 
 
It is important, however, to note that such a situation can lend itself to misuse. 
Trustees have to be aware of the warning posed by the court in Parker (par [22] 87C-D), 
with regard to separation between control and enjoyment: 
 
‘The duties imposed on trustees, and the standard of care exacted of them derive from this 
principle. And it is separation that serves to secure diligence on the part of the trustee, since a 
lapse may be visited with action . . . The same separation tends to ensure independence of 
judgment on the part of the trustee – an indispensable requisite of office – as well as careful 




“Trustees who do not exercise their powers independently run the risk of being held 
personally liable for breach of their fiduciary duty.”82 
 
Therefore, as long as the trustees are afforded the capacity for independent 
administration of the trust, it does not matter that there are risks that they would fail 
to exercise this capacity independently. Once such capacity is established, the 
establishment proposition holds that a valid trust is established (on condition that the 
other requirements for a trust are present) and questions regarding the failure of the 
trustees to act independently shift to be determined with reference to the principles 
underlying the fiduciary proposition. This principle is examined in further detail below.  
  
 
81  A van der Linde & S Lombard “Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 3 SA 34 (SCA) – identity of 
interest between trustees and beneficiaries in so far as object of trust is concerned: 
effect on liability” (2007) 40 De Jure 429 435. The reference to “Badenhorst” is a 
reference to the matter of Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 255 (SCA). The reference to 
the “control test” in Badenhorst is examined in Chapter 4. See part 4 4 in Chapter 4. 






3 4 1  The establishment proposition as justification for the capacity for 
independence of trustees 
As pointed out by Van der Linde and Lombard,83 the “question on validity or not of a 
trust should be answered with reference to the essentialia of a trust”.84 Therefore, 
key to the acceptance of the establishment proposition as a theoretical basis for the 
capacity for independence is the question of whether trustee independence is an 
essential requirement for the validity of a trust.85 
Trustee independence is not generally recognised as an essential requirement to 
establish a trust. The recognised requirements to establish a valid trust are: 
 
(i) an intention on the part of the founder to create a trust; 
(ii) the expression by the founder of the intention to create a trust in a mode 
suited to the creation of a legal obligation; 
(iii) a reasonably certain definition of the trust property; 
(iv) a reasonably certain definition of the trust object; and 
(v) the lawfulness of the trust object.86 
 
The fact that trustee independence is not traditionally recognised as an essential 
requirement for the validity of a trust suggests that the establishment proposition is 
inherently flawed. However, it may be argued that trustee independence is an 
indirect requirement for validity because it is implicit in the definition of a trust. 
Du Toit et al explain that the creation of trust burdens the trustee to administer the 
trust property in accordance with the trust instrument’s directives. It follows that trust 
provisions are by definition onerous in nature and that: 
 
“[f]or this reason, a trust founder must intend clearly and unambiguously to impose this 




83  435. 
84  434. See also Administrator’s Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (SCA). 
85  Van der Linde & Lombard (2007) De Jure 429. 
86  F du Toit, B Smith & A van der Linde Fundamentals of South African Trust Law (2019) 
51; Cameron et al Honoré 136. 






“What is therefore required is for the trust instrument to convey the founder’s unequivocal 
intention to create a trust by imposing a binding trust obligation on the trustee or on 
another”.88 
 
The intention of the founder to create a trust is accordingly decisive. Du Toit et al 
elucidate: 
 
“A court adjudicating on an allegation that a trust is a sham must therefore determine 
whether all the creation requirements – and the intention requirement in particular – were 
met (in which case a trust was validly created) or whether the founder or the founder and 
trustee merely devised the appearance that these requirements were met (in which case 
no trust was created and the resultant arrangement constitutes a sham trust).”89 
 
Due to the fact that the intention of the founder to create a trust is recognised as a 
requirement for the validity of a trust, the capacity for trustee independence may be 
imported as a requirement for validity if it is recognised that trustee independence is 
an essential element in the definition of a trust. Stated otherwise, if it were accepted 
that trustee independence is an essential characteristic of a trust, it follows that it is 
also an inherent requirement for the establishment thereof.  
Trusts are, however, notoriously difficult to define.90 As pointed out by De Waal: 
 
“In the most general sense a trust is an arrangement under which one person is bound to 
hold or administer property on behalf of another person or for an impersonal object and 
not for his own benefit. A trust in this sense would include, for example, persons such as 
tutors administering property for their pupils, curators of the mentally ill and agents 
holding property for their principals. But this will not do for a definition, because in this 
general sense all developed legal systems have the trust. And we know that is not true. 
Put differently, ‘there is a difference between a law of entrusting and a law of trusts’.”91 
 
 
88  52. 
89  53. 
90  DJ Hayton “Trusts” in DJ Hayton, SCJJ Kortman, AJM Nuytinck, AVM Stuycken & NED 
Faber (eds) Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements (1996) 3; T 
Honoré “Obstacles to the reception of trust law? The examples of South Africa and 
Scotland” in AM Rabello (ed) Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed 
Jurisdictions (1997) 739, 794. 
91  MJ de Waal “The core elements of the trust: aspects of the English, Scottish and South 






Accordingly, a definition of the trust must be more specific. Cameron et al suggest 
that a trust in the strict or narrow sense92 arises when: 
 
“the creator or founder of the trust has handed over or is bound to hand over to another 
the control of property which is, or the proceeds of which are, to be administered or 
disposed of by the other (the trustee or administrator) for the benefit of some person other 
than the trustee as beneficiary, or for some impersonal object.”93 
  
This definition is echoed in article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition:  
  
“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘trust’ refers to the legal relationships 
created – inter vivos or on death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have been 
placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified 
purpose.” 94 
 
Each of these definitions emphasises the fact that the assets that form the subject 
matter of the trust must be placed under the control (Afrikaans: “beheer”) of the 
trustee. The only notable exception is the definition contained in the TPCA where the 
term “control” is used only in the context of a so-called “bewind trust”.95  
The TPCA defines a trust in the following terms: 
 
“‘trust’ means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is 
by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed – 
 
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed 
of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person 
 
92  As opposed to a trust in the broad sense.  
93  Cameron et al Honoré 5 (emphasis added). 
94  This convention is accessible on the website of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59> 
(accessed 25-01-2020) [emphasis supplied]. 
95  As explained in Chapter 2, South African law recognises the “bewind trust” where the 
trust estate is made over to the beneficiaries with the caveat that control is placed in the 
hands of another, the trustee, who is required to administer the estate for the benefit of 







or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of 
the object stated in the trust instrument; or 
 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed 
under the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or 
class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument, 
 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any 
person as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the Administration of 
Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965)”.96 
 
As appears from the above, a trust in the usual sense, as opposed to a bewind 
trust, is an arrangement where the ownership of property is made over to another 
who must administer it in terms of a trust deed. The only mention made of “control” in 
this definition is with reference to the bewind trust. In those circumstances, a trust 
can only exist where the property in question is placed under the control of the 
trustee notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the assets vests in the 
beneficiaries. It is therefore submitted that in the definition of a trust in the TPCA, the 
element of control must be understood as being implicit in the concept of ownership. 
In connection with this definition, Du Toit et al also correctly point out that: 
 
“This definition of a trust in section 1 of the [TPCA] brings all trusts in the strict sense 
within the Act’s regulatory ambit. Although the making over or bequeathing of the 
ownership in the trust property is central to the definition, it nevertheless provides that 
such ownership can vest in either the trustee or the trust beneficiaries. The Act thus 
confirms that a trustee’s ownership of trust property is not the defining feature of the trust 
in the strict sense. The Act’s definition of the trust instead identifies a trustee’s 
administrative control, whether as owner or non-owner, as determinative of whether or 
not a trust in the strict sense is at hand.”97 
 
This construction is also consistent with the historical development of trusts and 
with other definitions of a trust,98 such as that contained in section 1 of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962:  
 
96  Section 1 of the TPCA (emphasis added). 
97  Du Toit et al Fundamentals 7.  







“’Trust’ means any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered 
and controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed 
under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a deceased person”.99 
 
Given the historical development of trusts discussed in Chapter 2, 100  it is 
submitted that a measure of control over the trust assets is an indispensable 
characteristic or element of a trust. In other words, the founder grants to the trustee 
administrative control over assets to be administered for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. The Oxford dictionary defines “control”, when used as a transitive verb, 
as “to have control of, regulate; serve as control to check, verify”. To be “in control” is 
defined as being “in charge” and “a controller” is “a person or thing that controls; 
person in charge of expenditure”. 101 
In view of this definition, it is submitted that a trustee can only be “in control” of the 
trust estate when afforded the capacity to exercise the powers conferred by the trust 
deed, independently. It is axiomatic that where an individual acts upon instructions of 
another, he or she cannot be said to act independently. Accordingly, in order to be 
said to gain independence a trustee is to be afforded independent control over the 
administration of the trust. Where such independent control is absent, it is submitted 
the parties did not intend to create a trust, but rather a form of mandate or agency 
where either the founder or the beneficiaries retain ultimate control over the trust 
assets. 
However, this argument was at one stage rejected by Honoré where he expressed 
the opinion that a trust may be valid notwithstanding the fact that the trustee may be 
subject to the control of the founder or the beneficiaries: 
 
“it is probably a mistake to require that for a valid trust the trustee must be independent of 
the control of the settlor or beneficiaries. Trusts which are terminable at the will of the sole 
beneficiary are certainly valid, as in the case of a trust whereby a nominee holds 
immovable property for a beneficiary (eg Strydom v De Lange 1970 (2) SA 6 (T)). In 
trusts of this sort the nominee may well be bound to obey the instructions of the 
 
99  Emphasis added. It is to be noted that this definition encompasses both trustees in a 
broad and a narrow sense. See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman 1993 1 
SA 353 (A) 373F-374A. 
100  See part 2 2 in Chapter 2. 






beneficiary as to the management of the property. Yet they are true trusts subject to the 
control of the court in regard to appointment and supervision (Administrator Estate 
Cachalia v Dabhel Madressa Trust 1940 WLD 14, Ex Parte Thulsie 1943 WLD 231, Ex 
Parte Rajoo Dehal 1937 WLD 136). Such a trust is distinguishable from mere agency by 
virtue of the fact that the trustee is dominus of the trust property and that the intention of 
the parties is to create a trust.”102 
 
Honoré, therefore, appears to suggest here that control by a trustee is not an 
essential element of the definition of a trust and that trusts in which the trustee does 
not have independent control over the assets remain valid. According to him the 
distinguishing factor between trusteeship and agency is the ownership (dominium) 
over the trust assets.  
It is significant to note that the view expressed above is inconsistent with Honoré’s 
later view on independence as set out in the third edition of his seminal work to the 
effect that a degree of trustee independence is required to found a trust.103 Similarly, 
in the fourth edition of that work, Honoré and Cameron suggest that the legislative 
recognition of the bewind trust underscores an important principle that “control by the 
trustee/administrator rather than ownership is the essential feature of a trust”.104 
Most recently, in 2008, Honoré has appeared to abandon his earlier view altogether 
when he wrote that: 
 
“It is true that trustees can be given a great deal of discretion as to how they invest trust 
funds and how they distribute income and capital among beneficiaries. This flexibility 
enables trusts to adapt to changing circumstances. But a trustee cannot be a mere tool of 
the settlor, subject to his orders as to the way in which he administers the trust.”105 
  
 
102  T Honoré “Law of donations and trust” (1974) 7 Ann Surv SA Law 145 148.  
103  Honoré The South African Law of Trusts 5. 
104  T Honoré & E Cameron Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 4 ed (1992) 4. The 
specific quotation referred to above has been omitted from the fifth and sixth editions of 
this work by its subsequent authors. However, the principle that it is the control over the 
assets that is the essential feature of the trust is explicitly endorsed. See Cameron et al 
Honoré (2002) 7 and Cameron et al Honoré (2018) 8. 
105 T Honoré “On fitting trusts into civil law jurisdictions” in Oxford 








This shift justifies the conclusion that independent control is an essential element 
of a trust. In addition, and as pointed out by L Olivier,106 it is doubtful whether the 
cases cited by Honoré in support of his earlier view advance his argument since they 
all deal with the situation where the immovable property was registered in the name 
of a nominee.  
It may also be submitted that Honoré’s mention of the existence of a trust that 
may be terminable at the will of a beneficiary (such as in Strydom v De Lange107) as 
evidence for his view that a trustee may be under the control of a beneficiary is 
misplaced. The termination of the office of a trustee through his removal as such or 
the termination of the trust is conceptually distinct from his capacity to exercise 
independent administration of the trust while in office.108 
It is notionally possible that a trustee may be removed at the direction of a 
beneficiary, but that such trustee would still have independent control over the 
administration of the trust while in office. The question of whether the trustee may 
succumb to threats of removal, or the termination of the trust, and thereupon fail to 
act independently, is in my view irrelevant for the purposes of the establishment 
proposition and is a question that must be considered in terms of the fiduciary 
proposition. 
In view of the dictum in Land Bank v Paker, that the separation of control from 
benefit lies at the heart of the trust idea,109 together with the accepted definition of a 
trust, it is submitted that the capacity for independent control by a trustee is (at least 
indirectly) an essential element to establish a trust. This is so because the capacity 
for independence is consistent with the central idea of a trust. Accordingly, where an 
asset is made over to another without granting such person the capacity to exercise 
independent control over such asset, there can be no suggestion of a trust being 
founded but that the construction is more akin to a mandate or agency.110 
 
106  Theron (1991) TSAR 268 286. 
107  1970 2 SA 6 (T). 
108  This distinction is highlighted by the distinction between “structural” and “asset” control 
discussed in Chapter 4. See the text to n 19 in Chapter 4. 
109  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) 86E-F. 







The establishment proposition, couched in terms of the independence duality, 
therefore provides a strong theoretical basis for explaining the consequences where 
a trustee is never afforded the capacity for independence, which explanation is not 
possible by way of the fiduciary proposition. 
 
3 4 2  The fiduciary proposition as justification for the independent exercise of 
control 
It is trite that a trustee is subject to a fiduciary obligation.111 As pointed out by 
Heher JA in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd,112 “there is no magic to the term 
‘fiduciary duty’” and the essential requirement to establish such a duty is that one 
party must stand towards the other in a position of confidence and good faith which 
he is obliged to protect.113  
It is a trustee’s fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis the founder and beneficiaries that 
forms the axis around which the administration of the trust turns. As Olivier et al put 
it: 
 
“[t]he practical implementation of a trustee’s duties within the ambit of the fiduciary 
relationship can be said to provide the electric current which ensures proper and enduring 
light for the trust.”114  
 
This fiduciary duty has found legislative expression in section 9 of the TPCA, 
which requires a trustee to act in the performance of his duties and the exercise of 
his powers “with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a 
person who manages the affairs of another”.115 
It is further uncontroversial to suggest that this duty to act in a manner that can 
reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another includes the 
 
111  Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 533; Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 
(C) 813A; De Waal (2000) SALJ 557; Cameron et al Honoré 13. 
112  2004 3 SA 465 (SCA) 159. 
113  159G. The theoretical basis for a trustee’s fiduciary duty is examined in Chapter 5. See 
also Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
114  Olivier et al Trust Law 2-3. 






duty to act independently.116 This simple, but important, principle was expressed 
over a century ago by Bristow J in the following terms: 
 
“A trustee should be wholly independent, he should regard equally the interests of all the 
creditors, and he should be in position to carry out his duties without fear, favour or 
prejudice, in the interest of all the various creditors.”117 
 
The proposition that a duty of independence forms part of a trustee’s broader 
fiduciary duty has found judicial118 as well as academic119 support and, considering 
the aforementioned, there can in my view no longer be any serious debate on the 
issue. 
The fiduciary proposition further succeeds to explain the obligation of a trustee to 
exercise independent discretion in the management of trust affairs in a manner that 
the establishment proposition is unable to do.  
Recognition of the independence duality therefore permits for the establishment 
and fiduciary propositions to be reconciled. The manner in which these two 
propositions interrelate is accurately captured by Van der Linde and Lombard as 
follows: 
 
“Facts and circumstances can show that there is no de iure separation between control 
and enjoyment in that the trustees and beneficiaries are the same resulting in such a trust 
being invalid. It is also possible that there can be de iure separation in the sense that 
there is in fact an independent trustee, but de facto separation is lacking due to the way 
the trust is administered. In such an instance it seems that the trust can be valid (in that 
the essentialia are objectively met) but that trustees can be liable for breach of trust, trust 
 
116  Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 156 (W) 163D-G. 
117  Goldseller v Hill 1908 TS 822 835. This matter related to the position of a trustee of an 
insolvent estate and thus refers to a trustee in the broad sense. However, it is submitted 
that the principle that a person who manages the affairs of another should remain 
independent is also directly applicable to a trust in the narrow sense. See Hoppen v 
Shub 1987 3 SA 201 (C) 217C; Tjimstra NO v Blunt Mackenzie NO 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 
474E-F; African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2003 4 All SA 50 (C) 54B-C. 
118  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) 2008 2 SA 351 (W). 
119  F du Toit “The fiduciary office of a trustee and the protection of contingent trust 






assets can be taken in consideration for purposes of a redistribution order, or trustees 
can be held to the provisions of the trust deed.”120 
 
3 4 3  “Developing non-independence” and the “curtailment of capacity for 
independence” 
The recognition of the independence duality is further confirmed as accurate when 
the issue of “developing non-independence” and “curtailment of capacity” is 
considered. 
“Developing non-independence” refers to the  gradual decline in trustee 
independence through a progressive failure by the trustees to exercise their capacity 
for independence. 
It is conceivable that trustees of a trust be afforded the capacity for independence 
at the trust’s inception, and also initially exercise such independence. However, 
where the exercise of independence is eroded through time (owing to, for example, a 
growing familiarity between the trustees and founder), a situation may arise where it 
can no longer be said that the trust is being administered independently. 
In terms of the establishment proposition, the existence of a trust will be placed in 
doubt where a trustee is not afforded the requisite capacity for independence. 
However, the evaluation of the trustee’s independence is, under this model, confined 
to the time of establishing the trust. It is at this point in time that the trustee either has 
the requisite capacity for independence, thus giving rise to a trust, or not, thereby not 
giving rise to a trust. 
Where trustee independence is gradually eroded, it is in my view theoretically and 
practically unsound to suggest that the trust’s existence is compromised. The correct 
position is that a failure by a trustee to exercise the capacity for independence 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, developing non-independence may 
give rise to a claim for the breach of trust and the possible removal of the trustee.  
Trustee independence may also be compromised by an attempt to “curtail 
capacity for independence” through a proposed amendment to the trust deed. It is, 
however, submitted that such an attempted amendment will be visited with nullity by 
virtue of the provisions of section 9(2) of the TPCA. In terms of the independence 
duality model, a trust is established if, initially, a trustee is afforded sufficient capacity 
 






for independence. Once so established a trustee has a fiduciary obligation to 
exercise such capacity independently. Any amendment that would divest a trustee of 
the capacity for independence (and consequently excuse a trustee from such 
obligation on account of impossibility) would in my view not invalidate the trust, but 
would itself be void by virtue of the provisions of section 9(2). 
That section, which follows the statutory duty of a trustee to act in a manner that 
can be “expected of a person who manages the affairs of another”,121 reads as 
follows: 
 
“Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the 
effect of exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him against liability for breach of trust 
where he fails to show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required in subsection 
(1).”122 
 
Therefore, once it is accepted that a trustee has a fiduciary responsibility to act 
independently, it follows that, by virtue of the provisions of section 9(2) of the TPCA, 
any provision inserted in a trust deed that is aimed at somehow curtailing this duty, 
would be void for having the effect of exempting or indemnifying a trustee against 
liability for failing to act independently. 
The fiduciary proposition, couched in terms of the independence duality, therefore 
provides a sound theoretical and academic explanation for “the developing 
independence” and “curtailment of capacity” conundrums, which cannot be achieved 
through the establishment proposition alone. 
 
3 5  Conclusion 
As the discussion above reveals, the establishment and fiduciary propositions are 
not mutually exclusive but are, in reality, complementary. They each relate to one 
aspect of the independence duality, which requires a distinction to be drawn between 
the capacity of trustees to act independently and their exercise of that capacity.  
Put differently, where trustees have no objective de jure capacity to make trust 
decisions independently from third parties (such as the founder, beneficiaries, or 
advisers), it cannot be said that a trust has been established. 
 
121 Section 9(1) of the TCPA. 






However, once the requisite objective measure of independence is met (this 
measure is examined in the following chapter) the investigation turns to the manner 
in which the trustees in question have exercised this capacity. Where a trustee fails 
to bring an independent mind to bear upon the administration of the trust, such 
failure constitutes a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty in accordance with the 
fiduciary proposition. Such a breach would not invalidate the trust but could give rise 
to a claim in the hands of the beneficiaries.  
Viewed in this light, it is clear that the principal propositions explored in this 
dissertation both explain one aspect of the “independence duality”. In the following 
chapters, these two propositions will be further examined. In particular, the question 
is asked what measure of capacity for independence on the part of the trustees is 
required for a trust to be valid. In addition, competing propositions regarding the 
requirement that this capacity is to be exercised independently are examined. In this 
regard, it is submitted that the duty to bring an independent mind to bear upon trust 
business flows from the trustees’ fiduciary duty.  
The development of these propositions in this manner establishes, it is submitted, 
a sound theoretical framework to further examine questions regarding so-called 
“sham” trusts as well as under what circumstances it would be open to a court to 







CHAPTER 4:  THE ESTABLISHMENT PROPOSITION 
4 1  Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the interplay between the establishment proposition and 
the independence duality was briefly explored. The establishment proposition holds 
that, first and foremost, a founder must intend to establish a trust, and then also that 
a trustee’s capacity for independent control of the trust estate is a pre-requisite for 
the establishment of a trust.  
It, however, remains altogether uncertain what type and degree of control is 
required to satisfy this pre-requisite. In this chapter, this question is considered 
against the backdrop of the so-called “control test” primarily developed and applied 
in the USA. The examination of this test, together with its constituent aspects of 
“structural” and “asset” control, provide a basis to consider the type and extent of 
control required by the establishment proposition. 
 
4 2  The control test 
The control test is a product of judicial development in the USA1 and ascribes liability 
for corporate conduct to the true controllers of a juristic entity or collective. The test 
has its origins in the context of partnerships and in particular in the context of joint-
stock companies.2 
 
1  Williams v Inhabitants of Milton 215 Mass 1 102 NE 355 (1913); Frost v Thompson 219 
Mass 360 160 NE; Navarro Savings Association v Lee 446 US 458 (1980). 
2  As explained in Chapter 3, the description “joint-stock company” can be misleading. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, a joint-stock company does not constitute a corporation 
but a partnership. The joint-stock company has its roots in the conventional partnership 
where each partner brings into the partnership capital or skill. However, where the 
capital funding requirement is much larger, necessitating a greater number of partners, 
a structure developed whereby the parties delegated management authority to a smaller 
number (that is, a management committee). Accordingly, the joint-stock company has 
been defined as “an association in which the capital is thrown into one mass employed 
for the general benefit, each member participating in the gain according to the 
proportion of stock or capital which belongs to him.” W Wait A Treatise Upon Some of 
the General Principles of the Law: Whether Legal, or of an Equitable Nature, Including 
Their Relations and Application to Actions and Defences in General, Whether in Courts 
of Common Law, Or Courts of Equity; and Equally Adapted to Courts Governed by 






During the mid-1980s the Canadian academic, Robert Flannigan, made a 
strenuous attempt to demonstrate that the control test also applied to trusts in the 
Anglo-Canadian context.3 Flannigan proposed that the beneficiaries of a trust may 
be held liable for the debts of the trust estate in circumstances where they were the 
effective controllers of the trust business. He, therefore, suggested that the “limited 
liability” 4  that is afforded to beneficiaries of a trust should be deemed lost in 
circumstances where such beneficiaries are in a position to control the administration 
of the trust.5  This thesis supports the notion of an agency relationship between 
trustee and beneficiary (in terms of which the beneficiary is liable for the debts of the 
trust estate) on the basis of policy considerations.6 
In the USA the control test is primarily employed to distinguish between trusts and 
partnerships. This distinction is illustrated in Hecht v Malley (“Hecht”)7 where the 
United States (“US”) Supreme Court held as follows: 
 
“The ‘Massachusetts Trust’ is a form of business organization, common in that state, 
consisting essentially of an arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in 
accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and managed for the 
benefit of such persons as may from time to time be the holders of transferable 
certificates issued by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial interest in 
the property is divided. These certificates, which resemble certificates for shares of stock 
in a corporation and are issued and transferred in like manner, entitle the holders to share 
ratably in the income of the property, and, upon termination of the trust, in the proceeds. 
Under the Massachusetts decisions, these trust instruments are held to create either 
pure trusts or partnerships, according to the way in which the trustees are to conduct the 
affairs committed to their charge. If they are the principals and are free from the control of 
the certificate holders in the management of the property, a trust is created; but if the 
certificate holders are associated together in the control of the property as principals and 
 
3  RDM Flannigan “Beneficiary liability in business trusts” (1984) 6 Est & Tr Q 278; RDM 
Flannigan “The control test of principal status applied to business trusts: Part I” (1986) 8 
Est & Tr Q 37; RDM Flannigan “The control test of principal status applied to business 
trusts: Part II” (1986) 8 Est & Tr Q 97. 
4  This limited liability should not be equated to the limited liability afforded to shareholders 
of a juristic person, but refers to the protection from creditors of the trust estate 
established through the mechanism of separate estates examined in Chapter 2. 
5  Flannigan (1984) Est & Tr Q 278. 
6  These policy considerations are discussed in further detail below.  






the trustees are merely their managing agents, a partnership relation between the 
certificate holders is created.”8 
 
Flannigan approaches the matter from the perspective of the public good. He 
argues that the imposition of a similar control test to trusts outside the USA (notably 
in Canada) would serve to deter the true decision makers from harmful risk-taking, 
shielding third parties from harmful risk and thereby augmenting the public good.9 If 
actors who enjoy effective control over the administration of an estate also enjoy 
immunity from claims by third parties, so the argument goes, the probabilities of such 
actors acting in a manner prejudicial to third parties are amplified.  
However, where the effective controllers are held liable for the consequences of 
their actions, the risk of such liability serves as an effective bulwark against the 
administration of an estate in a manner which may prejudice third parties. Flannigan 
phrases the argument as follows: 
 
“The rationale for the business trust control test is the same as that for the limited 
partnership control test. Beneficiaries (like limited partners) bear a different liability 
exposure than do trustees. If their different risk aversion can be applied to the 
employment of trust assets that risk aversion will affect third parties. But third parties are 
never required to submit to a limited liability risk aversion in persons whom they actually 
deal with unless they agree. They are not subject to limited liability in persons who 
contract with them either directly or through an agent. In order to maintain this principle of 
personal liability for personal conduct the beneficiaries must be prevented from affecting 
the trust assets which are the security for third parties. Accordingly, the ability to affect 
trust assets is the factor which establishes whether the trustee or the beneficiary is liable 




“Generally, if risk-taking is not regulated, if it is insulated from its own consequences, it is 
more likely to involve the taking of greater risks and to result in a higher probability of loss 
 
8  146-147 (emphasis added). See also Navarro Savings Association v Lee 446 US 458 
(1980). 
9  Flannigan (1986) Est & Tr Q 97 111; Flannigan (1984) Est & Tr Q 278. See also 
Comment (1928) 37 Yale LJ 1103 1111-1112. 






to third parties. This rationale is as applicable to partial control as it is to complete 
superior control.”11  
 
Flannigan’s proposals were heavily criticised by Maurice Cullity.12 For Cullity, the 
imposition of liability on beneficiaries (or trustees) must be based on the intention of 
the parties to the trust and not on the basis of control.13 He contended that, outside 
of the USA and in particular within the Anglo-Canadian context, there was no 
justification for the imposition of liability on the basis of Flannigan’s risk-aversion 
principle.14 
This disagreement resulted in a vigorous academic debate between Flannigan 
and Cullity that culminated in Cullity’s final academic article on the issue in 1996.15 
The debate now appears to have been settled and, as discussed below, Cullity’s 
view is to be preferred. This view is also compatible with the establishment 
proposition and the central tenet of the independence duality.  
The imposition of a control test on trusts, as proposed by Flannigan, is therefore 
not supported. However, the work done by Flannigan and others16 in unpacking the 
control test is valuable in understanding the establishment proposition and, in 
particular, the question of the type and measure of control required thereunder.  
Particularly helpful is the distinction between “structural” and “asset” control 
developed by Flannigan.17 
 
11  Flannigan (1986) Est & Tr Q 97 111. 
12  MC Cullity “Liability of beneficiaries – a rejoinder” (1985) 6 Est & Tr Q 35; Flannigan 
(1986) Est & Tr Q 37; MC Cullity “Liability of beneficiaries – a further rejoinder" (1986) 8 
Est & Tr Q 130. 
13  Cullity (1985) Est & Tr Q 35 42. 
14  51. 
15  See, Flannigan (1984) Est & Tr Q 278; Cullity (1985) Est & Tr Q 35; Flannigan (1986) 
Est & Tr Q 37; Flannigan (1986) Est & Tr Q 97 111; Cullity (1986) Est & Tr Q 130; RDM 
Flannigan “‘Control’ and the control basis of legal relationships and business 
organizations” (1989) 53 Sask L Rev 1; RDM Flannigan “Trust or agency: beneficiary 
liability and the wise old birds” in S Goldstein (ed) Equity and Contemporary Legal 
Developments (1990) Ch 4 and MC Cullity “Personal liability of trustees and rights of 
indemnification” (1996) 16 Est & Tr J 115. 
16  See, Comment (1928) 37 Yale LJ 1103; M Honiball & L Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in 
South Africa (2009) and L Olivier “Trusts: traps and pitfalls” (2001) 118 SALJ 224 227. 






“Structural control”, on the one hand, refers to the ability to regulate the manner in 
which the trust is administered. The structure of the trust relates to, for example, the 
composition of the body of the trustees, arrangements regarding voting, notice of 
meetings, quorum requirements, and reporting to beneficiaries.18 Control over the 
structure of the trust may be granted to trustees (or others) by vesting them with the 
power to appoint and remove trustees, fill trustee vacancies, or amend the trust 
deed. These powers, when exercised, determine the structural framework of the 
trust. Persons with such powers are said to have “structural control” over the trust. 
“Asset control”, on the other hand, refers to the ability to regulate the business of 
the trust.19 Typically this type of control entails the power to determine the manner in 
which trust assets are employed and is said to be “the highest authority capable of 
being exercised in relation to any particular aspect of the actual business 
operation”.20 Examples of asset control are the power to alienate, invest, disburse or 
otherwise encumber trust property. 
In summary, structural control refers to control over the framework through which 
the trust assets are managed and asset control refers to the direct control over the 
trust assets through the framework set by the trust deed.  
 
4 3  The development of the control test through the cases 
The first hint of what would later develop into the control test appears in the English 
case of Smith v Anderson (“Smith”).21 In that matter, a trust deed provided for the 
purchase by the trustees of shares in the capital stock of different submarine 
telegraph companies.  
The proposed venture was capital intensive, and a scheme was developed 
whereby capital could be raised by permitting investors to subscribe in the trust 
against payment. These investors would, in turn, be furnished with transferable 
certificates.22 
The trust deed at issue provided that the income accruing from the submarine 
shares (together with any proceeds from the sale thereof) was to be applied by the 
 
18  41. 
19  39. 
20  39. 
21  Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 ChD 247 (CA). 






trustees in three distinct ways: first, by paying 6% interest on the certificates issued 
to subscribers; secondly, by redeeming these trust certificates at an agreed price of 
£120; and, finally, when all the certificates had been redeemed, the surplus, if any, 
was to be divided between the former certificate holders.23 The trustees accordingly 
had limited powers to sell securities and reinvest but had more extensive powers if 
their decision was confirmed at a meeting of certificate holders. Smith, who was a 
certificate holder, sought relief declaring the scheme illegal by virtue of the provisions 
of the then applicable Companies Act of 1862 (requiring registration of an 
association with more than 20 members that intended to conduct business).  
At issue, therefore, was whether this arrangement constituted an association or 
whether a trust was established, in which event registration under the Companies 
Act of 1862 was not required. In the court a quo Smith was successful, but the 
decision was overturned on appeal.  
It was held in the Court of Appeal that the arrangement constituted a trust and not 
an association or partnership. This conclusion was partially reached on the ground 
that there was no evidence that the trustees were agents of the certificate holders:  
 
“They [the parties to the scheme] are from the first entire strangers who have entered into 
no contract whatever with each other, nor has either of them entered into any contract 
with the trustees or any trustee on behalf of the other, there being nothing in the deed 
pointing to any mandate or delegation of authority to anybody to act for the certificate 
holders as between themselves, and nothing, as it appears to me, by which any liability 
could ever be cast upon the certificate holders either as between themselves or between 
themselves and anybody else. Therefore, I cannot arrive at the conclusion that the 
certificate holders form an association within the meaning of this Act of Parliament any 
more than persons who subscribe for debentures in a railway … Persons who have no 
mutual rights or obligations do not, according to my view, constitute an association 
because they happen to have a common interest or several interests in something that is 
to be divided between them.”24 
 
Smith informed the decision in Williams v Inhabitants of Milton (“Milton”),25 a case 
often credited as being the first in which the control test was applied to trusts in the 
 
23  274. 
24  274-275 (emphasis added). 






USA.26 That matter turned on the proper interpretation and status of the Boston 
Personal Property Trust (“the Boston Trust”) and in particular on how it stood to be 
taxed.  
The Boston Trust was a property-holding trust with immovable assets held in 
different tax jurisdictions. The trust also issued transferable certificates to 
beneficiaries and the proceeds of the trust’s business would ultimately flow into the 
hands of these certificate holders.27 
In the city of Boston, taxes in respect of the trust property had been assessed on 
the basis that the trust was, in reality, a partnership (in the sense of the joint-stock 
company) whereas in the municipalities of Milton, Waltham, and Brookline the trust 
property was taxed as property held in trust, the income of which was payable to 
another.28 
After discussing Smith, and analysing the trust deed in question, the court held 
that the trustees had sufficient control over the trust assets for the arrangement to 
constitute a trust. The court held: 
 
“The certificate holders are throughout called ‘cestuis que trustent.’ The certificate 
holders, or ‘cestuis que trustent,’ are in no way associated together, nor is there any 
provision in the indenture of trust for any meeting to be held by them. The only act which 
(under the trust indenture) they can do is to consent to an alteration or amendment of the 
trust created by the indenture or to a termination of it before the time fixed in the deed. 
But they cannot force the trustees to make such alteration, amendment or termination. It 
is for the trustees to decide whether they will do any one of these things. All that the 
certificate holders or ‘cestuis que trustent’ can do is to give or withhold their consent to 
the trustees taking such action. 
And the giving or withholding of consent by the cestuis que trust is not to be had in a 
meeting, but is to be given by them individually. As we have said, no meeting of the 
cestuis que trust for that or any other purpose is provided for in the trust indenture. The 
trustees of the Boston Personal Property Trust have a right to sell the trust securities and 
reinvest the proceeds, and also a limited power to borrow on the security of the trust 
property. The certificate holders, or ‘cestuis que trustent,’ as they are called in the trust 
deed, have a common interest in precisely the same sense that the members of a class 
of life tenants (among whom the income of a trust fund is to be distributed) have a 
 
26  Although the Milton case is generally credited with originating the control test, it had 
been used before. See, PLW “Liability of shareholders in a business trust – the control 
test” (1962) 48 Va L Rev 1105 and the cases cited there in the text to n 1 and n 12. 
27  356. 






common interest, but they are not socii, and it is the trustees, not the certificate holders, 
who are the masters of the trust property. 
The sole right of the cestuis que trust is to have the property administered in their 
interest by the trustees, who are the masters, to receive income while the trust lasts, and 
their share of the corpus when it comes to an end.”29 
 
Therefore, the control over the manner in which the trust property was to be 
applied was held to be definitive of the status of the trustees and, as a consequence, 
the nature of the arrangement. From the ratio above, it is clear that the court in 
Milton considered asset control as decisive in this regard, as it was the control over 
the assets and not the structure in terms of which the trust was administered, that 
was determinative. Consequently, the nature of the Boston Trust as a trust was 
affirmed and it stood to be taxed on that basis. 
In Frost v Thompson (“Frost”),30 decided by the same court only a year after the 
Milton case, the degree of certificate holder control was again held to be decisive, 
but increased emphasis was placed on structural control. That matter concerned 
efforts of the holder of a promissory note to execute the note against the assets of a 
joint-stock company, the Buena Vista Fruit Company.  
The plaintiff had previously brought a successful action against the trustees in 
their personal capacity which he sought to enforce. The action in question related to 
the trustees’ right to be indemnified from the trust estate. In affirming the test set out 
in the Milton case, the court held as follows: 
 
“A declaration of trust or other instrument providing for the holding of property by trustees 
for the benefit of the owners of assignable certificates representing the beneficial interest 
in the property may create a trust or it may create a partnership. Whether it is the one or 
the other depends upon the way in which the trustees are to conduct the affairs 
committed to their charge. If they act as principals and are free from the control of the 
certificate holders, a trust is created; but if they are subject to the control of the certificate 
holders, it is a partnership.”31 
 
 
29  Williams v Inhabitants of Milton 215 Mass 1 102 NE 355 (1913) 358 (emphasis added). 
30  219 Mass 360 160 NE 1009 (1914). 






In examining the declaration of trust in question, the court arrived at the 
conclusion that the association was a partnership based on the level of structural 
control enjoyed by the certificate holders: 
 
“Tested by the principles laid down [in the Milton case], the Buena Vista Fruit Company is 
a partnership and not a trust. It is a voluntary association organized under two 
instruments, one called a ‘declaration of trust’ and the other, ‘by-laws.’ These two 
instruments provide that the shareholders representing two thirds in value of outstanding 
shares have power to remove either or all of the trustees at any time, without assigning 
any cause, and to appoint others to fill the vacancy; to terminate the trust at any time 
earlier than that limited for its duration in the declaration of trust, and to terminate it by 
requiring conveyance of the property to other trustees upon new trusts, or to a 
corporation. A majority of the shareholders at any time by vote may amend the 
declaration of trust. The by-laws may be ‘altered, amended or repealed’ by vote of the 
majority of the shareholders ‘at any annual or special meeting of the … shareholders.’ 
These provisions demonstrate that this association is a partnership and not a trust.”32 
 
Subsequent case law in the USA has supported the analysis in the Frost case 
when similar powers were reserved for beneficial owners.33 It thus appears that 
structural control has been placed on a level footing with asset control as an 
indicator of the type of control required to establish a trust.  
However, in the minority opinion by Blackmun J in the US Supreme Court case of 
Navarro Savings Association v Lee (“Navarro”) 34  some doubt was cast on the 
suitability of structural control as a test for independence.  
In Navarro, the respondents were the eight trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors 
(“Fidelity”), a business trust organised in terms of the laws of Massachusetts. 
Significantly, the trust deed vested the trustees with full asset control over the trust 
assets.35 During 1971, the trustees lent a sum of $850 000 to a Texas firm in return 
 
32  365-366. 
33  See First Nat’l Bank v Chartier 305 Mass 316 25 NE 2d 733 (1940); Neville v Gifford 
242 Mass 124 136 NE 160 (1922). 
34  446 US 458 (1980). 
35  459. The deed provided that the trustees held title to the real estate investments of the 
trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries (termed shareholders) and that they had 
exclusive authority over the property “free from any power and control of the 
Shareholders, to the same extent as if the Trustees were the sole owners of the Trust 






for a promissory note payable to them. The note was secured by an undertaking 
from Navarro Savings Association (“the Association”) (the petitioner in the appeal) to 
cover the obligations of the Texas firm to the trustees.36  The trustees were all 
resident in the state of Massachusetts, but the residence of the various shareholders 
(numbering approximately 990) varied, with at least some being resident within the 
state of Texas.37 
In 1973, the trustees called upon the Association to perform in terms of the 
undertaking and, when the Association refused, enforcement action in a federal court 
followed.38 The Association objected to the court’s jurisdiction on the basis that the 
parties lacked sufficient diversity of residence.39 The district court concluded that a 
business trust was a citizen of every state in which its shareholders reside and that, 
since some shareholders were residents of the state of Texas, the parties lacked the 
required diversity of residence to confer jurisdiction onto the federal court system.40 
An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
finding of the district court on the basis that Fidelity’s residence was to be 
 
36  Navarro Savings Association v Lee 446 US 458 (1980) 459. 
37  460. 
38  Due to its federal nature, there are two parallel court systems in the USA, namely state 
and federal courts. State and local courts are established by a state (within states there 
are also local courts that are established by cities, counties, and other municipalities). 
Federal courts are established under the US Constitution to decide disputes involving 
the Constitution and laws passed by congress. State courts have broad jurisdiction 
limited by geographical area. Federal court jurisdiction, by contrast, is limited to the 
types of cases listed in the Constitution. These include cases against the federal 
government, matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution or laws of congress, 
bankruptcy and patents, and disputes between citizens of differing states based on the 
“diversity principle” (see the text in n 39 below). For a useful explanation of the US legal 
system see <http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure> 
(accessed 11-07-2018). 
39  In the matter of Strawbridge v Curtis 7 US 267 (1806), the US Supreme Court set out 
the basis of jurisdiction of federal courts on the diversity principle. According to this 
principle, a federal district court would have jurisdiction over a matter if there is complete 
diversity of residence between the parties. The principle was laid down that for diversity 
jurisdiction to exist, no party on the one side of a suit may be a citizen of the same state 
as a party on the other side of the suit. Therefore, if, in the event of a multiple parties, 
one of the claimants was a citizen of the same state as one of the defendants, the 
matter should be dealt with by the State Court of the state concerned.  






adjudicated with reference to those of the trustees and not the shareholders. In 
arriving at this conclusion the Court of Appeals relied on the asset control enjoyed by 
the trustees.41 The court therefore held that, since diversity of residence existed 
between the trustees on the one hand (who were residents of Massachusetts), and 
the Association on the other (which was a resident of Texas), the federal courts 
enjoyed jurisdiction to hear the matter.  
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari42 and affirmed the finding of the Court of 
Appeals. The court held that Fidelity’s residence should be determined based on that 
of its trustees. In the justification, the majority per Powell J, relied on the earlier 
decision in Bullard v Cisco,43 and on the control that the trustees enjoyed over the 
trust’s assets. The position was set out as follows: 
 
“Bullard reaffirms that a trustee is a real party to the controversy for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction when he possesses certain customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose 
of assets for the benefit of others. The trustees in this case have such powers. At all 
relevant times, Fidelity operated under a declaration of trust that authorized the trustees 
to take legal title to trust assets, to invest those assets for the benefit of the shareholders, 
and to sue and be sued in their capacity as trustees.”44 
 
 
41  460. 
42  “Certiorari” may be translated from Latin as “to be informed of, or to be made certain in 
regard to”. See, <http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/certiorari.htm> 
(accessed 11-07-2018). According to the Legal Information Institute of Cornell University, 
“Certiorari is most commonly associated with the writ that the Supreme Court of the 
United States issues to review a lower court's judgment. A case cannot, as a matter of 
right, be appealed to the US Supreme Court; therefore, a party seeking to appeal from 
a lower court decision may file a petition to a higher court for a writ of certiorari. That writ 
is the formal order to the lower court to deliver its record of the case for review. In the 
US Supreme Court, if four Justices agree to review the case, then the Court grants 
certiorari (often abbreviated as “cert.”); if that does not happen, the Court denies 
certiorari” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/certiorari> (accessed 11-07-2018). 
43  290 US 179 189 (1933) 190. In Bullard v Cisco the trust beneficiaries were numerous 
investors who had conveyed bonds to a central committee. The agreement in terms of 
which the bonds were so conveyed, did not use trust terminology, but it was 
nevertheless held that the power enjoyed by the committee over the assets of the 
beneficiaries rendered them the relevant persons for litigation and that “[t]he 
beneficiaries were not necessary parties and their citizenship was immaterial”. Bullard v 
Cisco therefore affirmed juristic asset control as the determinative measure of control.  






The asset control enjoyed by the trustees was accordingly held to be 
determinative of the nature of the trust. Since the nature of the trust was affirmed, 
the trust’s residence was determined with reference to that of the trustees and, 
consequently, sufficient jurisdictional diversity existed for the Federal Courts to 
exercise jurisdiction.  
 In a dissenting opinion, Blackmun J disagreed strongly with the conclusion 
reached by the majority of the court. He affirmed the control test as applied in Frost 
and, in an implicit endorsement of the view that structural control is central to the 
control test, opined as follows: 
 
“That the trustees’ control over the assets of Fidelity is substantial may be accepted 
without quarrel. The Court fails to recognize, however, that the Declaration of Trust 
[applicable to Fidelity] lodges in the beneficial shareholders substantial control over the 
actions of these trustees. Article 2.1 of the Declaration provides that the trustees are to be 
elected at annual shareholder meetings by a majority of the shares voted… Article 2.2 
provides that trustees may be removed from office, with or without cause, by vote of the 
majority of the outstanding shares… Article 6.7 vests in the shareholders two significant 
powers: the ability to call a special meeting upon the request of not less than 20% of the 
outstanding shares, and the requirement that any sale, lease, exchange, or other 
disposition of more than 50% of the trust assets is to be made only upon the affirmative 
approval of the holders of a majority of the shares … Most significantly, Art. 8.2 reserves 
to the holders of a majority of the shares the right to terminate the trust at any 





“While I prefer and accept the Court of Appeals’ approach to this case, I am persuaded, 
on that approach, that one cannot ignore the pervasive measure of control that Fidelity’s 
shareholders possess over the trustees’ actions taken [on] their behalf. … That factor, in 
my view, is the principal distinction between the ongoing business entity at issue here and 
the trust relationship among certificate holders and the bondholders’ committee that was 
at issue in Bullard v Cisco 290 U.S. 179 (1933), cited and relied upon by the Court … 
Though the question is not free from doubt, in the light of these circumstances I believe 
that the citizenship of Fidelity should be determined according to the citizenship of its 
beneficial shareholders, and that diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case.”46 
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Notwithstanding the debate regarding the relevance of structural control in 
determining the true controllers of the trust, Navarro affirmed the control test as the 
decisive manner in evaluating the nature of a trust-like arrangement in the USA. 
The decision in Navarro has given rise to significant debate. Carden v Arkoma 
Associates (“Carden”),47 a matter in which the US Supreme Court was called upon to 
determine the residence of a limited partnership, appeared to overturn Navarro’s 
reliance on the control test in the context of an association.  
Carden concerned a limited partnership organised in terms of Arizona law. The 
association, Arkoma Associates (“Arkoma”), had both general and limited partners 
and sued the defendants who were citizens of Louisiana, in a federal court. One of 
the limited partners was a resident of Louisiana and the defendants accordingly 
contended that the court lacked jurisdiction on the diversity principle.48 
The matter proceeded to trial and Arkoma succeeded. Upon appeal by the 
defendants, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the court a quo holding that 
Arkoma’s residence was to be determined based on its general partners only.49 
This decision was overruled on appeal to the US Supreme Court. Arkoma 
repeated the argument that its residence should be determined based on its general 
partners as these were the persons who had effective control over the partnership. In 
support it cited Navarro.50 The US Supreme Court distinguished Navarro on the 
basis that “Navarro had nothing to do with the citizenship of the ‘trust,’ since it was a 
suit by the trustees in their own names.”51 
The court held that for the purposes of an association, which it stressed was not a 
corporate entity, the residence of all partners was relevant. In this regard, it relied on 
the so-called “doctrinal wall” of Chapman v Barney,52 a case involving a joint-stock 
company and to the effect that the US courts would only treat incorporated groups of 
“artificial entities” as legal persons and would assimilate all other groupings to 
partnerships.53 
 
47  494 US 185 (1990). 
48  186. 
49  186. 
50  199. 
51  192 to 193. 
52  129 US 677 (1889). 






There matters laid in abeyance for over a decade and a half. In 2016, the US 
Supreme Court decided the matter of Americold Realty Trust v ConAgra Foods Inc 
(“Americold”).54  
Americold involved a lawsuit brought by several corporations against the owner of 
an underground warehouse, housing the corporations’ food products. The 
warehouse, and its content, were destroyed by fire in 1991 and the corporations 
sought to hold the owner, Americold Realty Trust (“Americold”), liable for their loss.55 
Americold was a so-called real estate investment trust (“REIT”) created under 
Maryland law.  
Initially, the suit was brought in a Kansas state court but was later transferred to a 
federal district court.56 On appeal, the appellate court raised the issue of Americold’s 
residence for jurisdictional purposes. It was clear that the plaintiff corporations were 
all residents of different States but the appellate court concluded, on the basis of 
Carden, that Americold’s residence was to be determined by that of its 
shareholders.57 Since there was no evidence before the court on the residence of all 
of Americold’s shareholders, so it was held, the parties failed to demonstrate the 
residence diversity required to establish jurisdiction.58 
The US Supreme Court affirmed this finding. In so doing, it singled out for 
discussion Americold’s argument that, under Navarro, “anything called a ‘trust’ 
possesses the citizenship of its trustees alone, not its shareholder beneficiaries as 
well.” In distinguishing Navarro, the Court first examined the nature of a REIT. In 
Maryland a real estate investment trust (REIT) is defined as an “unincorporated 
business trust or association” in which property is held and managed “for the benefit 
and profit of any person who may become a shareholder”.59  
Against this background, the Supreme Court observed that “[a]s with joint-stock 
companies and partnerships, shareholders [in a REIT] have ‘ownership interests’ 
 
54  577 US 136 S Ct 1012 (2016). 
55  Para I. 
56  Para I. 
57  See ConAgra Foods Inc v Americold Logistics LLC 776 F. 3d 1175 1182 (2015) 1180-
1181. The terms “beneficiaries” and “shareholders” were used interchangeably or 
conjunctively as “beneficiary shareholders”. 
58  Para III. 






and votes in the trust by virtue of their ‘shares of beneficial interest’.”60 It is therefore 
clear that, for the Supreme Court, the measure of asset control afforded to 
shareholders of a REIT distinguished it from a “traditional trust” and placed it on 
equal footing with joint-stock companies and partnerships.61 
The distinction between “traditional trusts”, as was the focus in Navarro, and a 
REIT such as Americold, was determinative. In this regard the Supreme Court held 
that: 
 
“Traditionally, a trust was not considered a distinct legal entity, but a ‘fiduciary 
relationship’ between multiple people… Such a relationship was not a thing that could be 
haled into court; legal proceedings involving a trust were brought by or against the 
trustees in their own name … And when a trustee files a lawsuit or is sued in her own 
name, her citizenship is all that matters for diversity purposes… For a traditional trust, 
therefore, there is no need to determine its membership, as would be true if the trust, as 
an entity, were sued. 
Many States, however, have applied the ‘trust’ label to a variety of unincorporated 
entities that have little in common with this traditional template. Maryland, for example, 
treats a real estate investment trust as a ‘separate legal entity’ that itself can sue or be 
sued… So long as such an entity is unincorporated, we apply our ‘oft-repeated rule’ that it 
possesses the citizenship of all its members … But neither this rule nor Navarro limits an 
entity’s membership to its trustees just because the entity happens to call itself a trust. 
We therefore decline to apply the same rule to an unincorporated entity sued in its 
organizational name that applies to a human trustee sued in her personal name.”62 
 
The significance of the distinction between a REIT and a “traditional trust” in 
interpreting Americold, was underscored in Wang, by and through Wong v New 
Mighty U.S. Trust (“New Mighty”).63 New Mighty concerned a rags-to-riches tale of a 
family patriarch and the subsequent feud over the sequestering of his immense 
wealth to the exclusion of his wife.  
 
60  Para II. The reference to the “ownership interest” and votes according to “shares of 
beneficial interest” appears from the Md. Corp. & Assns. Code Ann. Paras 8-7049(b)(5) 
and 8-101(d). 
61  See also MS McNamara and RCK Boyd “REIT citizenship and the impact of Americold 
Realty Trust on jurisdictional challenges” <https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-
insights/reit-citizenship-and-the-impact-of-americold-realty-trust-on.htm> (accessed 01-
05-2018). 
62  Para III. 






Born into a poor tea-farming family in Taiwan in 1917, Yung-Ching Wang (“Yung-
Ching”), who was unable to attend high school as a result of poverty, married the 
teenage Yueh-Lan Wang (“Yueh-Lan”) in 1935. In 1954 he established the Formosa 
Plastics Group. This group achieved tremendous success and, by the time of Yung-
Ching’s death in 2008, Forbes magazine ranked him as the 178th wealthiest person 
in the world, with an estimated net worth of $6.8 billion.64 
Although Yung-Ching remained married to Yueh-Lan through the course of his 
life, he also fathered several children with two other women, Wang Yan Chiao 
(“Chiao”) and PC Lee (“Lee”). Yueh-Lan helped raise some of these children and she 
considered one child in particular, Winston Wen-Young Wong (“Winston”), whose 
biological mother was Chiao, as her son. 
Three years prior to his death, Yung-Ching made several distributions and stock 
transfers to the New Mighty US Trust (“the US Trust”), a trust formed under the laws 
of the District of Columbia in the USA, and thereby effectively placed the bulk of his 
wealth out of the reach of Yueh-Lan.65 In October 2010, Winston, who purported to 
act on behalf of Yueh-Lan, sued the US Trust for return of the distributions made to 
it.66 
One of the issues that stood to be determined was whether the court had 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. The matter came before the district court prior to the 
hearing of Americold and, in employing Carden’s language of an “artificial entity”, the 
court concluded that the residence of a traditional trust was also to be determined by 
that of its beneficiaries. The composition of the US Trust’s beneficiaries was such 
that diversity of jurisdiction would have been excluded. 
An appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed but 
was held in abeyance by the passing of Yueh-Lan and interlocutory disputes about 
Winston’s authority to proceed with the action. This dispute was referred to the 
 
64  Para I. 
65  Para I. 
66  Winston alleged that Lee and members of her family created the New Mighty Trust to 
defraud Yueh-Lan and that the distributions to this trust resulted from undue influence 
that Lee exerted on Yung-Ching. See Wang, by and through Wong v New Mighty U.S. 






appellate court to be heard together with the appeal but was again delayed when it 
became apparent that the US Supreme Court was to determine Americold.67 
The Court of Appeal consequently had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Americold and, on the basis of the distinction between a REIT and a “traditional trust” 
raised in that case, it concluded that the residence of a traditional trust was to be 
determined by that of the trustees.68 
What remained to be determined was whether the US Trust was, in fact, a 
“traditional trust”. In considering this question the court placed considerable 
emphasis on Title 19 of the DC Code, which includes the District of Columbia’s 
version of the Uniform Trust Code.69 
The court concluded that “a traditional trust was a trust that lacks juridical person 
status.”70 In arriving at this conclusion the court highlighted sections of the DC Code 
and the Restatement of Trusts71 that emphasise “control” as a central feature of a 
trust. It held: “[a] trustee shall take reasonable steps to take control of and protect the 
trust property” 72  and “[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to take 
reasonable steps to take and keep control of the trust property”.73 
Against this background, the US Trust was held to be a traditional trust and the 
decision of the court a quo was reversed. The questions regarding Winston’s 
authority to proceed with the action were referred to the district court for 
consideration.74 
 
67  Para I, n 6. 
68  13. 
69  District of Columbia Code para 19-1304.01(2).  
70  16-17. 
71  The restatement on trusts is a product of the American Law Institute (“ALI”). The ALI is 
an independent organisation based in the USA that states as its aim the production of 
“scholarly works to clarify, modernize, and improve the law”. See the website of the ALI 
at <https://www.ali.org/about-ali/> (accessed 11-07-2018). 
72  District of Columbia Code para 19-1308.09 (emphasis added). 
73  Restatement (second) of trusts, para 175 (emphasis added).  
74  Page 20. The litigation in the matter is ongoing. After the resolution of litigation relating 
to the appointment of the executors in Taiwan, the US Trust raised a motion that 
litigation in the USA be halted on the basis of forum non conveniens. This defence was 
determined in favour of the US Trust by the district court in February 2018. An appeal 
followed to the United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia, see Robert 






Navarro, Americold and New Mighty all illustrate that control by the trustees (and 
by implication the control test as developed in Milton and Frost) remains an 
important consideration in the USA for determining the true nature of a trust and in 
particular whether it is a “traditional trust”, which in turn affects the question of 
liability. 
 
4 4  The control test in South Africa 
In the South African context, the control test often solicits a reference to the 
reasoning in Badenhorst v Badenhorst (“Badenhorst”).75  
In that case, the SCA approached the question of whether assets of a trust are to 
be taken into account for a redistribution order in a divorce, in terms of section 7(3) 
of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (“the Divorce Act”)76 on the basis of control exercised 
by one of the parties.  
The matter entailed a bitter divorce wherein Mrs Badenhorst contended that the 
assets of a family trust were to be taken into account as part of Mr Badenhorst’s 
estate for the purposes of calculating a possible redistribution of assets following 
their divorce. The facts were briefly as follows. 
The parties were married to each other out of community of property in 1981, and 
subsequently lived on the family farm, at that stage, owned by Mr Badenhorst’s 
father. It was at all times understood that Mr Badenhorst would eventually inherit his 
 
7066 (D.C. Cir. 2019) available at 
<https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4600239/robert-shi-v-new-mighty-us-trust/> 
(accessed 21-01-2020). The court of appeal held that the district court erred in 
upholding the plea of forum non conveniens and, again, remitted the matter to the 
district court for consideration on the merits. At the time of writing (December 2019) the 
matter remained unresolved.  
75  2006 2 SA 255 (SCA). See BS Smith “Sham trusts in South Africa: tempora mutantur, 
nos et mutamur in illis (times change, and we change with them)” (2019) 136 SALJ 
550 556; F du Toit, B Smith & A van der Linde Fundamentals of South African Trust Law 
(2019) 140-141. 
76  The power of a court to order a redistribution under this Act is examined in detail in part 
6 5 2 in Chapter 6. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that section 7(3) of the 
Divorce Act is aimed at ameliorating an inequity that may arise in a divorce where the 
parties at the time of their marriage did not have the option of concluding a marriage out 
of community of property with the inclusion of the accrual system, which option was only 






father’s farm and the couple farmed the farm as if it were already theirs. Upon the 
death of Mr Badenhorst’s mother, the farm devolved upon a trust, where it was held 
at the time of the trial. In addition, the couple established another trust, the Jubli 
Trust in which they, during the currency of their marriage, acquired immovable 
property for investment and recreation.77 It was the status of this trust that formed the 
focus of the appeal. 
In 2001 Mr Badenhorst purchased the shares in a company, Catwalk Investments 
(Pty) Ltd, in the name of the Jubli Trust. The company owned the franchise for the 
Seeff Real Estate Agency for the area where the parties lived. While 50% of the 
shares in the company were donated to Mrs Badenhorst, the trust retained the other 
50%.78 
The Jubli Trust was founded by Mr Badenhorst’s father and the trustees were 
Mr Badenhorst and his brother, and the capital beneficiaries were Mr Badenhorst’s 
children. Mrs Badenhorst was an income beneficiary.79  
Mr Badenhorst also enjoyed structural control over the trust. In this sense he had 
the right to discharge his co-trustee at will and appoint another in his place, and the 
trust deed provided that its terms could only be varied with the consent of the 
founder and, upon his death, that of his children. The trust deed also provided that 
Mr Badenhorst was to be compensated from the trust estate for his duties as 
trustee.80 
The evidence in the trial revealed that Mr Badenhorst ignored the core principles 
of the proper administration of the trusts. Combrinck AJA summarised his conduct as 
follows: 
 
“From the evidence of [Mrs Badenhorst] it is clear that in his conduct of the affairs of the 
trust [Mr Badenhorst] seldom consulted or sought the approval of his co-trustee, his 
brother. He was, in short, in full control of the trust. Furthermore, he paid scant regard to 
the difference between trust assets and his own assets. So, for instance, in a written 
application for credit facilities with the local co-operative, dated 27 March 2002, he listed 
the trust assets as his own. The liabilities in the form of bonds over the fixed property and 
the rental income from the buildings he also described as his. At one stage he insured the 
 
77  Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA) para 4. 
78  Para 4. 
79  Para 10. 






beach cottage (a trust asset) in his own name. A property in Calitzdorp registered in 
[Mr Badenhorst’s] name … was financed by the trust. He received an income of R50 000 
a month from the Seeff agencies when in fact the shares (50%) in the company Catwalk 
Investments (Pty) Ltd were owned by the trust. It is evident that, but for the trust, 
ownership in all the assets would have vested in [Mr Badenhorst].”81 
 
It is therefore clear that, on the facts, Mr Badenhorst utilised the trust assets as his 
own. In holding that these assets were to be included in his estate for the purposes 
of the divorce action, the court adopted a “but for” test82 in the sense that it examined 
whether the above amounted to evidence that Mr Badenhorst “controlled the trust 
and but for the trust would have acquired and owned the assets in his own name”.83 
It is within this context that the control exercised by Mr Badenhorst was emphasised.  
 
“Control must be de facto and not necessarily de iure. A nominee of a sole shareholder 
may have de iure control of the affairs of the company but the de facto control rests with 
the shareholder. De iure control of a trust is in the hands of the trustees but very often the 
founder in business or family trusts appoints close relatives or friends who are either 
supine or do the bidding of their appointer. De facto the founder controls the trust. To 
determine whether a party has such control it is necessary to first have regard to the 
terms of the trust deed, and secondly to consider the evidence of how the affairs of the 
trust were conducted during the marriage.”84 
 
It is therefore immediately clear that the court, in Badenhorst, did not employ the 
traditional control test as developed in the USA to determine whether a trust was 
established. The validity of the trust was assumed. What was in question was 
whether, based on Mr Badenhorst’s conduct, the “veneer of the trust” was to be 
“pierced”.85 
 
81  Para 11.  
82  This is the phrase preferred by Du Toit: F du Toit “Trusts and the patrimonial 
consequences of divorce: recent developments in South Africa” (2015) 8 Journal of Civil 
Law Studies 665 699. See also M de Jong, J le Roux-Bouwer & T Manthwa “Attacking 
trusts upon divorce and in maintenance matters: guidelines for the road ahead (1)” 
(2017) 80 THRHR 201 n 33 206. However, the phrase is criticised as not meaningful as 
all trustees hold property “but for” the trust: Smith (2019) SALJ 565. 
83  Para 9. 
84  Para 9. 
85  For the reasons set out in Chapter 6, I am of the view that this terminology is to be 
avoided. A more accurate term for the relief at hand is, in my view, “disregarding the 






Smith also accurately points out that the terminology used in Badenhorst is 
inaccurate: 
 
“the requirement that control must be ‘de facto and not necessarily de iure’ is also 
potentially misleading. It is most certainly beyond cavil that a trustee must have de iure 
control of the trust property. However, the context in which this remark was made is all-
important. Combrinck AJA clearly had in mind de facto ‘control’ by a dominant trustee that 
results in an abuse of the trust form. But even so, the requirement that such control need 
‘not necessarily [be] de iure’ is inaccurate because it implies that abuse which is the result 
of de iure control could lead to a piercing of the trust’s veneer.”86 
 
Smith proceeds to explain, in my view correctly, that the terminology used in 
Badenhorst is more appropriate in the context of examining the validity of the trust, 
as the retention of control by the founder might have compromised the establishment 
of the trust.87 For this reason, the “control test” formulated in Badenhorst cannot be 
equated with the control test as developed in the USA, which has not been applied in 
South Africa. 
Honiball and Olivier have advocated for what they also refer to as a “control test” 
to be applied to trusts in South Africa.88 They have suggested that where the founder 
of a trust exercises effective control over the trust, through for example an over-
prescriptive trust deed, the validity of the trust may be compromised.89  
In support of this submission, the authors point to so-called “section 38 trusts” 
established in accordance with section 38(2)(b) of the (now repealed) Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 (“the 1973 Act”).90 Section 38 of the 1973 Act prohibited financial 
 
whether the court in Badenhorst did in fact disregard the separate estate of the Jubli 
Trust or whether it simply ordered redistribution in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act. As discussed in Chapter 6, I agree with Smith that Badenhorst was an instance 
where the trust’s separate estate was disregarded. See the discussion at part 6 5 2 in 
Chapter 6. 
86  Smith (2019) SALJ 565. 
87  565. 
88  The central tenet of Honiball and Olivier’s thesis is examined in Chapter 3. See the text 
to n 38 in Chapter 3. 
89  Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts 250-251; Olivier (2001) SALJ 224 227. 
90  The 1973 Companies Act has since been replaced by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 






assistance by a company for the purchase of its own shares.91 However, section 
38(2) provided an exception to this general rule, and allowed a company to give 
financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares if the shares were to be held 
in trust for the benefit of its employees.92  
A study by L Olivier93 revealed that the deeds of trusts so established often afford 
special powers to the company vis-à-vis the trustees, such as the power to: 
 
(i) appoint and remove trustees; 
(ii) fix trustees’ remuneration and to determine the interest rate on loans made 
to or incurred by the trust; 
(iii) amend the trust deed and even terminate the trust; and 
(iv) decide who should be beneficiaries, which shares can be allocated to which 
beneficiaries and how payments should be made.94 
 
These powers are plainly structural in nature. Other examples listed by Honiball 
and Olivier them, are a mix of asset and structural control.95 It accordingly appears 
 
91  Although the 1973 Act has now been repealed, many such trusts are still in existence 
today. In addition, there is reason to believe that this practice will continue under the 
new 2008 Act. While section 38 of the 1973 Act has not been duplicated in the 2008 Act, 
it is submitted that the spirit of section 38(2) of the 1973 Act finds expression in section 
44(3) of the 2008 Act. Section 44(3) of the 2008 Act allows a company to provide 
financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares if such assistance is directed at 
existing employees, or a particular category of potential recipients. It appears that these 
provisions are aimed at aiding South African corporations to transform their shareholder 
base and contribute to the policy of Black Economic Empowerment. Despite the fact that 
section 44 of the 2008 Act does not require financial assistance to be held in trust, as 
was the case under section 38 of the 1973 Act, it is submitted that the practice of 
establishing empowerment trusts, as well as the familiarity of section 38 trusts, will 
contribute thereto that financial assistance in terms of section 44 of the 2008 Act will 
often be conducted through the trust institution. 
92  Section 38(2)(b) of the 1973 Act. 
93  Olivier (2001) SALJ 224. 
94  227. 
95  Examples listed by them are:  
(i) that the founder retains the lifetime power to dismiss and appoint trustees and to 
vary the provisions of the trust deed; 
(ii) that the founder is entitled to a distribution of trust capital or income in his or her 






that Honiball and Olivier do not emphasise the distinction between asset and 
structural control and that the decisive factor for validity is that the founder be 
divested of general control over the trust assets and that a functional separation 
between the control over and benefit of those assets be established. If the founder 
retains control over the trust estate, Honiball and Oliver contend that the validity of 
the trust may be compromised.96  
This result represents a significant departure from the control test proposed by 
Flannigan. Flannigan does not propose that control by others renders the trust 
invalid, but merely seeks to impose liability on such controllers for the consequences 
of acts by the trustees. 
The “control test” proposed by Honiball and Olivier is therefore reminiscent of the 
establishment proposition, which differs from the US control test in important 
respects. 
 
4 4 1  The establishment proposition and the control test distinguished  
The chief distinction between the control test and the establishment proposition is 
its goal or objective. The control test seeks to justify liability of the true controllers of 
the trust based on the risk-aversion principle. Flannigan explains the application of 
the principle as follows:  
 
“Risk-taking is implemented through what has been described herein as asset control. An 
ability to make decisions in relation to the employment of assets gives effect to a person’s 
risk set or risk-taking. The regulation of risk-taking, accordingly, is accomplished by the 
establishment of a rule that attaches principal status to a person who is in a position to 
apply his risk set to the employment of assets. This prevents others being exposed to 
what would be an unregulated, and hence objectionable, risk-taking. Typically, this means 
that the person now labelled as a principal will be liable for a loss to third parties. If a third 
party suffers loss, it will be because the business operation has generated a tort or 
degenerated into insolvency. When a beneficiary has an ability to affect the employment 
of assets (i.e., a right to control), his risk set will have been incorporated into the 
 
(iii) that the trustees must at all times act in the exclusive interests of the founder; and 
(iv) that important administrative decisions require the founder’s prior written consent.  
See Honiball & Olivier Taxation of Trusts 250. 






operation and he will be partly responsible for the probability of tort and contract loss that 
is associated with that operation.”97 
 
The control test, therefore, has a utilitarian goal and seeks to militate against the 
abuse of the trust form and to ensure responsible management of the trust. In order 
to achieve this goal, the test is flexible in the sense that it not only focusses on the 
position of the trustees but also examines the level (and type) of control enjoyed by 
others.  
The control test is also not tied to application at a specific point of time. It does not 
matter that the control over the management of the trust is granted to others when 
the trust is established or at any point thereafter. Where trust decisions are in 
practice made by persons other than the trustees, the control test holds that those 
persons should be held responsible for the consequence of those decisions.  
The establishment proposition, on the other hand, does not purport to have any 
such utilitarian goal or equitable effect. The sole purpose of this proposition is to 
unmask other arrangements, such as mandate or agency, masquerading as a trust.  
This is achieved by focussing on the type and measure of control enjoyed by the 
trustees at the time of the establishment of the trust. Once it is established that there 
is a sufficient degree of separation of control and benefit in the sense suggested in 
Land Bank v Parker98 when the trust is established, the establishment proposition 
ceases to be relevant.  
Any further considerations of the exercise of control after the establishment of the 
trust must then be determined with reference to the fiduciary proposition as the other 
constituent part of the independence duality.  
  
4 4 2  The control test not applicable in South Africa 
As discussed above, Flannigan’s control test was the subject of a spirited 
academic debate between him and Cullity, who opposed its implementation.99 Cullity 
opposed the implementation of the control test on the basis that there was no 
 
97  Flannigan (1986) Est & T Q 111. 
98  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 19. 
99  Cullity (1985) Est Tr Q 35. The debate between Flannigan and Cullity on this issue has 
dissipated and it is submitted that the issue has now become settled in favour of Cullity. 






theoretical justification for the imposition of an agency relationship without the parties 
thereto agreeing. In support he referenced Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & 
Fairclough Ltd:100 
 
“The relationship of principal and agent can only be established by the consent of the 
principal and the agent. They will be held to have consented if they have agreed to what 
amounts in law to such a relationship, even if they do not recognize it themselves and 
even if they have professed to disclaim it …”101 
 
Cullity concludes that the proposition that an agency relationship may be imputed 
based solely on the control exercised by a beneficiary “is not warranted in principle 
or … on the authorities”.102 
Cullity’s criticism of the importation of Flannigan’s control test holds equally from a 
South African perspective. It is trite that agreement or ratification by the principal is a 
pre-requisite for the establishment of an agency relationship. Silke stated the 
principle as follows:  
 
“Generally, the principal gives, and the agent accepts, a prior authorization or instruction 
to do the act or series of acts, but such prior authorization or instruction by the principal is 
not essential because the principal may ratify and adopt acts done on his behalf by the 





“The contract of agency is created by the express or implied assent of the principal and 
agent. Where there is no intention to create the relationship of principal and agent there 
can be no contract of agency.”104 
 
 
100  [1968] AC 1130 (HL).  
101  1137. Discussed in Cullity (1985) Est & Tr Q 51. 
102  52. 
103  JM Silke The Law of Agency in South Africa 3 ed (1981) 38. 
104  81. See also Smale v Castle Wine & Brandy Co 1936 CPD 213; Ocean Cargo Line Ltd v 






An agreement of sorts on the part of the principal is accordingly a pre-requisite for 
the imposition of an agency relationship and Flannigan’s control test is therefore 
incompatible with South African law also on the same basis as argued by Cullity in 
the Canadian context. 
However, there is a further (arguably more significant) reason why the agency 
relationship is incompatible with the underpinning of a South African trust.  
Notwithstanding his criticism of the control test, Cullity does not object to the 
application of an agency relationship to a trust: 
 
“There is, of course, no reason why trust and agency relationships cannot coincide and 
they often are intended to do so, particularly in the case of bare trusts where the trustee 




“It is quite clear that in many situations trustees will also be agents. This occurs, for 
example, in the familiar case of investments held by an investment dealer as nominee or 
in the case of land held by a nominee corporation. In such cases, the trust relationship 
that arises by virtue of the separation of legal and equitable ownership is often described 
as a bare trust and for tax and some other purposes it is quite understandably ignored. 
The distinguishing characteristic of the bare trust is that the trustee has no 
independent powers, discretions or responsibilities. His only responsibility is to carry out 
the instructions of his principals – the beneficiaries. If he does not have to accept 
instructions, if he has any significant independent powers or responsibilities, he is not a 
bare trustee and it seems clear that … the relationship is to be treated as a trust.”106 
 
In as far as this view may refer only to a trust in the broad sense, there can be no 
cause for disagreement. However, where it refers to a trustee in the narrow sense,107 
it cannot be supported. It is also reminiscent of a similar comment by Honoré made 
in 1974, which has been disagreed with in Chapter 3.108  
 
105  Cullity (1996) Est & Tr J 138. 
106  Cullity (1985) Est & Tr Q 36 (emphasis added). 
107  This distinction is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. See the text below n 57 in Chapter 3. 
108  T Honoré “Law of donations and trusts” (1974) 7 Ann Surv S African L 145 148. 







The establishment proposition, founded in the independence duality, requires that 
trustees be afforded the capacity for independent control and where such capacity is 
not provided for, it cannot be said that the parties intended to establish a trust. 
The incompatibility of agency and trusts may be explained based on trusteeship 
constituting an office. Cameron captured this distinction accurately in the following 
terms: 
 
“Honoré has accorded this formality its clearest doctrinal authority, distinguishing 
throughout his work between ‘trust’ in the wide sense, and ‘trust’ in the strict or narrow 
sense. The former exists ‘whenever a person is bound to hold or administer property on 
behalf of another or for some impersonal object and not for his own benefit’, and may 
include office-holders such as tutors, curators and executors, as well as agents, who do 
not hold office. The ‘special feature’ of a trust in the strict sense, by contrast, is that the 
trustee ‘acts not in his private but in an official capacity other than one of the nominate 
capacities referred to above’. 
Trusteeship, then, is a ‘quasi-public office’, in the performance of which the trustee is 
subject to judicial scrutiny and to the supervision of the Master of the Supreme Court. In 
this it is distinct from agency, even though the agent undoubtedly owes fiduciary duties to 
the principal. It is also distinct however from curatorship, executorship and tutorship in the 
duties it imposes and the powers it accords.”109 
 
Therefore, the emphasis that South African law places on trusteeship as an office, 
means that the trust form is incompatible with an agency relationship and where the 
parties have agreed (perhaps tacitly) that the “trustee” would be the agent of his 
principal (irrespective of whether it is the “founder” or “beneficiary”), it is submitted 
 
“it is probably a mistake to require that for a valid trust the trustee must be independent 
of the control of the settlor or beneficiaries. Trusts which are terminable at the will of the 
sole beneficiary are certainly valid, as in the case of a trust whereby a nominee holds 
immovable property for a beneficiary (eg Strydom v De Lange 1970 (2) SA 6 (T)). In 
trusts of this sort the nominee may well be bound to obey the instructions of the 
beneficiary as to the management of the property. Yet they are true trusts subject to the 
control of the court in regard to appointment and supervision (Administrator Estate 
Cachalia v Dabhel Madressa Trust 1940 WLD 14, Ex Parte Thulsie 1943 WLD 231, 
Ex Parte Rajoo Dehal 1937 WLD 136). Such a trust is distinguishable from mere agency 
by virtue of the fact that the trustee is dominus of the trust property and that the intention 
of the parties is to create a trust.” 
109  E Cameron “Constructive trusts in South African law: the legacy refused” (1999) 3 
Edinburgh LR 342 353. The reference to Honoré is to the fourth edition of his book: T 






that the arrangement fails the test of the establishment proposition and no trust will 
be established.  
The above proposition is arguably uncontroversial. What is, however, altogether 
more opaque, is the question of what type and measure of control the parties must 
intend to bestow upon a trustee to meet the requirements of the establishment 
proposition.  
This question is considered below.  
 
4 5  Type of control relevant to the establishment proposition 
The difference in perspective between the control test and the establishment 
proposition highlighted above is significant.110 It accounts for why considerations of 
structural control may be relevant in determining the effective controller under the 
control test, but not for determining whether a trust has been established in 
accordance with the establishment proposition. 
An investigation of what measure of structural control is afforded to third parties 
(apart from the trustees) fits snugly with the theoretical justification for the control 
test. In the context of holding the true controllers of a trust liable for the irresponsible 
exercise of such control, Flannigan has argued that sufficient structural control 
should attract principal status to controllers depending on what has been termed 
their “in terrorem” quality.111 
This “in terrorem” quality refers to the persuasive power of structural control 
granted to others. Flannigan proposes that, where structural control over a trust is 
vested in persons other than the trustees, such controllers may abuse the threat of 
exercising this control to influence the manner in which the trustees exercise their 
asset control over the trust assets. The effectiveness of these threats is, according to 
him, directly proportional to the in terrorem quality of the structural control afforded to 
such third party; in other words, in the inherent quality of the structural right to strike 
fear or favour in the minds of the assets controllers – the trustees. 
For example, where a founder has been vested with the structural right to dismiss 
and appoint trustees at will, it is conceivable that such a founder would be able to 
impose his will over the trustees in office, lest they run the risk of being removed. 
 
110  See part 4 4 1 above.  






The same holds for where a beneficiary is vested with the right to amend the trust 
provisions relating to trustee remuneration. These structural rights accordingly have 
a high in terrorem quality as they have the potential to influence the decisions by the 
trustees, either through explicit threat of use or through self-censorship of the 
trustees.  
However, where structural control is limited to appointing replacement trustees 
upon a vacancy arising, such a right has little potential of influencing decisions of the 
trustees in office as it has no bearing upon them. Accordingly, such structural powers 
would have a low in terrorem quality. 
Structural powers could, therefore, be sufficient to cause trustees to do what a 
beneficiary or founder “suggests” or “advises”. The holder of the structural control 
may thus employ it to gain “effective asset control congruent with the scope of the 
function performed by the ostensible asset controller who is responsive to the in 
terrorem use of the right”.112 
I accept that the in terrorem quality of structural rights could result in trustees 
compromising their independence in favour of the holders of these rights. Therefore, 
the determination of the identity of structural controllers, and the measure of control 
that they enjoy, may be an important consideration in the context of Flannigan’s 
control test. However, structural control (and its in terrorem quality) is not relevant in 
the context of the establishment proposition where the enquiry is limited to whether a 
valid trust has been established. This is so for two reasons. 
The first is that the establishment proposition is only concerned with the status of 
the trust at its establishment and whether the trustees have the capacity to exercise 
independent judgement at that moment in time. 113  This postulates an objective 
examination based on the provisions of the trust deed.114 An underlying assumption 
of importing structural control into the control test is that trustees may be swayed by 
the in terrorem quality thereof in future. This examination requires consideration that 
 
112  113-114. 
113  Over six decades ago, Caney J observed in Moosa v Jhavery 1958 4 SA 165 (N) at 
169D-F: 
 “In my opinion the trust speaks from the time of its execution and must be interpreted as 
at that time. It is the settlor's intention at that time that must be ascertained from the 
language he used in the circumstances then existing. Subsequent events (and in these 
are included statutes) cannot, I consider, be used to alter that intention.” 






goes beyond the moment that the trust is established and requires one to consider 
the probable conduct of the trustees when faced with the threat of the exercise of 
structural control.  
From this perspective, the investigation goes beyond the moment of the 
establishment of the trust and requires a subjective investigation regarding the 
likelihood of whether structural controllers would threaten the position of the trustees 
as well as the likelihood of the trustees succumbing to such threats. 
The second reason relates to the second leg of the independence duality. Where 
the trustees hold effective asset control, structural controllers could only influence 
the manner in which the assets are managed where these trustees fail to act 
independently. This failure, it is submitted, constitutes a breach of the trustees’ 
fiduciary duty and the consequences of such a breach, therefore, stand to be 
determined with reference to the fiduciary proposition.115 
Asset control, on the other hand, is highly relevant in the context of the 
establishment proposition. As this type of control relates to the power to determine, 
directly, the manner in which the trust assets are to be employed, it strikes at the 
very core of the trust idea.  
However, it is not inconceivable that structural control may also amount to 
effective asset control. In instances where structural control empowers a third party 
to assert direct asset control, and not rely on the in terrorem quality of the structural 
control, the structural control in question will also qualify as asset control. For 
example, where a founder retains the power to effect unilateral amendments to the 
trust deed, which include the manner in which the assets are to be employed, such 
structural control will be relevant for the purposes of the establishment proposition. 
The relevance however stems from the capacity of the founder to effect asset control 
through the exercise of structural control. 
It follows that for purposes of the establishment proposition, the only determinative 
type of control is asset control. The question which follows is what measure of asset 
control is required to be held by trustees for a trust to be established. 
 
 






4 6  Measure of asset control required 
The varied application of the control test in the USA has caused one commentator to 
state that:  
 
“it is exceedingly difficult to make any accurate statement as to what powers may be 
given to the shareholders without subjecting them to personal liability”.116 
 
This difficulty is as present as ever in the context of the establishment proposition, 
and in particular regarding the measure of asset control required to establish a trust. 
However, an answer may be ventured when the emphasis placed on trusteeship as 
an office in South Africa is borne in mind. 
It is uncontroversial to state that, at the very least, a trustee must be dominus of 
the trust property in the sense that he must be the proper functionary with the power 
to alienate, invest, distribute, or otherwise encumber the trust property. To hold 
otherwise, would conflict with the definition of a trust discussed in Chapter 3.117  
What remains unclear is whether a trustee’s discretion to exercise this facet of 
asset control may be restricted. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that it may. The South African legal landscape is 
strewn with trusts where the trustees are afforded varying levels of discretion in the 
administration of the trust estate, from being granted absolute discretion to no room 
for discretion at all. 
It is tempting, therefore, to propose a minimum test of discretion that is required 
for the validity of a trust. However, consider an arrangement where a founder 
transfers assets to a trustee for the sole purpose of investing same in a nominated 
account until a specified date, whereafter the trustee is directed to pay same to a 
beneficiary. In these circumstances, the trustee has no discernible discretion in the 
employment of the trust assets, but the arrangement is clearly still a trust. 
On the other hand, an arrangement where assets are made over to a trustee, who 
must administer it according to the absolute direction of the founder or others, sits 
uncomfortably with the definition of trust discussed in Chapter 3 because such a 
trustee has no control over the trust assets. 
 
116  GG Bogert The Law of Trusts and Trustees 2 ed (1964) para 297. 






What, then, is the distinction between these two scenarios? In my view, the 
answer lies in the legal construction of trusteeship as an office. The appreciation of 
trusteeship as a quasi-public office allows for an interpretation where full asset 
control (including absolute discretionary power) is vested in that office, with the 
exercise of such discretion being regulated by the trust deed. 
Once it is appreciated that the full complement of asset control vests in the office 
of trusteeship, but that the employment of that control is subject to the trust deed 
(and not the whim of another) the distinction between the two scenarios highlighted 
above appears clearly.  
Irrespective of whether a trust deed limits the exercise of a trustee’s discretion, 
same is still vested in that office and not in the hands of the founder or third parties. 
This construction accounts for why an amendment of the trust may permit for a 
variation of a trustee’s discretion. Such an amendment does not transfer discretion 
from one functionary to another; it merely amends the basis upon which it is 
exercised.  
This construction also accounts for why no trust is established where the founder 
does not divest himself of all control in favour of the office of trusteeship.  
It is accordingly proposed that the measure of asset control that is to be afforded 
to trustees is absolute, but there can be no objection to the exercise of this control 
being restricted through the trust deed from time to time as all asset control remains 
vested in the office of trusteeship. 
 
4 7  Conclusion 
In this chapter, the establishment proposition is examined with reference to the 
control test developed in the USA. It is argued that there are key distinctions 
between the control test and the establishment proposition. 
Key among these distinctions is that the focus of the control test is to unmask the 
true controllers of the trust, whereas the focus of the establishment proposition is to 
determine whether the trustees are afforded sufficient control for the arrangement to 
comply with the core idea of the trust.  
This distinction results therein that the control test is often subjective and also 






the trustees, whereas the establishment proposition is objective and limited to the 
moment of the establishment of the trust.  
Consequently, the establishment proposition is not concerned with the identity of 
structural controllers but with whether the trustees are afforded a sufficient measure 
of asset control. It is proposed that absolute asset control is to be afforded to the 
office of trusteeship in order to meet the requirements of the establishment 
proposition.  
The limitation that may be placed on the discretionary asset control may be 
explained on the basis that full discretionary control is still vested in the office of 
trusteeship, but that key decisions in respect thereto are grounded in the trust deed 
that informs the office. 
As appears from the discussion in Chapter 6, the establishment proposition as 
developed in this chapter plays an important role in considerations relating to so-
called “sham trusts”.  
In the following chapter, Chapter 5, the fiduciary proposition is examined in further 
detail. This proposition is relevant in the manner in which the administration of the 
trust is evaluated and applies only once a trust is established. This proposition as a 
part of the independence duality model plays an important role to explain the 
consequences of a failure of a trustee to administer the trust estate independently 
once afforded the capacity to do so.  
Accordingly, consideration of the principles of the fiduciary proposition only arises 







CHAPTER 5: THE FIDUCIARY PROPOSITION 
5 1  Introduction 
It is now settled that a trustee has a duty to bring an independent mind to bear upon 
the administration of the trust.1 However, this duty may be skirted in a number of 
ways. Examples include: not participating in the administration of the trust; acting as 
what has been referred to as a “sleeping trustee”;2 or through habitual deference to a 
dominant trustee, the founder, beneficiaries, or other third parties.3 
Notwithstanding the general consensus that there is no place for such a form of 
trusteeship in South African law, 4  a review of relevant case law and academic 
commentary suggests that the exact basis, or theoretical underpinnings, of a 
trustee’s duty of independence, has not yet been settled.5  
One explanation is that the duty of independence flows from the requirement of 
trustees to act jointly in the administration of the trust, which in turn is required as a 
result of the so-called “joint-action rule”.6 
In this chapter, the above proposition is critically examined with a particular focus 
on the underpinnings of the joint-action rule. The conclusion is reached that this rule 
does not adequately explain a trustee’s duty of independence because it is not 
applicable to the internal administration of the trust. This is not to say that trustees 
are not compelled to act collectively in the administration of the trust, but, as is 
elucidated below, it is submitted that this requirement is as a result of the joint 
occupation of the office of trusteeship. 
 
1  F du Toit “The fiduciary office of trustee and the protection of contingent trust 
beneficiaries” (2007) 18 Stell LR 469 475. 
2  MJ de Waal “The liability of co-trustees for breach of trust” (1999) 10 Stell LR 32. 
3  Tjimstra NO v Blunt-MacKenzie NO 2002 1 SA 459 (T). See also, Jordaan v Jordaan 
2001 3 SA 288 (C); Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA); Stander v 
Schwulst 2008 1 SA 81 (C); Wiid v Wiid NCHC 13-01-2012 case no 1571/2012. 
4  L Olivier “Trusts: traps and pitfalls” (2001) 118 SALJ 224 229-230; Tjimstra NO v Blunt-
MacKenzie NO 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 474E-F. 
5  See also, Smit v Van der Werke 1984 1 SA 164 (T); Goolam Ally Family Trust t/a 
Textile, Curtaining and Trimming v Textile, Curtaining and Trimming (Pty) Ltd 1989 4 SA 
985 (C); Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 5 SA 674 (T); Steyn NO v Blockpave (Pty) 
Ltd 2011 3 SA 528 (FB); F du Toit “A trustee’s duty of independence” (2009) 73 THRHR 
637; F du Toit “Co-trusteeship and the joint-action rule in South African trust law” (2013) 
27 Trust Law International 18. 






Against this background, it is argued that the fiduciary proposition,7 within the 
context of the dual independence dichotomy highlighted in Chapter 3, provides the 
theoretical framework within which a trustee’s duty to bring an independent mind to 
bear upon the administration of the trust is to be explained and evaluated.  
To conduct this analysis, a brief review of the manner in which a fiduciary 
relationship arises is required. Accordingly, this chapter commences with a 
discussion of the nature and ambit of fiduciary relationships in general, and the tests 
developed to evaluate whether a specific relationship gives rise to a fiduciary duty.  
This analysis is then applied in the context of trusts, which leads to the evaluation 
of the joint-action rule as justification for trustee independence, compared to that of 
the fiduciary proposition.  
 
5 2  How is a fiduciary duty established? 
The term “fiduciary duty” has proven surprisingly difficult to define with sufficient 
clarity and has been described as “a legal obligation in search of a principle”.8 
What is clear, is that fiduciary duties exist in the context of particular relationships9 
and that certain relationships have been clearly accepted as being fiduciary in 
nature. Examples of accepted fiduciary relationships include the relationship 
between an agent and principal, employee and employer, directors and companies, 
partners, and trustees and beneficiaries.10 However, the list of fiduciary relationships 
is not a closed one.  
The Canadian experience is helpful in considering whether a measure may be 
developed for the recognition of a fiduciary relationship. Between 1984 and 1994, the 
Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) considered and enforced fiduciary duties in 
varying contexts and developed what has been referred to as the “fiduciary 
principle”. 
 
7  See part 3 3 2 in Chapter 3. See also, PA Olivier Trustreg en Praktyk (1989) 37; Du Toit 
(2009) THRHR 637; PA Olivier, S Strydom & GPJ van den Berg Trust Law and Practice 
(SI 6 2018) 2-15. 
8  Hodgkinson v Simms 1994 3 SCR 377 415. See also, K Idensohn “Towards a 
theoretical framework of fiduciary principles: Volvo (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 
4 All SA 497 (SCA)” (2010) 2 Speculum Iuris 142; Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 3; E Nel 
“Unfettered, but not unbridled: the fiduciary duty of the trustee” (2016) 37 Obiter 436.  
9  Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 177. 






The first of these cases was Guerin v The Queen (“Guerin”), 11  a landmark 
decision on Aboriginal rights, in which the SCC held that the government owed a 
fiduciary duty to the indigenous people of Canada and confirmed Aboriginal title as a 
common-law doctrine.12 
In confirming that fiduciary duties transcend accepted relationships, Dickson J, 
writing for the majority of the court, held as follows:  
 
“It is sometimes said that the nature of fiduciary relationships is both established and 
exhausted by the standard categories of agent, trustee, partner, director and the like. I do 
not agree. It is the nature of the relationship, not the specific category of actor involved 
that gives rise to the fiduciary duty. The categories of fiduciary, like those of negligence, 
should not be considered closed.”13 
 
In Frame v Smith (“Frame”)14 Wilson J, in a dissenting judgment, expounded upon 
the conceptual approach to fiduciary relationships in Guerin, and proposed a three-
step analysis to guide the court in identifying new fiduciary relationships. 15  She 
proposed that fiduciary relationships are marked with the following three 
characteristics:  
 
(i) scope for the exercise of some discretionary power;  
(ii)  that power or discretion can be used unilaterally so as to effect the 
beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and  
(iii)  a peculiar vulnerability to the exercise of that discretion or power.16 
 
In Hodgkinson v Simms (“Hodgkinson”),17 a matter where a stockbroker sought to 
hold his accountant liable for losses incurred in investing in a real estate project, the 
 
11  1984 2 SCR 335. 
12  Aboriginal title refers to the doctrine that land rights of indigenous people survive the 
assumption of sovereignty under colonialism: See, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary 
<http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/A/AboriginalTitle.aspx> (accessed 08-09-
2018). For an in-depth discussion of Aboriginal title, see AJ Ray Aboriginal Rights 
Claims and the Making and Remaking of History (2016) 68. 
13  384 (emphasis added). 
14  1987 2 SCR 99. 
15  The SCA in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA) 482C endorsed 
these steps as helpful, but not determinative.  






SCC cautioned against employing the three-step test set out in Frame.18 It did so on 
the basis that it does not apply in circumstances where fiduciary duties, though not 
innate to a given relationship, arise from the particular circumstances of that specific 
relationship. 
In determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed, the court held that: 
 
“the question to ask is whether, given all the surrounding circumstances, one party could 
reasonably have expected that the other party would act in the former’s best interests 
with respect to the subject matter at issue. Discretion, influence, vulnerability and trust are 





“In summary, the precise legal or equitable duties the law will enforce in any given 
relationship are tailored to the legal and practical incidents of a particular relationship. To 
repeat a phrase used by Lord Scarman, ‘[t]here is no substitute in this branch of the law 
for a meticulous examination of the facts’”.20 
 
The Canadian authorities, therefore, underscore that it is the nature of the 
relationship, and not the conduct of the parties, that is determinative of the existence 
of a fiduciary duty.21 That this also applies in South Africa, appears from the differing 
outcomes of two early cases that bear a factual resemblance, but are nevertheless 
distinguishable. 
 
17  1994 3 SCR 377 
18  1987 2 SCR 99. 
19  417. 
20  421, quoting from National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan 1985 1 All ER 821 (HL) 831. 
21  This sentiment, that it is undesirable to lay down a general test for the recognition of a 
fiduciary relationship, is echoed by Gibbs CJ of the High Court of Australia in Hospital 
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation 1984 156 CLR 41 (HC of A) 69 as 
follows:  
“I doubt if it is fruitful to attempt to make a general statement of the circumstances in 
which a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist. Fiduciary relations are of different 
types, carrying different duties and a test which might seem appropriate to determine 







The first is Burland v Earle (“Burland”),22 a decision of the Privy Council on appeal 
from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and the second Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd (“Robinson”),23 a decision of the Appellate Division (as it 
then was) on appeal from the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court.  
Burland concerned the conduct of a member of a joint-stock company, the British 
American Bank Note Company (“the Bank Note Company”). The Bank Note 
Company conducted business in the engraving and printing of banknotes, 
debentures, stamps, and other bills of exchange. This business proved highly 
successful courtesy of printing contracts with various governments and regular, 
generous, dividends were paid to its shareholders. 
Burland was the majority shareholder and the president of the company and Earle 
its second-largest shareholder. Shortly before the commencement of litigation, the 
company lost a lucrative contract with the Dominican Republic, causing its profits to 
decline significantly. On 7 December 1897, Earle, together with other shareholders, 
commenced action against Burland claiming, inter alia, repayment of profits he made 
by selling property to the Bank Note Company while he was president thereof.24 
In addition to his association with the Bank Note Company, Burland was also a 
shareholder and creditor of a company situated in Montreal, the Burland Lithographic 
Company. This company, having become insolvent, was wound-up and Burland 
purchased from the liquidator certain lithographic plant equipment for a sum of 
$21 564, which he subsequently on-sold to the Bank Note Company for $60 000. 
The evidence suggested that Earle and the other shareholders were aware of the 
sum for which Burland purchased the equipment and that the price paid by the Bank 
Note Company was market-related. 
The trial court ordered Burland to pay to the Bank Note Company the sum of 
$38 436, being the amount of the profit realised by him on the resale, which order 
the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed. 
 
22  1902 AC 83.  
23  1921 AD 168. 
24  All in all, the plaintiffs prosecuted four claims against Burland and, initially, the company, 
relating to (i) payment of a reserve fund to shareholders as dividends; (ii) a claim 
regarding the manner in which this fund was invested; (iii) payment by Burland of profits 
realised in the on-sale of goods to the company; and (iv) allegations of an improper 
salary drawn by Burland. For present purposes, only the payment of profits by Burland 






However, on appeal to the Privy Council, these orders were set aside and it was 
held that Burland was entitled to retain the profits from the resale of the lithographic 
plant equipment. Lord Davy, delivering the judgment, stated as follows: 
 
“There is no evidence whatever of any commission or mandate to Burland to purchase on 
behalf of the company or that he was in any sense a trustee for the company of the 
purchased property. It may be that he had an intention in his own mind to resell it to the 
company, but it was an intention which he was at liberty to carry out or abandon at his 
own will. It may be also that a person of a more refined self-respect and a more generous 
regard for the company of which he was president would have been disposed to give the 
company the benefit of his purchase. But their Lordships have not to decide questions of 
that character. The sole question is whether he was under any legal obligation to do so. 
Let it be assumed that the company or the dissentient shareholders might by appropriate 
proceedings have at one time obtained a decree for rescission of the contract. But that is 
not the relief which they ask or could in the circumstances obtain in this suit.”25 
 
From the above, it is clear that the result may have been different if Burland stood 
in a relationship of agency or other facts were present upon which he was deemed to 
be a trustee of the company. However, in the circumstances, the Privy Council held 
that the relationship between the parties was such that Burland was at liberty to 
transact in his own interest and the relief claimed by the Bank Note Company was 
refused. 
In contrast, the South African Appellate Division in Robinson26 upheld a claim by 
the respondent company (the plaintiff in the court a quo) against a former director 
and shareholder for profits made in the on-sale to it of certain farmland and mining 
rights. Innes CJ, writing for the majority of the Appellate Division, referenced 
Burland27  with approval and emphasised that it is the nature of the relationship 
between parties that is determinative of whether a fiduciary duty is owed. 
The court pointed out that the existence of a relationship of agency was a 
powerful pointer to such a fiduciary relationship, but emphasised that it is by no 
means the only consideration:  
 
 
25  99 (emphasis added). 
26  1921 AD 168. 






“Whether a fiduciary relationship is established will depend upon the circumstances of 
each case. Where the director was at the date of the acquisition the agent of the 
company for such transaction, the fiduciary relationship would of course be created. That 
element has generally been present in the decided cases where profits have been 
awarded. But, so far as I am aware, it is nowhere laid down that in these transactions 
there can be no fiduciary relationship to let in the remedy without agency. And it seems 
hardly possible on principle to confine the relationship to agency cases. There may surely 
be circumstances, apart from mandate, where a duty to acquire for the company may be 
inferred.”28 
 
As if to further emphasise that the nature of the relationship between parties was 
determinative of the issue, the court referred to the result in Burland and drew a 
distinction with that case as follows: 
 
“An order to account for profits was refused in Borland v Earle, not merely because there 
was no mandate to purchase for the company, but because there was neither such a 
mandate, nor other circumstances which would have made the director a trustee of the 
company.”29 
 
As testament to its adequacy and reflection of the importance of the principles 
highlighted therein, the SCA again endorsed the above passages in Robinson,30 in 
Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Phillips”)31 together with the position elucidated 
in Hodgkinson32 discussed above. 
The Phillips matter concerned the liability of an employee to account to his 
employer for secret profits made out of an opportunity that arose in the course of his 
employment. 33  At issue was whether the employee had a fiduciary duty to the 
employer to declare the secret profit. Counsel for the appellant (the employee) 
emphasised that the particulars of claim contained no reference in terms of a 
fiduciary duty. The submission was accordingly that the respondent was unable to 
rely on the existence of a fiduciary duty between the parties. The court, per Heher 
 
28  180. 
29  180 (emphasis added). 
30  1921 AD 168. 
31  2004 3 SA 465 (SCA). 
32  1994 3 SCR 377. 






JA, famously held that “There is no magic in the term ‘fiduciary duty’”.34 The court 
proceeded to explain: 
 
“The existence of such a duty and its nature and extent are questions of fact to be 
adduced from a thorough consideration of the substance of the relationship and any 
relevant circumstances which affect the operation of that relationship… While agency is 
not a necessary element of the existence of a fiduciary relationship… that agency exists 
will almost always provide an indication of such a relationship. The emphasis in the 
particulars of claim upon the representative nature of the appellant’s status in dealing with 
Safika [the counterparty in the transaction with the respondent] and the duty to account 
for profits acquired by him in that capacity should have been to counsel an unmistakable 
beacon which marked the claim as one in which the appellant stood toward the 
respondents in a position of confidence and good faith which he was obliged to protect.”35 
 
The defence that the fiduciary relationship was not pleaded accordingly failed as 
the pleading of the nature of the relationship between the parties was regarded as 
sufficient notice of the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
The significance of the nature of the relationship between the parties as an 
indication of the existence of a fiduciary duty was again emphasised by the SCA in 
the matter of Volvo (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel (“Volvo”).36 That matter now 
provides further insight into the South African approach to the question of 
determining both the existence, and ambit, of a fiduciary duty.  
The facts of the case were as follows. After commencing operations in 2000, 
Volvo (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (“Volvo”), the appellant in the SCA, required the 
services of a manager for its information technology (“IT”) division. A third-party 
recruitment agency introduced Mr Yssel (“Yssel”), the respondent, to Volvo, who 
decided to appoint him to the position.37 
Yssel did not favour entering into direct employment with Volvo and on his 
insistence, he was instead employed indirectly through the services of a labour 
broker, Highveld Personnel (Pty) Ltd (“Highveld”).38 For the next five years, Yssel’s 
 
34  Para 27. 
35  Para 27. 
36  2009 6 SA 531 (SCA). 
37  Para 1. 
38  This arrangement was presumably due to tax considerations: see Idensohn (2010) 






services were rendered to Volvo through Highveld, who would invoice Volvo and in 
turn pay Yssel. In making these arrangements, Volvo had no direct contact with 
Highveld and all dealings were solely done through Yssel.39 
By 2004, the IT department of Volvo had expanded to include six more persons 
who were similarly employed by labour brokers (other than Highveld) and who 
assigned their services to Volvo (“the personnel”). By middle 2004, Yssel 
approached the human resources manager of Volvo, Ms Van Eeden, and told her 
that some of the personnel were unhappy with their respective labour brokers and 
that he could arrange for them to be transferred to Highveld at no extra cost to Volvo. 
Yssel also suggested to the other personnel that their remuneration could be more 
favourably structured if they render their services to Volvo through Highveld.40 
On the basis of these proposals, a master agreement was concluded between 
Volvo and Highveld in terms of which it was agreed that Highveld would supply the 
services of the personnel to Volvo in return for a monthly fee that was to be 
stipulated in each case in an annexure to the master agreement. Subsequently, and 
over a period of time between August 2004 and April 2005, Yssel accompanied each 
of the six other personnel members to the offices of Highveld where they were 
introduced to an officer of Highveld, Ms Pieterse (“Pieterse”), and signed the 
annexures to the master agreement. All the personnel testified that they were led to 
understand that from the fees Highveld charged to Volvo, Highveld would retain a 
fixed charge of R425 per month and an administration fee of 3% on their earnings. 
None of the personnel were, however, aware of the rate at which their services were 
being charged to Volvo. 41  Upon the conclusion of each annexure, Highveld 
proceeded to invoice Volvo for the services of the relevant personnel. 
Significantly, Volvo had no direct contact with Highveld in these dealings and at all 
times dealt only through Yssel. Unbeknown to Volvo, or the personnel concerned, 
Yssel had arranged with Pieterse that a portion of the payment made by Volvo would 
be paid to him as a “commission” for arranging the transfer of the personnel to 
Highveld. Yssel and Pieterse also conspired to keep the payment of the commission 
 
39  Para 2. 
40  Para 4. 






secret from both Volvo and the personnel.42 The payments received by Yssel in this 
respect were significant and represented approximately 40% of all payments made 
by Volvo to Highveld.43 
The truth was exposed when at the end of 2005 one of the personnel, Steyn, 
came across a document reflecting the payment Volvo made to Highveld in respect 
of his services. This evidenced a clear shortfall in what he, in turn, was paid by 
Highveld. At first, Steyn turned to Yssel for an explanation, but when no satisfactory 
explanation was forthcoming, he pressed on and discovered other, similar 
documents, whereupon the matter was escalated to the senior personnel of Volvo.44  
The matter came to the attention of Van Eeden in January 2006, who 
subsequently arranged for a meeting with Pieterse. This was the first time that any 
representative of Volvo, other than Yssel, had any dealings with an officer of 
Highveld. When confronted with the discrepancies between that paid to Highveld by 
Volvo and that paid over to the relevant personnel, Pieterse at first denied any 
payment to Yssel, but later relented and admitted to the commission scheme 
involving Yssel. When Yssel learnt of the meeting later that day, and while Van 
Eeden was in the process of preparing a letter suspending him, he delivered a letter 
of resignation. The remaining personnel immediately terminated their relationship 
with Highveld and accepted direct employment with Volvo.45 
Subsequent investigations by Volvo’s internal auditor revealed that between 
August 2004 and January 2006, Volvo paid a sum of R1 967 900 to Highveld in 
respect of the services rendered by the personnel concerned (excluding Yssel). Of 
this sum, only R1 087 650 was paid over to the personnel, with Highveld retaining 
R114 143 and the balance of R775 107 paid to Yssel. 
Based on this discovery, Volvo instituted action against Yssel in the 
Witwatersrand Local Division,46 claiming repayment of the R775 107 paid to Yssel by 
Highveld on the basis that it was secret profits made through a breach of fiduciary 
 
42  Para 7. 
43  Para 7. As per example, Volvo paid the sum R27 400 to Highveld in respect of the 
services of one of the personnel in January 2006. Of this sum, R12 000 was paid to the 
person concerned with the balance of R15 400 being paid to Yssel. 
44  Para 9. 
45  Para 10. 






duty.47  It was argued on behalf of Yssel that, in view of the successive written 
agreements between Volvo and Highveld, and the lack of privy of contract between 
him and Volvo, he did not owe Volvo a fiduciary duty.48  
In the alternative, it was submitted that in as far as any fiduciary relationship may 
have existed between him and Volvo, Yssel did not breach the nature and duties 
attaching thereto. 
In order to determine liability, the court was therefore called upon to decide, first, 
whether Yssel owed Volvo a fiduciary duty, and if so, the nature and extent of this 
duty. 
After referencing Burland49 and Robinson,50 the court a quo held that, given the 
nature and scope of Yssel’s responsibilities, a fiduciary relationship did exist 
between him and Volvo,51 but that Yssel’s duties in this respect were limited to the 
management of Volvo’s IT department and did not extend to the recruitment of the 
personnel.52 Accordingly the court a quo refused Volvo’s claim.  
On appeal, the SCA endorsed the sentiment in Hodgkinson53 that the existence of 
a fiduciary relationship must be determined by the nature of the relationship between 
the parties, but cautioned against an interpretation of that case that suggests some 
“mutual understanding” between the parties as a pre-requisite for a fiduciary 
relationship.  
Instead, the court held that “[w]hat is called for is an assessment, upon a 
consideration of all the facts, of whether reliance by one party upon the other was 
justified in the circumstances”.54  
 
47  The claim for secret profits made through breach of a fiduciary duty is a sui generis 
claim and is not based on contract or delict. Accordingly, it is not a claim for damages 
and the fact whether the claimant suffered any damage is of no consequence – Volvo 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2008 3 All SA 488 (W) para 54. See also, Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 and Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 
3 SA 465 (SCA). 
48  Volvo SA (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2008 3 All SA 488 (W) para 63. 
49  1902 AC 83. 
50  1921 AD 168. 
51  Volvo SA (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2008 3 All SA 488 (W) paras 68-71. 
52  Para 72. 
53  [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC) ((1995) 117 DLR (4th) 161).  






On this basis the SCA held that a fiduciary relationship had arisen between Volvo 
and Yssel and expressed itself as follows: 
 
“Yssel was well aware that Van Eeden had made no independent enquiries relating to the 
arrangement with Highveld and was acting entirely upon what she was told by him. That 
he found it necessary to secure an agreement of secrecy from Pieterse makes it 
abundantly clear that he was well aware that Van Eeden believed that he was arranging 
matters pursuant to his ordinary managerial duties and not for his own account. In short, 
he was well aware that Van Eeden did not consider herself to be dealing at arm’s length 
with an independent broker who was arranging matters on his own account, but was 
dealing with the manager of the division concerned. It was only because Yssel was the 
manager that the transaction came about at all. I have no doubt that Yssel was in a 
position of trust when he engaged himself in the matter and was not entitled to allow his 
own interests to prevail over those of Volvo. He is obliged in those circumstances to 
disgorge his secret commissions and the appeal must succeed.”55 
 
This matter illustrates that the particular relationship between the parties does not 
only determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship, but also its nature and 
extent. The position adopted in Volvo was approved and applied in the matter of 
Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control v Intibane Mediates (“Intibane”).56 
In that matter, the Attorneys Fidelity Fund (“the AFF”) mandated Mr Ramathibe 
(who traded as the first defendant) to identify a suitable immovable property to serve 
as their headquarters. Ramathibe discharged his mandate by identifying a property 
owned by two companies, Erf 49-1 (Pty) Ltd and Head Brothers (Pty) Ltd, the third 
and fourth defendants in the action (“the sellers”).57 In their dealings with the AFF, 
the sellers were represented by Mr Roome. Ultimately, the property concerned was 
purchased for a sum of R37.5 million, which sum Roome presented as the sellers’ 
“bottom line”.58 
However, before the transfer of the property to the AFF could be completed, it 
came to light that Roome had a separate, and secret, agreement with Ramathibe to 
the effect that the latter could retain the balance of any sale in excess of R32 million 
as a commission that was not to be disclosed to the AFF.59 Details of this agreement 
 
55  Para 20. 
56  2016 6 SA 415 (GP). 
57  Para 2. 
58  Para 6. 






were contained in non-disclosure agreements between Roome and Ramathibe in 
order for it to be kept from the AFF. Transfer of the property was nevertheless 
proceeded with and the R5.5 million rand commission (representing the excess of 
the purchase over R32 million) was retained in the transferring attorney’s trust 
account, pending the finalisation of the proceedings for recovery initiated by the 
AFF.60 The central issue for consideration was whether Roome was under a legal 
duty to have disclosed his agreement of a secret commission with Ramathibe to the 
AFF.61 
In holding that there was such a duty on Roome, Potterill J endorsed the principle 
enunciated in Volvo that “[w]hat is called for is an assessment, upon a consideration 
of all the facts, of whether reliance by one party upon the other was justified in the 
circumstances”:62 
 
“There is in my mind no doubt that Roome can in law never be entitled to the commission 
he agreed to with Ramothibe and should be disgorged thereof. Roome had a relationship 
with the AFF’s agent, Ramothibe. He also had a relationship with the AFF directly; he 
emailed it and met with representatives of the AFF. He knew that Ramothibe was acting 
on behalf of the AFF in obtaining the premises. He knew that as incentive for Ramothibe 
to promote his properties, he (Roome) was agreeing to commission in non-disclosure and 
confidentiality agreements to which the AFF was not privy. In assessing all these facts the 
question to be answered is whether it was justified for the AFF to rely on the conduct of 
Roome.”63 
 
In view of the prevailing circumstances, Potterill J held that the AFF could 
reasonably have expected Roome to inform it that Ramathibe, who was appointed 
as its agent, was conspiring against its interest by negotiating an inflated purchase 
price.64 In the circumstances, by representing that the sellers’ “bottom line” was 
R37,5 million when, in reality it was R32 million, Roome made a wrongful 
misrepresentation on account of which the defendants were held liable to the AFF for 
damages in the sum of R5.5 million.65 
 
60  Para 3. 
61  Para 109. 
62  2009 6 SA 531 (SCA) para 17. 
63  Para 105. 
64  Para 106. 






These two cases illustrate that there is no one-size-fits-all approach in determining 
the existence and nature of a fiduciary duty. What is called for is an assessment, 
upon consideration of all the available facts, of whether reliance by one party upon 
the other was justified.66  It follows, therefore, that a fiduciary duty arises where 
parties stand in a position of trust towards each other and the extent of this duty is 
determined by the relationship between the parties.67 
 
5 3  Fiduciary duties grounded in the office of trusteeship 
In view of the fluidity of a fiduciary relationship, and the difficulty in developing a 
single test for its existence, it is unsurprising that the nature of a trustee’s fiduciary 
duty has proven difficult to define. 
Du Toit68 points out how South African courts have intermittently referred to a 
trustee’s “fiduciary duty” (in the singular),69 and a trustee’s “fiduciary duties” (in the 
plural)70 and how divergent views exist as to the trustee’s counterpart in the fiduciary 
relationship ranging between the trust property, 71  on the one hand, and the 
beneficiaries, on the other.72 
In an instructive contribution, Du Toit has unpacked the fiduciary duty of a trustee 
in the narrow sense.73 He has shown how a trustee’s fiduciary duty stems from the 
office of trusteeship and that the trustees all occupy one, unitary, composite office.74 
In particular, Du Toit has shown how section 9(1) of the TPCA now reflects the 
 
66  Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 6 SA 531 (SCA) 537A. 
67  See also the instructive discussion of the Volvo case by Idensohn (2010) Speculum Iuris 
142. 
68  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 472. 
69  Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407F. 
70  Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813C-D; Bafokeng Tribe v Impala 
Platinum Ltd 1999 3 SA 517 (BHC) 546B. See in this regard, Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 
469 472. 
71  Louw v Coetzee 2003 3 SA 329 (SCA) 336A-B; African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2003 All SA 
50 (C) 54D-E. 
72  Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813B; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 
SA 274 (SCA) 284C-D. 
73  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469. 
74  471. See also, MJ de Waal “Die wysiging van ‘n inter vivos trust” (1998) TSAR 326 331; 






common-law standard in respect of trustees’ trust administration75 and that there is 
one, single, fiduciary duty. In this regard, Du Toit states that: 
 
“a South African trustee is under a single fiduciary duty, which can conveniently be called 
a ‘general fiduciary duty’ … [T]his general fiduciary duty is multi-faceted in that it is 
comprised of a number of specific component duties. Which component duty or duties of 
a trustee’s general fiduciary duty will be relevant in any given instance will depend, as 
indicated by the court in the Phillips case, on the facts at hand adduced from the 
substance of the relationship between the relevant parties, as well as any relevant 
circumstances which affect the operation of such relationship.”76 
 
Du Toit’s submissions in this respect are well motivated and must be supported. 
He proceeds to identify at least four specific component fiduciary duties, being the 
duty of care,77 the duty of impartiality,78 the duty of independence79 and the duty of 
accountability. 80  For present purposes, it is the identification of the duty of 
independence that is most relevant. In this regard, Du Toit argues: 
 
“A third component of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty is that he is duty bound to exhibit 
a minimum degree of independence in respect of trust administration – a trustee, as a 
fiduciary office-holder, should exercise independent judgment in respect of trust 
administration and should not merely slavishly follow the lead of the trust founder, his co-
trustees or the trust beneficiaries. Cameron JA acknowledged a trustee’s independence 
in Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker as an essential of trusteeship, 
stemming from the ‘core idea’ of the trust, when he stated that the functional separation of 
a trustee’s ownership (or control) over trust property from any benefit consequent 
thereupon ‘tends to ensure independence of judgment on the part of the trustee – an 
indispensable requisite of office.’”81 
 
 
75  Section 9(1) of the TPCA provides that:  
 “[a] trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers act with 
the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who 
manages the affairs of another.” 
76  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 473. The reference to the “Phillips case” is to Phillips v 
Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA).  
77  473; Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd 1998 2 SA 554 (T) 556I-J. 
78  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 474; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA). 
79  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 475; Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 
SA 77 (SCA). 
80  Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 475; Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C). 






It is submitted that in the context of trusts, there are two sets of relationships that 
give rise to a trustee’s fiduciary duty. First, a trustee is entrusted with certain assets 
by the founder of the trust who surrenders control thereof in favour of the trustee. 
This act of surrendering control is indicative of the relationship of reliance and trust 
that is specific to the particular trustee.  
In addition, the relationship of trust between trustee and beneficiary, and in 
particular the separation of control from benefit, 82  underscores the fact that 
beneficiaries are required to place reliance upon the trustees for the responsible 
administration of the trust estate. It is therefore clear, in view of the position adopted 
in Phillips,83 Volvo84 and Intibane,85 that the nature of the relationship between the 
parties is decisive, that the duty to bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust must form part of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. In view of the 
functional separation between control and benefit over trust assets there can be no 
doubt that a mutual understanding between founder, trustee and beneficiary, that the 
trustee will play an active and independent role in the administration of the trust, 
exists.  
The duty of independence as a facet of a trustee’s fiduciary duty appears clearly 
from the matter of Wiid v Wiid (“Wiid”),86 a decision of the Northern Cape High Court, 
Kimberley, in which trustees were held to account for their failure to bring an 
independent mind to bear upon the administration of the trust.87 
The Wiid case related to a typical family trust, the Elwida Trust, in which the 
founder, a game farmer and the family patriarch (who was already deceased at the 
time of the hearing of the matter), settled a trust for the benefit of his wife, their 
children and other lawful descendants.88 The trust was a discretionary trust in the 
sense that the trust deed provided that the trustees could:  
 
“in hulle uitsluitlike diskresie al die of enige van die Inkomstebegunstigdes ingevolge 
hierdie Trust, vrye gebruik en genot mag toelaat van enige bates waarvan die Trust die 
 
82  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
83  Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA). 
84  Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 6 SA 531 (SCA). 
85  Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control v Intibane Mediates 2016 6 SA 415 (GP). 
86  NCHC 13-01-2012 case no 1571/2012.  
87  For an in-depth discussion of the Wiid case see Nel (2016) Obiter 436. 






eienaar is, en mag besluit of die Trust of die betrokke Inkomstebegunstigdes vir 
die instandhouding van die bates asook die betaling van enige belastings, 
versekeringspremies en ander soortgelyke koste verantwoordelik moet wees.”89 
 
The Elwida Trust was established during 1992 with the founder, his wife (“Mrs 
Wiid”), daughter (“Van Loggenberg”) and a Mr Erasmus (a bookkeeper) as the 
trustees.90 During or about December 1999, Erasmus resigned as trustee and a 
Mr Du Toit (“Du Toit”) (also a bookkeeper) and the founder’s son, Jacobus Philipus 
Wiid (“Jacobus”), were appointed as trustees.  
The founder had operated all the family farming operations in the trust, which 
included holding various farms, game, and livestock therein.91 During August 2001, 
the trustees of the Elwida Trust leased all the farms, game, and livestock they held to 
Jacobus on extremely generous terms. A nominal rental was charged for the lease of 
the farms and the livestock, and no rental was charged for the use of the game, 
providing that the game numbers were maintained.92 
After the founder’s passing, the plaintiffs, three of the founder’s other children, and 
also beneficiaries under the trust, claimed that the lease of the trust’s assets to 
Jacobus was prejudicial as it was not market related, which led to financial losses for 
the trust. On this basis, the plaintiffs claimed damages from the trustees.93 
Of significance for present purposes was the testimony of the second defendant, 
Van Loggenberg, who indicated that the founder often intimidated the trustees when 
the trust business was discussed and, in particular, that they were so intimidated 
when the terms of the lease with Jacobus had been considered. She testified that 
she and the other trustees had followed the founder’s wishes and had failed to 
exercise their own discretion in determining whether the lease agreement was in the 
interest and to the benefit of the trust and its beneficiaries. 94  
The principal defence raised on behalf of the defendant trustees was simply that 
the trust deed empowered them to enter into agreements that favoured one 
 
89  Para 2.3. 
90  Para 2.1. 
91  Para 2.2. 
92  See the decision of the trustees in para 3.  
93  Para 3.3. In addition to damages, the plaintiffs sought an annulment of the agreements 
with Jacobus and the removal of the trustees from office.  






beneficiary over another as this fell within their discretionary prerogative.95 The court 
rejected this argument and held that, upon a proper construction of the trust deed, 
the founder’s intention was not to favour one beneficiary at the expense of another.96 
An application for leave to appeal followed, but was refused.97 
However, and significantly for present purposes, the court proceeded to hold in 
the alternative, and in the event that it was incorrect in its interpretation of the trust 
deed, that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to act in an 
independent and impartial manner. The court’s strong reliance on this failure is borne 
out in both the judgment in the action and the judgment refusing leave to appeal as 
follows: 
 
“Selfs al sou gesê kan word dat die voorbehoudsbepaling aan die trustees ŉ diskresie 
bied om na willekeur met die bates te handel, het nόg Loggenberg nόg Du Toit getuig dat, 
ten tye van die neem van die tersaaklike besluit in Augustus 2001, die trustees 
hoegenaamd behoorlik die aangeleentheid oorweeg het en daarna ŉ deurdagte besluit 
geneem het. Inteendeel is dit duidelik dat die besluit primêr deur die oorledene geneem 
is, en dat die ander trustees soos marionette bloot daarmee saamgestem en ingeval het 
sonder om ŉ onafhanklike diskresie uit te oefen. Geen uitoefening van ŉ diskresie het dus 
hoegenaamd geskied deur enigeen van die eerste, tweede en vierde verweerders nie. 
[Jacobus] het verkies om nie te getuig nie. Uit [sy] aanvaarding van die besluit en die 
afwesigheid van enige getuienis tot die teendeel kan aanvaar word dat ook [hy] bloot 
berus het in die besluit van die oorledene. Waarom sou [hy] nie in die besluit berus het 




“Self al sou ek verkeerd wees in my vertolking van paragraaf 5 van die trustakte, was die 
verweerders steeds, qua trustees, regtens verplig om behoorlik en verantwoordbaar die 
sake van die Trust in belang van die trustbegunstigdes te bestuur. Dit het hulle, op hul eie 
getuienis, nalatiglik versuim om te doen. Trouens, soos bevind, en soos toegegee deur 
mnr. Coetzee [counsel for the defendants], het hulle eenvoudig geen onafhanklike 
 
95  Para 14. 
96  Paras 14.1-14.4.  
97  The judgment in the application for leave to appeal, which was refused, is reported 
electronically on the Saflii database as Wiid v Wiid (1571/2006) [2012] ZANCHC 9 (30 
April 2012) <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZANCHC/2012/9.html> (accessed on 08-09-
2018) (“Wiid leave to appeal”). 






diskresie uitgeoefen tydens die besluitnemingsproses met die sluit van die huurkontrakte 
nie, en het hulself laat intimideer deur die oorledene, en bloot sy wil klakkeloos gevolg.”99  
 
On this basis, the court held that the relevant trustees had failed in their fiduciary 
duties as set out in section 9 of the TPCA and that they were to be held personally 
liable for the loss suffered by the trust.100 
The practical effect of trustees failing to act independently in the administration of 
the trust is borne out by the outcome in the Wiid matter. The court’s reasoning in this 
respect should be supported as it enforces the fiduciary proposition as the basis for a 
trustee’s duty to remain independent once a valid trust has been established. 
The importance of the office of trusteeship as the source of a trustee’s fiduciary 
duty is illustrated by the outcome of Griessel NO v De Kock (“Griessel”).101 Therein 
the SCA held that the role of a trustee called for the exercise of a fiduciary duty owed 
to all the beneficiaries, irrespective of whether they had vested rights or were 
contingent beneficiaries whose rights would only vest on the happening of some 
uncertain future event.102 The facts of the matter were as follows. 
In 1999, two sisters established an inter vivos trust. The trust in question held all 
the shares in a private company, which in turn had as its sole asset a farm situated 
within a game reserve in Mpumalanga. The trust was a discretionary trust, in the 
sense that the trustees had the power to select beneficiaries from time to time from 
amongst those described in the trust deed as “potential beneficiaries”. The trust deed 
contained the following provision: 
 
“The Trustees shall have the power, in their entire discretion from time to time and at any 
time to pay to, or to apply the whole or any part of the income of the trust fund for the 
general advantage of anyone or more of the beneficiaries as the Trustees may decide, 
and in such proportions and from such source as the Trustees may determine, and any 
income so paid or applied shall accrue to the beneficiary.”103 
 
 
99  Wiid leave to appeal para 4. 
100  Wiid para 15.5. 
101  2019 5 SA 396 (SCA). 
102  Para 18. 






Significantly, all the “potential beneficiaries” were afforded the right to visit the 
farm with their families on vacation on a rotational basis.104 
A dispute developed between one of the potential beneficiaries, Harold de Kock 
(“Harold”) and the trustees in relation to the commercial development of the farm. 
The dispute gave rise to significant acrimony between the parties and, initially, the 
trustees adopted an amendment of the trust deed removing Harold as potential 
beneficiary altogether.105 Litigation followed and was settled on the basis that the 
removal of Harold as potential beneficiary was regarded as “of no force and effect 
and invalid”.106 However, the privilege of vacationing on the farm on a rotational 
basis was still refused to Harold, but was afforded to the other potential beneficiaries. 
Aggrieved, Harold again approached the High Court in Pretoria effectively seeking 
a reinstatement of the right to vacation on the farm and the removal of the trustees of 
the trust. The court of first instance ordered that Harold be afforded equal access 
and enjoyment of the farm but stopped short of removing the serving trustees. The 
trustees applied to the SCA for leave to appeal (leave having been refused by the 
court of first instance). 
The SCA directed that oral argument be heard in relation to the application for 
leave to appeal,107 but that the parties be prepared, if called upon to do so, to 
present oral argument also in respect to the merits of the matter. The judgment is 
significant in the manner in which it approached the trustees’ obligations to the 
beneficiaries. In holding that the trustees unfairly discriminated against Harold in 
 
104  The farm in question was situated near Pilgrims Rest in Mpumalanga. Pilgrims Rest is a 
small museum town in Mpumalanga and a protected provincial heritage site. See 
https://www.pilgrims-rest.co.za/ (accessed 23-12-2019). In view of the significant 
litigation that ensued, it may be inferred that the farm is an attractive vacation 
destination.  
105  Para 3. 
106  Para 3. 
107  Section 17(2)(d) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, provides that:  
(d)  The judges considering an application referred to in paragraph (b) may dispose of 
the application without the hearing of oral argument, but may, if they are of the 
opinion that the circumstances so require, order that it be argued before them at a 
time and place appointed, and may, whether or not they have so ordered, grant or 
refuse the application or refer it to the court for consideration. 
Sub-section (b) refers to an application for leave to appeal made to the SCA in the event 






refusing him the privilege to vacation on the farm, the court emphasised the fiduciary 
obligation owed by the trustees: 
 
“The role of a trustee in administering a trust calls for the exercise of a fiduciary duty 
owed to all the beneficiaries of a trust, irrespective of whether they have vested rights or 
are contingent beneficiaries whose rights to the trust income or capital will only vest on 
the happening of some uncertain future event. While discrimination on the basis of need 
may, under certain circumstances, be justified by the needs of a particular beneficiary, the 
trustees did not advance ‘need’ as the reason for treating the first respondent less 
favourably. It is clear from the averments made in the affidavits and the tenor of the 
attorneys’ correspondence that he was regarded as obstructive and contrarian. That may 
be so, but that does not suffice as justification for treating him less favourably.”108 
 
On this basis the SCA ordered that the trustees reinstate Harold’s equal access to 
the enjoyment of the farm.109 The Griessel matter illustrates the importance of the 
quasi-public nature of the office of trusteeship. It was common cause in that matter 
that the trust was a discretionary trust, in the sense that the trustees had the freedom 
to select beneficiaries from listed “potential beneficiaries”. However, the intercession 
of the court to the effect that the trustees were not permitted to discriminate against 
one such potential beneficiary without a justifiable basis, on account of the fiduciary 
duty owed, underscores the quasi-public nature of the office of trusteeship. It is 
submitted that there can be no objection to a founder, in his personal capacity and 
prior to his death, discriminating in favour of one of his children by affording 
preferential treatment or privileges. In those circumstances the relationship is a 
purely private one. However, once assets are placed in trust the nature of the 
relationship changes to a quasi-public one on account of the nature of the office of 
trusteeship. As the outcome in the Griessel judgment illustrates, it is this public 
nature that accounts for the principle that trustees may not unreasonably 
discriminate against a particular beneficiary. It is therefore clear from this judgment 
that the fiduciary duty of trustees flows from their office and it follows that it is on 
account of the occupation of this office that trustees are required to bring an 
independent mind to bear upon the administration of the trust. 
 
 
108  Para 19. 






5 4  The joint-action rule and trustee independence 
As illustrated above, a trustee’s duty to remain independent is a facet of his or her 
fiduciary duty.110 In a valuable contribution to the subject of trustee independence in 
the context of co-trusteeship, Du Toit notes that the duty of independence: 
 
“essentially obliges a trustee, save when dealing with prescriptive matters of law or 
matters of a purely administrative nature, to bring independent judgment to bear when 
participating in the decision-making processes of trust administration.”111  
 
and that  
 
“compliance with the duty of independence ensures commensurate compliance with one 
of the facets of a trustee’s fiduciary duty.”112 
 
This sentiment is consistent with the principles of the fiduciary proposition and in 
my view correctly explains a trustee’s duty of independence once a valid trust has 
been established.113  
However, in the context of co-trusteeship, and the obvious duty on trustees to 
remain independent from each other, Du Toit proceeds to suggest that this facet may 
further be explained on the basis of the so-called “joint-action rule”.114 The joint-
action rule dictates that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the trust deed, the 
trustees must act jointly if the trust estate is to be bound.115  
The application of the joint-action rule in South African trust law is uncontroversial 
and was once again confirmed in O’Shea NO v Van Zyl,116 where the SCA held that, 
 
110  See part 3 3 2 in Chapter 3. 
111  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 641 (emphasis added). 
112  642 (emphasis added). 
113  See part 3 3 2  The fiduciary proposition in Chapter 3. 
114  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 642. 
115  Nieuwoudt NO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 3 SA 486 (SCA) para 16 (Harms JA 
for the court). See also, Goolam Ally Family Trust v Textile, Curtaining & Trimming (Pty) 
Ltd 1989 4 SA 985 (C) 988D-E; Hoosen v Deedat 1999 4 SA 425 (SCA) para 23; Erwee 
v Erwee 2006 1 All SA 626 (O) 630J; Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) para 9. 






in order to bind a trust, “trustees must act jointly unless the trust deed provides 
otherwise”.117  
Du Toit’s submission that the joint-action rule obliges trustees to bring 
independent judgement to bear on trust matters represents a departure from the 
fiduciary proposition as the theoretical underpinning of the duty of independence and 
is expressed as follows: 
 
“Trust administration is more often than not conducted by co-trustees. In this regard, 
South African trust law adheres strictly to the so-called ‘joint-action rule’ that requires co-
trustees to act collectively in the exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
duties. The joint-action rule applies not only to important trustee decisions (for example, 
regarding the alienation or burdening of trust property), but in respect to all trust matters. 
By necessary implication, the joint-action rule obliges each individual co-trustee to 
participate actively in and, therefore, to bring independent judgment to bear on the 
decision-making processes of trust administration.”118 
 
Du Toit’s argument is accordingly based on the premise that the joint-action rule is 
not limited to so-called “external acts”,119  but that the rule applies to all trustee 
conduct, including internal administration.120 
This view finds support in the matters of Smit v Van de Werke (“Smit”)121 and 
Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust (“Coetzee”),122 where it was respectively held that the 
trustees were to act jointly in the exercise of the power of assumption and in the 
passing of resolutions in the absence of a provision to the contrary contained in the 
trust deed. 
While it is correct that, absent a provision in the trust deed to the contrary, 
trustees are required to act unanimously in the conduct of internal business, it is 
 
117  97B-C. See also, Nieuwoudt NO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 3 SA 486 (SCA). 
118  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 642 (emphasis added). See also, Du Toit (2013) Trust Law 
International 18. 
119  Cameron et al distinguish between internal administrative acts, on the one hand, and 
external acts or business with outsiders. See, E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon 
Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6 ed (2018) 375-387. 
120  See, Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 18; Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 5 SA 
674 (T) 680F.  
121  1984 1 SA 164 (T). 






submitted that this duty is not founded upon the joint-action rule, but is rooted in their 
simultaneous occupation of the office of trusteeship.  
An analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the joint-action rule illustrates that it 
operates only in respect of business with outsiders, with the concomitant conclusion 
of obligations for the trust estate, but not in respect of the internal management of 
the trust. 
The rule accordingly does not provide an explanation for the requirement for 
trustees to act independently in the internal administration of the trust. This will 
become apparent from the discussion that follows. 
 
5 4 1  The type of joint ownership applicable to trusts 
In Land Bank v Parker,123 Cameron JA explained that the joint-action rule derives 
“from the nature of the trustees’ joint ownership of the trust property. Since co-
owners must act jointly, trustees must also act jointly”.124 
While it is now established that the joint-action rule is rooted in the nature of the 
joint ownership by trustees, the nature of this type of ownership was until recently 
unclear. De Waal proposed that the type of co-ownership among co-trustees in 
respect of trust property is similar to the concept of “joint tenancy” in English law.125  
“Tenancy” in this context must be understood as denoting ownership and should 
not be confused with any landlord-tenant relationship.126 In essence, the principle of 
joint tenancy provides that the entire interest in the trust property is vested 
simultaneously in all the trustees and that the trustees are deemed to form “a 
collective entity – one composite person”.127 
The concept can be fully explained as follows: 
 
 
123  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
124  Para 15. See also the judgment of Van Dijkhorst J in Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 5 
SA 674 (T) and Honoré “Trust” in R Zimmerman & DP Visser (eds) Southern Cross – 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 854 n 39. 
125  MJ de Waal “The strange path of trust property at a trustee’s death: theory and practice 
in the law of trusts” (2009) TSAR 84. 
126  According to Riddall Land Law (2003) 170, the term in this context derives from the term 
“tenant” in the old context of tenure. As pointed out by De Waal (2009) TSAR 84 87 n 14, 
there is also an obvious link with the Latin term teneo, meaning “to hold”. 






“The essence of joint tenancy consists in the theory that each joint tenant is wholly 
entitled to the whole of the interest which is the subject of co-ownership. The key to 
understanding joint tenancy is the realisation that no joint tenant holds any specific or 
distinct share himself, but each is (together with the other joint tenant or tenants) invested 
with the totality of the co-owned interest.”128 
 
Joint tenancy is therefore distinguishable from the established forms of 
co-ownership recognised in South African law. In South African law, co-ownership 
has been recognised as either normal or free co-ownership (“vrye mede-eiendom”) 
or bound common ownership (“gebonde mede-eiendom”).129 As explained by De 
Waal,130 free co-ownership originates in Roman law and exists in the normal course 
of business where two or more persons become co-owners of a thing, for example 
where two parties jointly purchase a thing. Bound common ownership, on the other 
hand, originates in Germanic law and exists where persons become co-owners of a 
thing by virtue of a special relationship between them, for example, a partnership or 
a marriage in community of property. 
A central feature of both these traditional modes of co-ownership is that each 
owner holds a share of the property or, more specifically, “undivided shares”.131 It is 
accordingly possible that an owner in free co-ownership could own a two-thirds 
undivided share in an asset with the other holding the remaining third share.132 This 
is, however, not possible where property is held by virtue of joint tenancy as the 
entire interest in the property is then vested simultaneously in all the co-owners, to 
the extent that the co-owners are (in relation to third parties) in the position of a 
single owner.133 
This explains what has been referred to as the “elastic” nature of ownership in 
trust property, as the removal of one trustee does not give rise to any formal or 
 
128  Gray & Gray Land Law 914. 
129  See De Waal (2009) TSAR 89 and see also, PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 133; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 378; AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of 
Property 7 ed (2016) 48.  
130  De Waal (2009) TSAR 90. 
131  Van der Merwe Sakereg 378-394. 
132  380. Note the distinction with the English form of ownership described as “tenancy in 
common” where the owners hold the property in undivided shares.  
133  See De Waal (2009) TSAR 89; C Harpum Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real 






express transfer of ownership and the “slack in the title” is simply “taken up” by the 
remaining trustees.134 
This phenomenon is known in English trust law as the “rule of survivorship” and 
has been said to be the “grand and distinguishing incident of joint tenancy”. 135 
De Waal explains the rule of survivorship as follows: 
 
“In its essence the rule of survivorship entails that, on the death of one joint tenant, his or 
her interest in the property passes to the other joint tenants by the ius accrescendi (right 
of accrual). This process defeats any provision in a joint tenant’s will or the rules of 
intestacy and it continues until there is only one survivor, who then holds the property as 
sole owner.”136 
 
It is, accordingly, clear that the rule of survivorship depends solely on ownership 
being held through joint tenancy as the traditionally recognised modes of 
co-ownership would by necessary implication require a formal transfer of ownership 
between the respective trustees.137 
Notwithstanding an initial rejection of joint tenancy by Cameron et al,138 it now 
appears settled that this peculiar form of ownership has been received into South 
African law.  
In the fifth edition of their work, Cameron et al unequivocally rejected the idea that 
joint tenancy has been received into South African law, but proceeded to explain that 
upon the death of a trustee “the ownership of the trust property … passes to the 
executor of the trustee’s estate, and must be transferred to the surviving or new 
trustees”.139 However, later in the same textbook the authors, seemingly contrary to 
the above view, recognise the operation of the rule of survivorship and suggest that 
upon death a trustee: 
 
 
134  De Waal (2009) TSAR 91, referencing K Reid in T Smith & R Black (eds) The Laws of 
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 18 (1993) para 35. 
135  See Gray & Gray Land Law 915. 
136  De Waal (2009) TSAR 88. See also, AJ Oakley Megarry’s Manual of the Law of Real 
Property (2002) 303; Gray & Gray Land Law 915. 
137  De Waal (2009) TSAR 90. 
138  E Cameron, M de Waal, B Wunsh, P Solomon & E Kahn Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts 5 ed (2002) 27. 






“loses the ownership of any assets which the person held as trustee provided that there 
remains another trustee in whom they can vest by virtue of the rule of survivorship.”140  
 
This view also appears to be in step with what happens in practice.141 
The initial position expounded by Cameron et al,142 was questioned by De Waal, 
who showed that joint tenancy had, in fact, been received into South African law as 
far as ownership of trust assets is concerned. The evidence for this conclusion is 
indeed there: recognised models of co-ownership are unable to explain the operation 
of the rule of survivorship and, moreover, there is nothing inherent in the concept 
itself that is incompatible with South African law.143 The observation that the rule of 
survivorship has been consistently applied in the context of South African trust law 
also reinforced the argument that joint tenancy was received into South African law 
as a composite part of the English trust that was introduced in the early nineteenth 
century.144 
In the latest version of their work, Cameron et al have accepted that joint tenancy 
has been received into South African law. Further, that it accounts for the applicable 
property regime regarding trusts,145 and that: 
 
“It appears that ‘joint tenancy’ as a form of co-ownership among co-trustees and the 
related rule that the office of trustee is conferred individually on the trustee in question, 
and is not transmitted to the trustee’s executor, have been received in South Africa.”146 
 
It is submitted that it is therefore now settled that the rule of survivorship has been 
received into South African law. 
 
140  574. This statement has been retained in the latest edition of that work. See Cameron et 
al Honoré 593. 
141  See also, De Waal (2009) TSAR n 32 where the author explains that, while no direct 
authority for this submission could be found, same was based on feedback received 
from trust law practitioners and the author’s own experience. My own investigations in 
the form of discussions with trust practitioners and my own experience, support this 
submission.  
142  Cameron et al Honoré 5 ed 27. 
143  De Waal (2009) TSAR 92. 
144  92. See also, MJ de Waal “The core elements of trust: aspects of the English, Scottish 
and South African trusts compared” (2000) 117 SALJ 548 570 n 143. 
145  Cameron et al Honoré 32. 






5 4 2  Joint-action rule does not compel joint decision making 
Returning to the concept of trustee independence and the proposition by Du Toit that 
the joint-action rule compels trustees to exercise independence also in the context of 
internal administration,147 it is submitted that this proposition is incorrect. This is so 
because, as shown above, the joint-action rule has its roots in the co-ownership (in 
the form of joint tenancy) of the trust assets. While it therefore follows that all acts 
that may create an obligation with respect to the trust estate vis-à-vis third parties 
would require joint action by the trustees, the co-ownership of the trust estate does 
not per se explain the requirement to act unanimously in respect of the internal 
administration of the trust. 
The authority cited by Du Toit for his proposition that it does, is Coetzee.148 
That matter concerned the efforts of the trustees of a trust to terminate the 
employment of an employee who also served as a trustee. Unsurprisingly, the 
employee in question (the applicant in the matter) did not agree to the termination of 
his employment and a unanimous trustee resolution was therefore impossible.149 
Following a resolution to terminate his employment contract by the remainder of the 
trustees, the applicant sought a declarator that the resolution was invalid. 
The question to be answered was therefore whether a decision to terminate the 
employment contract of the applicant could be validly taken by a majority of the 
trustees in office, or whether they were required to act unanimously.150 
The trust in question was a testamentary trust and the will in terms of which it was 
founded did not provide that a majority decision could pass resolutions. It was 
argued on behalf of the applicant that the resolution to terminate his employment 
was invalid since the trustees were required to act jointly. 
This line of argument found support with Van Dijkhorst J, who held as follows: 
 
“Daar is goeie gronde vir ŉ reël dat trustees gesamentlik moet optree en eenparig moet 
beslis. 
Die trustgoed word normaalweg aan trustees in eiendomsreg oorgedra ... 
Mede-eienaars het gesamentlike eiendomsreg, gebruiksreg en beheersreg oor die mede-
eiendom. Daar geld nie ŉ meerderheidstem nie. Beslissinge moet gesamentlik en 
 
147  Du Toit (2009) THRHR 642. 
148  2003 5 SA 674 (T).  
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eenparig geneem word om geldig te wees in soverre meer as die pro rata belang van die 
afsonderlike mede-eienaar betrokke is ... 
Tensy die trustakte of testament bepalings tot die teendeel bevat is daar regtens geen 
rede om ŉ ander reël te volg in die geval van trusts nie. Trouens die saak is sterker. 
Indien ŉ oprigter meerdere persone aanwys om trustees te wees is dit klaarblyklik sy 
bedoeling dat hulle gesamentlik moet optree. Waar daar twee trustees is beteken dit 
eenparig. Waarom sou die oprigter dan, waar hy byvoorbeeld drie trustees aangewys het, 
bedoel het dat die beslissing van twee daarvan voldoende sal wees? Klaarblyklik is in so 
ŉ geval die derde aangestel omdat sy oordeel en beslissing ook van belang geag word. 
Gesamentlike eenparige optrede in die vervreemding, hantering en bestuur van die 
trustgoed is dus ŉ voorvereiste.”151 
 
On behalf of the respondents, it was submitted that the co-ownership of trust 
assets only enjoins the trustees to act jointly in respect of the alienation or burdening 
of the trust assets and that the rule requiring joint action did not extend to the internal 
administration of the trust. This argument was rejected as follows: 
 
“Namens die respondente is betoog dat gesamentlike eenparige optrede slegs vereis 
word waar trustbates vervreem of beswaar word. Daar is geen gesag of logiese rede vir 
die stelling nie. Ondeurdagte kontrakte kan net so nadelig wees vir die trust as 
vervreemding van bates.”152 
 
Accordingly, it was held that the trust resolution terminating the applicant’s 
employment was void. 153  As explained below, the conclusion that trustees are 
required to act unanimously with regard to the internal business of the trust is 
correct. However, this duty is not rooted in the joint-action rule but derives from the 
nature of the trustee office.  
The analysis of the court in Smit154  illustrates this point. That case revolved 
around the exercise of the power of assumption by a sole trustee and bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the Land Bank v Parker case, albeit that it played out nearly 
20 years earlier.155 
The Smit case concerned a testamentary trust in which the founder, a 
Mr Johannes van de Werke, appointed his surviving spouse from a second marriage 
 
151  678G-679C. 
152  680F. 
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and the first respondent in the application, Mrs van de Werke, together with his 
accountant, Mr Geyser, as trustees of the trust established in his will.  
Mr Van de Werke also stipulated that there should at all times be no fewer than 
two trustees in office,156 and that, in the event that any of the trustees would vacate 
the office, his or her place was to be taken by a partner in Mr Geyser’s firm. The trust 
accordingly had a capacity-defining requirement akin to that highlighted in Land 
Bank v Parker. In addition, the trustees were clothed with the power of 
assumption.157 
Upon the founder’s death, Mrs Van de Werke and Mr Geyser assumed the office 
of trusteeship and managed the trust estate until Mr Geyser’s resignation two years 
later. After Mr Geyser’s resignation, his position as trustee was offered to the other 
partners in his firm, but all eligible candidates declined the nomination. This 
prompted Mrs Van de Werke to appoint a second trustee from outside Mr Geyser’s 
firm through the purported exercise of her power of assumption. 
Mr Van de Werke’s children from his first marriage opposed this appointment and 
launched an application to have it set aside. The now obvious point, courtesy of the 
Land Bank v Parker judgment, that a trust suffers from incapacity where there is a 
sub-minimum of trustees in office,158 was not directly argued. Instead, the applicants 
confined their attack on the capacity of the surviving trustee to exercise the power of 
assumption without the concurrence of another trustee. The submissions on behalf 
of the applicants were summarised as follows: 
 
“Juridies is die aanval op die tweede respondent se aanstelling voor my gerig teen die 
eerste respondent se mag om op haar eie en sonder die medewerking van ŉ ander 
eksekuteur of trustee, ŉ verdere trustee te assumeer. Dit word namens die applikante 
aangevoer dat die eerste respondent haar mag van assumpsie slegs kan ontleen aan die 
testament van die erflater; dat dit duidelik uit die bewoording daarvan blyk dat die amp ŉ 
gesamentlike een is bestaande uit twee persone en dat een enkele trustee onder geen 
omstandighede op sy eie kan funksioneer nie. Dit sluit ook die mag van assumpsie in. 
Gevolglik is die tweede respondent se aanstelling en die ‘Akte van assumpsie’ wat in 
Nederland verly is, ongeldig. Dit word aan die hand gedoen dat die eerste respondente 
die Hof moes genader het vir die aanstelling van ŉ tweede persoon as trustee om haar 
 
156  167B-D. 
157  166F. In this context, the power of assumption refers to the power to appoint further 
trustees to assist with the administration of the estate.  






gebrekkige bevoegdheid aan te vul. Hierdie persoon sou slegs deur ŉ Hof aangestel word 
met inagneming van die wense van en na oorlegpleging met die uiteindelike erfgename. 
Indien die eerste respondente en hierdie aangestelde trustee so sou besluit, kon hulle 
dan ŉ derde persoon assumeer en, as hulle nie hieroor kon ooreenkom nie, sou hulle die 
Hof weer moes nader. ”159 
 
The respondents conceded that the trust deed required a minimum of two trustees 
in office but argued that, with regard to the power of assumption, this power was 
conferred upon both trustees to be exercised independently. The judgment 
accordingly turned on the issue of whether the power of assumption could validly be 
exercised by a trustee acting alone, absent such express provision in the trust 
deed.160 
In arriving at its judgment, the court relied on an extract from Halsbury’s Laws of 
England161 to the effect that the power of appointment in the context of assumption is 
granted to the trustees as “it is annexed to their office”. 162  It was accordingly 
acknowledged that the power of assumption derived from the office of trusteeship to 
which it was conferred and the remaining question, therefore, was whether this 
power could be exercised by one trustee acting alone. 
In a passage reminiscent of Land Bank v Parker, Le Roux J held that the 
requirement of two trustees was indicative thereof that a single trustee could not act 
alone. The court held that: 
 
“Na my mening blyk dit duidelik hieruit dat die mag van assumpsie slegs erken word 
indien die erflater dit uitdruklik toeken, en, tweedens, en nog belangriker, dat waar ŉ 
kworum-bepaling in ŉ testament voorkom die oorblywende eksekuteurs (of eksekuteur) 
nie kan funksioneer in enige opsig, selfs nie eers om ŉ ander persoon te assumeer nie, 
waar hulle getal te kort skiet aan die vereiste kworum.”163 
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Ultimately the court held that Mrs Van de Werke could not have exercised the 
power of assumption since the office of trustee was not quorate and, consequently, 
the appointment of the second trustee was set aside.164 
The significance of the judgment in the Smit case lies therein that it acknowledges 
that the office of trusteeship is the source of the power of assumption and that such 
power is conferred upon the bearer of that office by the trust deed. The joint 
ownership of the trust assets was not in issue because the power to assume another 
trustee did not flow from the real rights held by the trustees.  
This finding echoes the emphasis placed on the office of trusteeship by Honoré.165 
The public nature of the office of trusteeship is discussed in Chapter 2,166 where it is 
described in view of the supervisory role that the courts and the Master play in the 
administration of the trust. However, for Honoré the office of trusteeship accounts for 
more than merely the court’s supervisory role in connection with trusts. As explained 
by De Waal: 
 
“It also tells us why a trust will not fail for want of a trustee; it explains the general duties 
of a trustee (thus providing a link with the trustee’s fiduciary position); it is a key to 
understanding the concept of separate private and trust estates; and it makes clear why 
one can have a trust without ownership necessarily having to vest in the trustee.”167 
 
Honoré emphasises that while the founder of the trust is its constituent, it is the 
trust deed that is its constitution,168 and that a necessary implication of occupying an 
office is that the trustee must be loyal to the trust deed. Therefore, in circumstances 
such as Smit, the power conferred upon the office of trusteeship may only be 
exercised when that office is quorate. 
 
164  175A. 
165  T Honoré “A comparative survey of the law of trusts and trust-like institutions” in 
International Court of Justice. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru. Memorial of the 
Republic of Nauru vol 1 (1990) 354; T Honoré “Obstacles to the reception of trust law? 
The examples of South Africa and Scotland” in AM Rabello (ed) Aequitas and Equity: 
Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions” (1997) 793 794; T Honoré “On fitting trusts 
into civil law jurisdictions” in Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2008 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270179> (accessed 04-08-
2019). 
166  See part 2 4 4 in Chapter 2. 
167  De Waal (2000) SALJ 566. 






The appreciation that the office of trusteeship is a unitary office therefore also 
accounts for trustees being required to act unanimously in the exercise of their 
internal administration. This is not as a result of the trustees’ status as joint owners 
of the trust estate.  
Accordingly, the duty for unanimity in the internal administration of the trust does 
not derive from the joint-action rule as suggested by Du Toit or as may appear from 
Coetzee169 but derives from the joint occupation of the office of trusteeship. Put 
differently, it is the unitary office of trusteeship, through the various trustees, that 
exercises the powers conferred upon it by the trust deed.  
Accordingly, the fiduciary proposition provides a sound framework within which a 
trustee’s duty of independence may be explained. In brief, the nature of the 
relationship between the founder and trustee and the trustee and beneficiary is such 
that the reliance placed upon the trustee to bring an independent mind to bear upon 
the administration of the trust is justified. Accordingly, it follows that the duty of 
independence is a component of a trustee’s fiduciary duty and a failure to act 
independently will constitute a breach thereof.170  
 
5 5  Conclusion 
It is now clear that there is no closed list of fiduciary duties and that it is the nature of 
the relationship between the parties that is determinative of whether such duties 
arise.  
It is also significant that our courts have acknowledged that such duties may also 
arise where the fiduciary relationship is not innate to the peculiar relationship 
between the parties, but that the specific circumstances present would demand the 
imposition of such duties. 171  In the context of trusts, it is submitted that the 
relationships between the founder and trustee and trustee and beneficiary give rise 
to the fiduciary duty of trustees and that this duty is embodied in the office of 
trusteeship. It is therefore clear that the duty of independence, as a component of a 
 
169  2003 5 SA 674 (T). 
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singular fiduciary duty, is foisted upon the trustee on the basis of his occupation of 
that office. 
It has further been argued that the joint-action rule is not the source of the duty of 
independence, since this rule is rooted in the joint ownership of the trust assets. 
While the specific form of joint ownership in question compels trustees to act jointly 
in establishing obligations that bind the trust estate, there is no reason to hold that 
they are also so bound in the internal administration of the trust. 
Instead, it is submitted, the obligation to act jointly in the internal administration of 
the trust, such as the passing of a resolution, is a function of the collective 
occupation of the trustee office. 
This is not to say that trustees do not have an obligation to bring an independent 
mind to bear upon the determination of internal trust business. Questions of trustee 
independence are to be examined against the fiduciary proposition and, as is 
discussed in Chapter 6, a failure to apply the requisite measure of independent 







CHAPTER 6:  SHAM AND ABUSE  
6 1  Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the separation of estates, and the recognition and 
enforcement of this separation, is a core element of the trust. It ensures the 
protection of the trust assets from the personal creditors of the trustees. 1  This 
principle is especially pronounced in the context of a civilian trust and is explicitly 
confirmed in the Principles of European Trust Law2 and the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition.3 
In the civilian context, the separation of estates is achieved without recourse to 
the “dual ownership” developed in equity, but through the recognition of a separate 
trust estate, distinct from that of the founder.4 The existence of this separate trust 
estate has been offered as a retort to allegations that civilian trusts are not “proper” 
or “real”5 trusts but merely rise to the level of “trust-like institutions”6 or “so-called 
trusts”.7  
The effect of recognising that the trustees have an estate separate from their 
personal estates, or that of the beneficiaries, is to afford the trustees limited liability 
in much the same manner that separate juristic personality does.8 This effect of 
limited liability has no doubt contributed to making trusts attractive vehicles to protect 
 
1  See the text below n 99 in Chapter 2. See also, MJ de Waal “The core elements of the 
trust: aspects of the English, Scottish and South African trusts compared” (2000) 117 
SALJ 548; GL Gretton “Trusts without equity” (2000) 49 Int Comp LQ 599; MJ De Waal 
“In search of a model for the introduction of the trust into a civilian context” (2001) 12 
Stell LR 63; MJ de Waal “The abuse of the trust (or: ‘going behind the trust form’): the 
South African experience with some comparative perspectives” (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078. 
2  Art 1(1). 
3  (Adopted on 1 July 1985, entered into force 1 January 1992) art 2. 
4  See part 2 3 in Chapter 2. 
5  See F Sonneveldt “The trust – an introduction” in F Sonneveldt & HL van Mens (eds) 
The Trust: Bridge or Abyss between Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions? (1992) 1 and 
JH Langbein “The contractarian basis of the law of trusts” (1995) 105 Yale LJ 625 669. 
6  DJ Hayton “The Hague convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their 
recognition” (1987) 36 Int Comp LQ 260 262. 
7  DJ Hayton “Trusts” in DJ Hayton, SCJJ Kortmann, AJM Nuytinck, AVM Struycken & 
NED Faber (eds) Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-like Arrangements (1996) 3. 






assets or further business interests.9 However, as is also encountered in the realm of 
corporate law, the limited liability afforded by trusts is open to abuse by trustees, 
founders and beneficiaries alike to the prejudice of third parties.  
This possibility was acknowledged in Land Bank v Parker,10  where the court 
suggested that trust law may require development in order to guard against abuse: 
 
“It may be necessary to … extend well-established principles to trusts by holding in a 
suitable case that the trustees’ conduct invites the inference that the trust form was a 
mere cover for the conduct of business ‘as before’, and that the assets allegedly vesting 
in trustees in fact belong to one or more of the trustees and so may be used in 
satisfaction of debts to the repayment of which the trustees purported to bind the trust. 
Where trustees of a family trust, including the founder, act in breach of the duties 
imposed by the trust deed, and purport on their sole authority to enter into contracts 
binding the trust, that may provide evidence that the trust form is a veneer that in justice 
should be pierced in the interests of creditors”.11 
 
On the strength of this dictum, South African courts have sought to develop the 
law of trusts in order to guard against the abuse of the trust.12 
In this chapter the mechanisms developed to look beyond the trust form are 
examined. Central to this examination is the distinction between deeming a trust a 
“sham” and therefore to conclude that no trust was established, and justifying “going 
 
9  See E Nel The Business Trust and its Role as an Entity in the Financial Environment 
LLD dissertation, NNMU (2012) 101. It was this advantage of the trust that has earned it 
the description of “cornerstone of the unincorporated company” in English law. 
Manchester explained as follows:  
“The property of the company was vested in trustees who were required to further the 
covenants which were set out in the deed of settlement. In this way it was possible to 
provide both for the company to sue and be sued and for the transferability of shares. It 
was possible even to provide for a form of limited liability, at least as between the 
partners.” 
AM Manchester A Modern Legal history of England and Wales 1750 – 1950 (1980) 350, 
quoted by R Harris Industrialising English law: Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organisation 1720 – 1844 (2000) 147. 
10  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA). 
11  Para 37.3. 
12  See as examples Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA); First Rand Limited 
t/a First National Bank v Britz ZAGPPHC 20-07-2011 case no 54742/09; Van Zyl NNO v 







behind the trust” (or, as is argued, “disregarding the trust estate”)13 in circumstances 
where the trust form has been abused. 
With regard to “sham” trusts, it is argued that the sham doctrine (and its South 
African counterpart) is not equipped to explain those instances where, owing to a 
hidden subjective intention on the part of the founder, no trust is established. 
Instead, the principles underlying the establishment proposition are offered as a 
more suitable alternative for holding that no trust was established.  
In respect to those instances justifying the disregard of the trust estate, the 
analysis of the Western Cape Division of the High Court in Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 
(“Van Zyl v Kaye”)14 is compared to the, fairly recent, conclusions reached by the 
SCA in WT v KT15 and REM v VM.16  
It is argued that the analysis in Van Zyl v Kaye is to be preferred as it more closely 
resembles the underpinning of the fiduciary proposition which, it is submitted, should 
form the basis upon which future questions of disregarding the trust estate are to be 
considered.  
Therefore, in this chapter, the establishment and fiduciary propositions developed 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are applied to the contemporary difficulty of identifying and 
dealing with the abuse of the trust form. It is submitted that these propositions 
provide a sound theoretical framework against which sham and abuse may be 
measured and offer justification for either challenging the validity of the trust or 
disregarding the separate estate thereof. 
  
6 2  The distinction between holding a trust a “sham” versus “going behind 
the trust form” 
When considering questions of so-called “sham” trusts and “abuse” permitting a 
disregarding of the trust’s estate, it is crucial to draw and maintain a clear distinction 
between these concepts which are approached from two different theoretical 
perspectives.17  
 
13  See part 6 2 below. 
14  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
15  2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 
16  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 






The use of the term “sham” in relation to a trust has been the subject of much 
criticism.18 For example, De Waal argues convincingly that there is a conceptual 
distinction to be drawn between sham situations, on the one hand, and the abuse of 
trusts, on the other.19 As he correctly points out, in the case of a sham the question 
is whether the trust was validly established and the emphasis falls on the 
requirements for the creation of a valid trust. This distinction received judicial 
approval in Van Zyl v Kaye as follows:  
 
“it [is] necessary to highlight that establishing that a trust is a sham and ‘going behind the 
trust form’ entail fundamentally different undertakings. When a trust is a sham, it does not 
exist and there is nothing to ‘go behind’”.20 
 
In contrast, the concept of “abuse” relates to the misuse of the separate estate 
afforded by trusts. In such a case, the enquiry proceeds from the premise that there 
is a valid trust, but that the effect of limited liability afforded through the separate 
estates are abused. The question, therefore, is whether the abuse warrants a court 
to disregard the separate estate of the trustee (that is, separate from the latter’s 
personal estate) and hold that the trust assets be applied for a particular purpose or 
– albeit somewhat controversially, as pointed out by Du Toit et al21 – that they in 
reality vest in a different estate (that is, the trustee’s personal estate).22 However, in 
what follows – for the sake of convenience of expression – reference will throughout 
be made to the “separate estate of the trust”. Note, however, that this expression 
refers to the estate that the trustee holds separately from his or her personal estate.  
It is trite that a trust is not a separate juristic person and, as such, it is submitted 
that the terms “piercing” or “lifting” the “veneer” or the “veil” of the trust, or “going 
behind the trust” is inappropriate as there is, strictly speaking, no juristic personality 
to “pierce”, “lift” or “go behind”. The abuse that is to be avoided relates to the 
 
18  J Palmer “Dealing with the emerging popularity of sham trusts” (2007) NZ LR 81; De 
Waal (2012) RabelsZ 1078; L BoHao “There is no such thing as a sham trust” (2013) 44 
VUW LR 115; E Nel “Two sides of a coin: piercing the veil and unconscionability in trust 
law” (2014) 35 Obiter 570. 
19  De Waal (2012) RabelsZ 1098. 
20  Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 4 SA 452 (WCC) para 16. 
21  F du Toit, B Smith & A van der Linde Fundamentals of South African Trust Law (2019) 
147. 






separate estate of the trust and the use thereof to achieve what the law would 
otherwise not countenance. Accordingly, it is suggested that the correct term for this 
form of relief is “disregarding the separate estate” of the trust. 
In what follows, the concepts of a sham trust and an abuse which merits 
disregarding the separate estate of a trust are critically evaluated within the context 
of the independence duality and the establishment and fiduciary propositions first 
identified in Chapter 3.23 
It is suggested that the “sham doctrine” in common-law jurisdictions and its 
counterpart in South Africa, the “simulation doctrine”, are ill-suited to the law of trusts 
and as such should be avoided. Instead, it is argued that the establishment 
proposition provides a sound theoretical basis upon which the validity of a trust can 
be determined in scenarios where the founder merely simulated the establishment of 
a trust.  
Recent developments in disregarding the trust estate are also examined and it is 
submitted that the development of this form of relief will benefit from the application 
of the fiduciary proposition.  
 
6 3  There is no such thing as a “sham trust” 
The debate about the appropriate use of the term “sham” in respect to trusts has 
only, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, developed and intensified fairly recently. 24 
Proponents of the use of the term “sham” in respect to trusts argue that it correctly 
encapsulates the position where the apparent creation of the trust was intended to 
merely mislead,25 whereas others argue that the sham doctrine is incompatible with 
the basic tenets of trust law.26 
 
23  See part 3 3 in Chapter 3. 
24  See Palmer (2007) NZ LR 81; Nel (2014) Obiter 570; IM Shipley “Trust assets and the 
dissolution of a marriage: a practical look at invalid trusts, sham trusts, and piercing the 
veneers of trusts/going behind the trust form” (2016) 3 Merc LJ 508; D Mallon “A critical 
analysis of sham trusts” (2017) 20 Trinity C LR 162. 
25  M Conaglen “Sham trusts” (2008) 67 CLJ 176; Mallon (2017) Trinity C LR 162. 






The sham doctrine is attributed to Diplock LJ who, in the 1967 case of Snook v 
London and West Riding Investments Ltd (“Snook”), 27  a case involving a hire-
purchase agreement, said in connection with the word “sham” that: 
 
“As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself … and the 
defendants were a ‘sham’, it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept 
is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any 
meaning in law, it means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ 
which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of 
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal 
rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create.”28 
 
This dictum has acquired “canonical” 29  status and has been cited as the 
authoritative statement of the sham doctrine in common-law jurisdictions around the 
world.30 In addition, and significant for present purposes, Diplock LJ’s formulation of 
the sham doctrine included the following:  
 
“One thing I think, however, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities … that 
for acts or documents to be a ‘sham’, with whatever legal consequences follow from this, 
all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not 
to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating.”31 
 
Against this background, it has become well-established that for a transaction to 
constitute a sham, all the parties thereto must share the intention to create the 
 
27  1967 1 All ER 518 (CA). 
28  528. 
29  Conaglen (2008) Cambridge LJ 177. See also A v A 2007 EWHC 99 (Fam) para 32. 
30  See eg, (i) in England, WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] AC 
300 337; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCLC 148 (CA); 
Painter v Hutchison [2007] EWHC 758 (Ch) 110; (ii) in Australia, Sharrment Pty Ltd v 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 82 ALR 530 537; Equscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan 
Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55 (2004) 218 CLR 471 para 46; (iii) in New Zealand, 
Bateman Television Ltd v Coleridge Finance Co. Ltd. [1969] NZLR 794 821 (CA); 
Official Assignee v Wilson [2006] 2 NZLR 841 para 52; (iv) in Canada, Minister of 
National Revenue v Cameron [1974] SCR 1062 1068; and (v) in Jersey, Gruppo Torras 
SA v Al-Sabah [2004] 1 WTLR 1 para 54. 







sham.32 This requirement has been labelled the “common intention requirement”,33 
and has been applied widely within the common-law world in cases where a trust 
has been alleged to be a sham.34 
In South Africa, an article that appeared in the De Rebus journal in 2007 ignited 
the debate in respect of sham trusts. 35  In that article, the author, Joffe, draws 
attention to the importance of trustees maintaining a level of independence in the 
administration of the trust. Citing the Jersey case of Rahman v Chase Bank Trust 
Company (CI) Ltd (“Rahman”),36 Joffe cautions against trust deeds that retain too 
much power over trust assets in the hands of the founder.  
In Rahman, the founder, a Lebanese national, settled a trust in Jersey, and as 
founder retained significant control over the administration of the affairs of the trust. 
Upon his death, his wife and mother challenged the validity of the trust on primarily 
two bases. First, they relied on a surviving French element of Jersey law 
encapsulated in the maxim “donner et retenir ne vaut” 37  and, secondly, that 
Mr Rahman never had the intention to establish a trust.  
The court granted the relief on the first ground but also held that:  
 
“We have to make a review of the evidence. We were unanimously satisfied that the oral 
evidence, together with the documentation placed before us, established clearly that from 
the date on which [Mr Rahman] purported to constitute the settlement he exercised 
dominion and control over the trustee in the management and administration of the 
settlement, including distributions of capital to himself, to others as gifts or loans, and the 
making and disposal of investments. He treated the assets comprised in the trust fund as 
 
32  This principle was reaffirmed and applied in both Rahman v Chase Bank (Cl) Trust Co 
Ltd [1991] JLR 103 and Hitch v Stone [2001] STC 214 para 69. 
33  BoHao (2013) VUW LR 116. 
34  Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); Esteem Settlement [2001] WTLR 641. 
35  H Joffe “‘Sham’ trusts” De Rebus (January/February 2007) 25 26. De Rebus is the 
South African attorneys’ journal which is published monthly. See 
http://www.derebus.org.za (accessed on 24-12-2019).  
36  (1991) JLR 103. See the discussion of this case by P Laidlow “Shams” (2000) 12 TACT 
(available online at <http://www.tact.uk.net/review-index/sham-trusts/>) (accessed on 
11-05-2019). The phrase “sham trust” came into use internationally after the Royal 
Court of Jersey’s decision in Rahman. 
37  Translated as: “To give and hold back at the same time does not work”. See J Nigel 
“Donner et retenir ne vaut? Reflections on the retention of founder’s rights” (2011) 17 
Trusts & Trustees 451 452 (available online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/tandy/ttr073>) 






his own and the trustee as though it were his mere agent or nominee. There was 
retention by [Mr Rahman]. We are unanimously of the opinion that the settlement was a 
sham on the facts, in the sense that it was made to appear to be a genuine gift when it 
was not. Thus, even if the court were wrong on the construction of the settlement and the 
impact of the maxim donner et retenir, the settlement would still be invalid.”38  
 
It was after the Rahman case that the term “sham trust” came into international 
use and which ultimately ignited the debate around the suitability of the sham 
doctrine to the law of trusts.39 While the focus in Rahman remained on the term 
“sham”, the above-quoted analysis with its focus on retention of control is 
reminiscent of the manner in which elements of the control test are applied in the 
establishment proposition.40 
South African law does not subscribe to the sham doctrine as developed in the 
Snook judgment, but a similar test was formulated almost 50 years earlier in 
Zandberg v Van Zyl41 when the Appellate Division, per Innes JA, held that: 
 
“Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express themselves in language 
calculated without subterfuge or concealment to embody the agreement at which they 
have arrived. They intend the contract to be exactly what it purports; and the shape which 
it assumes is what they meant it should have. Not infrequently, however (either to secure 
some advantage which otherwise the law would not give, or to escape some disability 
which otherwise the law would impose), the parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal 
its real character. They call it by a name, or give it a shape, intended not to express but to 
disguise its true nature. And when a Court is asked to decide any rights under such an 
agreement, it can only do so by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not what in 
form it purports to be.”42 
 
As the court pointed out, the principle enunciated can be summarised in the 
maxim plus valet quod agitur quam qoud simulate concipitur.43 It follows that in 
South Africa, the test is to establish the real intention of the parties to an agreement 
 
38  Rahman v Chase Bank Trust Company (CI) Ltd [1991] JLR 103 146 (emphasis added). 
39  See Palmer (2007) NZ LR 81; Conaglen (2008) Cambridge LJ 176; BoHao (2013) VUW 
LR 115 and Mallon (2017) Trinity C LR 162. 
40  See part 4 4 in Chapter 4. 
41  1910 AD 302. 
42  309. 
43  Translated as: “The real intention carries more weight than a fraudulent formulation (or 
pretence)” VG Hiemstra & HL Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary (1992), quoted by De 






and in what manner this intention differs from the simulated intention. This test is 
referred to as the “simulation test”.44  
The simulation test bears a striking resemblance to the sham doctrine. In 
particular, it is the true, common, intention of the parties to the agreement that is 
relevant. More recently, the SCA in Maize Board v Jackson45 held that the correct 
enquiry in determining whether a contract is simulated is: 
 
“to establish whether the real nature and the implementation of these particular contracts 
is consistent with their ostensible form. In pursuit of that enquiry one must strive to 
ascertain, from all the relevant circumstances, the actual meaning of the contracting 
parties.”46 
 
In following this manner of enquiry, the SCA in ABSA Ltd v Moore47 overruled a 
finding of simulation by the High Court on the basis that one of the parties did not 
intend to disguise the contract as something it was not.48 It is therefore clear that the 
“common intention requirement”, that is central to the sham doctrine, also applies to 
the South African simulation test. 
It follows that the analysis applied in other jurisdictions regarding the sham 
doctrine and trusts is equally applicable to the evaluation of the simulation test as a 
theoretical basis for exposing illusionary trusts. 
The main critic of the application of the sham doctrine to trusts is Palmer who 
approaches the problem from a common-law perspective.49 For Palmer, the common 
intention requirement intrinsic to the sham doctrine is incompatible with the manner 
in which trusts are established in common law jurisdictions. In what has been termed 
“the Palmer argument”,50 she argues that, due to the fact that it is only the intention 
of the founder that is determinative of the establishment of the trust, there is no valid 
reason to require an alternative common intention on the part of the founder and the 
initial trustee for a trust to be held illusionary. She expresses this view as follows: 
 
44  De Waal (2012) RabelsZ 1082. See Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service v NWK Ltd 2011 2 SA 67 (SCA) para 42 
45  2005 6 592 (SCA). 
46  Para 8.  
47  2016 3 SA 97 (SCA). 
48  Para 26. 
49  Palmer (2007) NZ LR 81; J Palmer “What makes a trust a sham?” (2008) 84 NZLJ 319. 







“In the case of trusts … only the intention of the settlor is pertinent to the creation of a 
valid trust. Although no one can be compelled to act as trustee, it is a basic equitable 
principle that a trust will not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee. Where a trustee 
disclaims his or her appointment, the trust property revests in the settlor but he or she 
holds it upon the trust of the initial settlement because the provisional vesting in the 
trustee until disclaimer is sufficient to constitute the trust. Further, where there is no 
trustee, the court will almost always appoint one … The identification, and therefore the 
intention, of the trustee are irrelevant to the existence of a valid trust … A valid trust is 




“If no mutuality of intention is required to create a valid trust, it is conceptually incoherent 
to require mutuality to create a sham trust.”52 
 
For Palmer, it is this unilateral nature in the establishment of the trust that is 
decisive in evaluating whether the sham doctrine can apply to trusts. In the passage 
above she emphasises that a trust will not be permitted to fail for want of a trustee 
and, in further support of the unilateral nature of a trust, Palmer points out that it is 
the intention of the founder alone that is relevant in an application for the rectification 
of the trust deed. In this respect, she emphasises a point by Matthews that: 
 
“If the court will rectify the trust document without considering the trustee’s own 
intentions, why should it look at the trustee’s intentions in considering whether to ignore a 
trust provision as a sham?”53  
 
The opposition to the Palmer argument from a common-law perspective is based 
on considerations of commercial certainty and fears of inequitable results should the 
founder’s intention alone be determinative of whether or not the trust is 
disregarded.54 Mallon argues that an important reason for holding that the sham 
doctrine, with its common intention requirement, is the correct approach in 
unmasking an illusionary trust is the need for commercial certainty. He cautions 
 
51  Palmer (2007) NZ LR 81 93. 
52  94. 
53  P Matthews “The sham trust argument, and how to avoid it” (2007) 21 Trust Law Int 
191 198, quoted by Palmer (2008) NZLJ 320. 






against the approach advocated by Palmer as this would “have drastic knock-on 
effects for parties linked to those transactions”.55  
For Mallon, there is a sense of security (that is, certainty) in the objective 
expression of the founder in establishing a trust and to submit to a proposition where 
the trust may be challenged on the basis of the founder’s subjective intention alone: 
 
“would in effect subvert the law’s commitment to the perceived security of the objectively 
ascertained meaning of bilateral transactions which goes to the heart of commercial 
certainty”.56 
 
While Conaglen accepts that a trust, in common law, may be established by 
unilateral act, he argues that: 
 
“this principle is not the focus of the sham doctrine and it does not justify the court 
ignoring a trust where the settlor’s intention, objectively determined, was to create a trust 
and the trustee agreed to act on the basis of such a trust simply because the settlor 
subjectively and entirely secretly did not in fact intend to create it. Palmer herself 
recognises that ‘the settlor’s intention is determined objectively’. If this is so, which it is, 
then for reasons already discussed, a court is not at liberty to ignore the existence of that 
objectively determined intention, and instead privilege the settlor’s unilateral subjective 
intention, unless it has a justification for doing so. It is not so justified unless the settlor 
and the trustee both subjectively joined in a common intention to mislead third parties. To 
hold otherwise would unnecessarily and unjustifiably subvert the common law’s 
commitment to the security of the objectively ascertained meaning of bilateral 
transactions.”57 
 
He further argues that the common intention requirement of the sham doctrine 
serves as a necessary bulwark against inequitable consequences that may follow 
from the approach suggested by Palmer. For him, like for Mallon, the common 
intention requirement represents a balance “between the need for stability in bilateral 
transactions and the need to protect individuals against injustice”.58 
Conaglen echoes Mallon’s argument of safeguarding certainty, stating: 
 
 
55  Mallon (2017) Trinity C LR 178. 
56  178.  
57  Conaglen (2008) Cambridge LJ 190. 






“The rationale for requiring a common intention to mislead is best explained by reference 





“A settlor who transfers property to a trustee to hold on trust, cannot set aside the trust 
merely because he secretly intended to retain the beneficial interest in the property if that 
intention was not made apparent to the trustee. Certainly, the settlor ought not to be able 
to set aside the trust vis-à-vis the trustee, as it would be grossly unfair in the context of 
such a bilateral arrangement for the settlor to be able to sue the trustee for, for example, 
dissipating the property entirely in accordance with the stated trusts …The most important 
question is whether a third party ought to be able to rely on the settlor’s undeclared 
intentions in order to treat the trust as a sham vis-à-vis the trustee. That question need 
only be posed for the answer to be clear: third parties should have no standing to deny 
that a trust has been validly created merely because the settlor unilaterally had ‘his 
fingers crossed behind his back’ when dealing with the trustee.”60 
 
This debate, and the competing submissions relating thereto, were considered in 
a leading New Zealand case on sham trusts, Official Assignee v Wilson (“Wilson”).61 
That case concerned the insolvent estate of Mr Reynolds, who was the founder of 
the GM Reynolds Family Trust. Messrs Wilson and Harvey, the respondents, were 
the appointed trustees whereupon the trust acquired immovable property. Upon the 
insolvency of Mr Reynolds, his trustee in insolvency, the Official Assignee, claimed 
that the trust was a sham (alternatively the “alter ego” of the insolvent) and that the 
trust property should vest in the insolvent estate for the benefit of his creditors. The 
High Court of New Zealand dismissed the claim and the Official Assignee appealed 
to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand. 
The Court of Appeal considered the sham concept and, in particular, the question 
of whose intention was relevant in determining the nature of the trust. In upholding 
the trust, it was held that it was necessary to consider first what type of trust was at 
issue. The court held that for a self-declaratory trust (such as a testamentary trust) 
only the founder’s intention was relevant. However, for a trust created bilaterally 
between the settlor and a separate trustee (such as an inter vivos trust) it was 
 
59  188. 
60  188-189. 






necessary to consider a shared intention.62 The Court of Appeal went on to conclude 
that it was unable to disturb the High Court’s finding that, on the facts, there was not 
sufficient evidence to establish the requisite sham intention on the part of the founder 
or trustees.63 
The distinction between unilateral and bilateral trusts that formed the basis of the 
decision in Wilson has been criticised by Palmer64 who argues that:  
 
“the idea of sham is meaningless apart from the context within which it arises. ‘Sham’ is 
no more than a descriptive label attaching to a transaction which appears to be 
something that it is not. Yet, it is only possible to determine whether a transaction is truly 
something other than it appears to be by considering what is required to be fulfilled in 
order for the transaction to be legitimately what it appears to be … With respect, while 
their Honours were correct in Official Assignee v Wilson to formulate the relevant 
elements of a sham within the context of trusts as it was being alleged, it makes no sense 
to differentiate between unilateral and bilateral trusts when the law of trusts recognises no 
such distinction in the principles relating to the formation of trusts. The elements of 
proving a sham trust ought to be reflective of the elements proving a trust. Whether a 
trust is said to be unilateral or bilateral, the law of trusts requires that the relevant 
intention is that of the settlor alone.”65 
 
I find the Palmer argument persuasive. It is intellectually coherent to evaluate the 
validity of a trust on the principles required to establish a valid trust. In my view, there 
is no logical reason to impute an additional requirement of common intention to 
deceive in those cases where it is not a requirement for the establishment of the 
trust.  
Palmer also answers the fears raised by Mallon and Conaglen by pointing out that 
the law of estoppel provides a powerful bulwark against abuse by the trustee.66 In 
circumstances where a founder intentionally deceives a trustee to enter into a trust 
obligation, such founder would be hard-pressed to deny the trust in circumstances 
where the trustee entered into the obligation on the basis of the deception. This 
response would apply equally in the South African context where a party who has 
 
62  Paras 40-41. 
63  Para 95. 
64  Palmer (2008) NZLJ 319. 
65  320. 
66  319. Conaglen however also acknowledges estoppel as a possible remedy guarding 






acted to his or her detriment upon an objective misrepresentation by the founder 
may also in the appropriate circumstances raise the estoppel defence.67 
From a common-law perspective, Palmer’s approach undoubtedly holds merit. 
However, from a South African perspective, it is the fundamental premise of the 
Palmer argument, that the establishment of a trust is a unilateral act, which provides 
an insurmountable obstacle. 
While in common law, an inter vivos trust may be created by unilateral declaration, 
this is not the case in South Africa with its civilian underpinnings.68 The general 
principle in South Africa was stated by Van den Heever JA in Crookes NO v Watson 
(“Crookes”),69 as follows:  
 
“I can think of no principle of our law according to which the individual can during his 
lifetime unilaterally sequester a portion of his estate and dedicate it to certain ends.”70 
 
Cameron et al are similarly unequivocal in their view:  
 
“this [statement by Van den Heever JA in Crookes] was followed in Challenor’s Estate v 
CIR71 and is clearly right. A donation is not binding until accepted by the donee, and a 
unilateral decision to abandon property is revocable until another person has taken 
possession of it as owner. There is no good reason why unilateral declarations should be 
effective in the special case where the declarer wants to create a trust, and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has repeatedly applied this doctrine.”72 
 
The authors point out that the SCA applied this doctrine in De Freitas v Society of 
Advocates, Natal73 where an advocate was found guilty of unprofessional conduct in 
that he had offered to receive clients’ monies into a bank account he had opened in 
 
67  See, Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1981 3 SA 274 (A) 
and SA Broadcasting Corp v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) for an exposition on the law of 
estoppel in South Africa.  
68  E Cameron, M de Waal & P Solomon Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 6 ed (2018) 
166. See also DJ Hayton Underhill & Hayton‘s Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 15 
ed (1995) 124. 
69  1956 1 SA 277 (A). 
70  298, repeating his views set out in the earlier case of Ex Parte Kelly 1942 OPD 265 271. 
71  1960 1 SA 13 (N). 
72  Cameron et al Honoré 166. 






his own name. Since he was not an attorney, there was no statutory protection for 
the clients in the form of the Attorney’s Fidelity Fund against the advocate’s own 
appropriation of the money or in the event of his insolvency. 
The reason for the bilateral requirement in establishing an inter vivos trust in 
South Africa stems from the requirement that the intention to establish a trust is to be 
expressed in a form that is apt to create a legal obligation.74 This means that a 
testamentary trust may be established through a unilateral act, but, since an inter 
vivos trust is established by contract, and through the stipulatio alteri, a bilateral act 
is required.75 
Palmer’s argument accordingly remains inapplicable in the South African context 
due to the fact that, in terms of South African law, a bilateral act is a pre-requisite to 
establish an obligation. Therefore, and at first blush, the outcome in Wilson would 
appear to apply equally in the South African context where a unilateral act is 
sufficient to establish a testamentary trust, but a bilateral act is required to establish 
an inter vivos trust.  
Cameron et al explain as follows: 
 
“If a living donor declares an intention to create a trust and to appoint X trustee, but X 
refuses, no trust will be created since X has not accepted the donor’s offer and there is no 
contract between them. In this case the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a trustee other 
than X. The donor has simply failed to create a trust. In the case of a will, by contrast, 
where X declines office, the court has the power to appoint trustees in X’s stead.”76 
 
This distinction between a testamentary and an inter vivos trust relates to the 
differing manners in which they are established. As discussed in Chapter 3,77 it is a 
requirement for the establishment of a trust that the founder expresses the intention 
to create a trust in a mode suited to the creation of a legal obligation. In the case of a 
testamentary trust, this is achieved through the relevant will, whereas in the context 
of an inter vivos trust, a contract is required.  
 
74  Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (SCA) 258. See also Cameron 
et al Honoré 159. See part 3 4 1 in Chapter 3. 
75  See the text to n 122 in Chapter 2. 
76  Cameron et al Honoré 168. 






The outcome of Wilson, therefore, fits snugly into this conceptualisation of the 
manner in which trusts are established in South Africa. However, this outcome 
appears forced in view of the requirements for validity of trusts in common-law 
jurisdictions and the difficulty in applying the sham doctrine. This has led at least one 
commentator to call for a more flexible approach to the question of illusionary 
trusts.78  
Case law has also appeared to dilute the common intention requirement. In the 
matter of Autoclenz v Belcher (“Autoclenz”),79 the United Kingdom (“UK”) Supreme 
Court arrived at a nuanced interpretation of Diplock LJ’s classic statement of the 
sham doctrine. That matter concerned a labour dispute between Autoclenz, a 
company providing car-cleaning services to motor retailers, and 20 individual 
valeters. The litigation concerned benefits claimed by the valeters who contended 
that they qualified as “workers” under the prevailing minimum wage regulations.80 
The written agreement between Autoclenz and the respective valeters recorded 
that the latter were “sub-contractors” who confirmed that they were “self-employed 
independent contractor(s)”. Significantly the contract expressly provided that: 
 
“The Sub-contractor and Autoclenz agree and acknowledge that the Sub-contractor is 
not, and that it is the intention of the parties that the Sub-contractor should not become, 
an employee of Autoclenz …”81 
 
 
78  T Graham “Sham revisited: has Snook passed its sell-by date?” (2016) 22 Trusts & 
Trustees 859. 
79  [2001] UKSC 41. 
80  In the UK, the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/584) adopted the 
definition of “worker” in section 54(3) of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. 
Regulation 2(1) of the Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1833) is materially 
identical to that set out tin the National Minimum Wage Act and provides as follows: 
 “‘worker’ … means an individual who has entered into or works under … 
(a) a contract of employment; or 
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether 
oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally 
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by 
virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business 
undertaking carried on by the individual.” 






The issue to be decided was therefore whether the provisions in the agreement to 
the effect that the valeters would not be (or become) employees of Autoclenz could 
be ignored on the basis that it constituted a sham. The court pointed out that, on the 
test set out in Snook, a sham required a finding that both parties intended to paint a 
false picture as to the true nature of their respective obligations.82 
However, in the context of a labour relationship, where the parties are seldom 
bargaining on level footing, the court held that the correct principle to follow was to 
ascertain “the true agreement between the parties” which would be “gleaned from all 
the circumstances of the case, of which the written agreement is only part”.83 This 
approach constituted an important departure from the Snook test, as it was no longer 
required to find that both parties intended to paint a false picture of the nature of their 
relationship. The focus, therefore, appears, in this context, to have shifted to the 
common intention of the parties regarding the nature of their relationship as opposed 
to the common intention to deceive. 
This approach bears an uncanny resemblance to the one adopted by the SCA in 
Roschcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC84 where the court reaffirmed the 
genuineness of the agreement as the central consideration of the test and that, in 
arriving at this determination “the court examines the transaction as a whole, 
including all surrounding circumstances, any unusual features of the transaction and 
the manner in which the parties intend to implement it”.85 
Notwithstanding the above, Palmer’s argument is instructive as it echoes the 
establishment proposition in that it is the founder’s intention to establish a trust, and 
divest himself of control over trust assets in favour of a trustee, that is determinative. 
This argument based on the establishment proposition holds notwithstanding the 
difficulties of the Palmer argument in South Africa.  
Irrespective of the position one adopts on whether or not a common intention is 
required to establish a trust, it is settled that it remains a separate and distinct 
requirement for the validity of a trust that the founder intends to establish a trust.86 
 
82  Para 28. 
83  Para 29. 
84  2014 4 SA 319 (SCA). 
85  Para 37. See also Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 
SA 593 (SCA) para 18. 






Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that, while the co-operation of the initial 
trustee may be required to establish the obligation that gives rise to an inter vivos 
trust, this requirement remains secondary to the primary question, which is whether 
the founder intends to establish a trust in the first place. Accordingly, the argument 
may be made that while the acquiescence or co-operation of the initial trustee is 
required to establish an inter vivos trust, it does not follow that this intention is 
relevant in determining the primary question. Once it becomes clear that the founder 
never intended to establish a trust (which is an independent requirement for validity 
and a question of fact) it is irrelevant whether the obligation in terms of which the 
trust was purportedly established is valid. 
Holding that the validity of the trust depends on the intention of the founder alone 
is therefore consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the trust and the 
requirement that the founder divests himself of ownership and control over the trust’s 
assets.  
Where the founder lacks the intention to divest himself of the trust assets in this 
manner, there can be no trust, irrespective of the intention of the initial trustees. 
Conceptually, the intention of the founder precedes any investigation of the intention 
of the initial trustees and, where the founder does not intend to establish a trust, the 
intention of the initial trustees is irrelevant. 
When the decision in Rahman is viewed through this prism, it becomes clear that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the court expressed itself in terms more suitable to the 
sham doctrine, the underlying argument was premised on the basic principles of the 
establishment proposition in that the determination of the case turned on 
Mr Rahman’s intention to not establish a (true) trust, but rather to disguise the control 
he exercised over the trust assets. 
For these reasons, the sham doctrine and the simulation test are unhelpful in 
evaluating the validity of the trust where its establishment is drawn into question and 









6 4  The establishment proposition applied 
The utility of the establishment proposition to unmask arrangements masquerading 
as trusts is underscored by the facts and outcome of two matters where South 
African courts have directly examined the validity of a trust. These are Khabola v 
Ralitabo (“Khabola”)87 and Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd v Wait (“Wait”).88 
 
6 4 1  Khabola v Ralitabo89 
Khabola entailed a purported business venture conducted through a trust. The 
applicant was the founder and, together with the first to third respondents, a trustee 
of the Lithakali Development Trust.90 The trust was established for the purpose of 
acquiring agricultural land with a view to commencing farming activities. The 
purchase was financed through a loan from the Land Bank together with a grant from 
the (then) National Government Department of Land Affairs. The arrangement was 
that the four trustees would contribute on a monthly basis to the repayment of the 
loan to the Land Bank, but at the hearing of the matter, only the applicant had made 
such a contribution. 
Subsequently, the applicant’s co-trustees sold the land to a third party,91 who was 
cited in the litigation as the fourth respondent. When faced with eviction by the fourth 
respondent, the applicant launched an application to set aside the sale of the land by 
his co-trustees. In response, the co-trustees launched a counter-application seeking 
 
87  ZAFSHC case no 5512/2010 of 24 March 2011. 
88  ECHC case no 2896/2012 of 1 November 2016. Both these judgments are unreported. 
The Khabola judgment is available from the Southern African Legal Information 
Institute’s (SAFLII) online database at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAFSHC/2011/62.
html> (accessed on 24-12-2019). However, the Wait judgment is not so readily available. 
While I was able to obtain a copy of this judgment, I am nevertheless indebted to Smith 
who not only highlighted its existence, but also provided a detailed analysis of the facts 
of that matter and the conclusions that were arrived at. See BS Smith “Sham trusts in 
South Africa: tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis (times change, and we change 
with them)” (2019) 136 SALJ 550. 
89  ZAFSHC 24-03-2011 case no 5512/2010. 
90  Para 1. 
91  It does not appear that the applicant was a party to this agreement, nor that he had a 






an order removing the applicant as trustee, authority to wind-up the trust estate, and 
to dissolve the trust.  
At the hearing of the application it was agreed that the court first decide the matter 
of locus standi of the parties to bring the applications against each other as they did. 
In arriving at the conclusion that the parties did have such locus standi, the court 
held that the trust was simulated and that it was, in reality, a partnership: 
 
“Having found that the parties clearly had the formation of a partnership in mind from the 
onset and tacitly agreed to the applicant performing the role of a general manager, the 
alleged Trust seem[s] simulated. No meetings of trust[ees] were held either. Of course 
the partners in a partnership have a right to sue each other. The direct and substantial 
interest in the matter is clear in as far as everyone is concerned.”92 
 
On the facts, the court accordingly effectively held that the applicant (as founder) 
did not have the requisite intention to establish a trust, but that the parties (and by 
implication also the founder) in reality intended to establish a partnership. This 
emphasis on the intention to establish a trust is to be welcomed and echoes the 
premise of the establishment proposition that the founder must intend to establish a 
trust and not create some other arrangement. 
However, the judgment has, justifiably, been criticised for appearing to hold that a 
failure to establish a trust equates to the establishment of a partnership: 
 
“Alhoewel die hof in die Khabola-saak bevind dat die bedoeling om ŉ trust op te rig 
ontbreek en die trust dus ŉ sham is, is dit jammer dat dit nie as noodwendige gevolg 
hiervan duidelik bevind dat die trust ŉ sham is en ab intio nietig is nie. In plaas daarvan 
bevind die hof dat die partye ‘had the formation of a partnership in mind from the onset’. 
Dit beteken dat die regter, na ons mening, op die oog af gedwonge voel om te bevind dat 
daar by alle gevalle van ŉ sham-trust outomaties ŉ vennootskap ontstaan, en dit kan tog 
nie. 
Om net eenvoudig ŉ skyn- of sham-trust in alle gevalle as ŉ venootskap te beskou is 
regtens onaanvaarbaar.” 93  
 
The above approach by Vorster and Coetzee must be correct.94 It does not follow 
automatically that a failure to establish a trust equates to the establishment of a 
 
92  Para 5. 
93  A Vorster & JP Coetzee “Die geldigheidsveriestes van ‘n trust opnuut ondersoek 






partnership.95  Their additional criticism that, in order to make a finding that the 
parties established a partnership, the court was required to consider and measure 
the arrangement established against the essentialia of partnership, also cannot be 
faulted.96 
The judgment in Khabola, however, remains significant for its willingness to 
question the validity of a trust on the basis of scrutiny of the intention of the founder 
and underscores that such scrutiny serves as the point of departure in applying the 
establishment proposition.  
  
6 4 2  Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd v Wait97 
Wait is, arguably, of more value in demonstrating the utility of the establishment 
proposition than Khabola as the trust there in question was invalidated on account of 
the founder not affording the trustees sufficient capacity for independence.  
The facts were briefly as follows. Mr Wait was the founder and co-trustee of the 
Wait & Wait Family Trust which was established in 2000. The other trustees were his 
wife, Mrs Wait, and an independent third party. The third party’s independence was 
premised on the basis that he was neither a relative of the Waits nor a trust 
beneficiary. The beneficiaries of the trust were Mr and Mrs Wait and their children. 
During 2009 the plaintiff, Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd (“the co-op”) obtained 
default judgment against Mr Wait in his personal capacity for the sum of R620 000. 
In 2012, Mr Wait resigned as a trustee of the trust and the debt owing to the co-op 
remained unpaid. Later that year (judging from the case number) the co-op instituted 
action for the recovery of the sums owed to it by Mr Wait, against the trust. Initially, 
the action was directed against the trustees in their official capacities, and against 
Mr and Mrs Wait in their personal capacities, and later the beneficiaries of the trust 
were joined as further defendants on account of the interests that they had in the 
outcome. 
 
94  Smith (2019) SALJ 573 also supports this view. 
95  International authority that suggests the existence of a partnership where a trust was 
invalidated should probably be understood against the particular background of that 
jurisdiction and the joint-stock company concept. See part 3 3 1 in Chapter 3. 
96  Vorster & Coetzee (2015) PER/PELJ 1803-1805. 






The plaintiff’s primary contention was that the trust was never validly established 
or had never “come into being de jure”.98 In this regard, reliance was placed on 
several provisions of the trust deed, namely: 
 
(i) Clause 4 thereof, which provided that there would at all times be no fewer 
than two trustees in office and that a trustee could provide for a successor 
by way of testamentary provision; 
(ii) Clause 9, which described the trust as a discretionary trust and stipulated 
that the trustees were at liberty to benefit or withhold benefits from any 
income beneficiary in their absolute discretion; and 
(iii) Clauses 17.3 and 17.4 which provided as follows: 
 




17.3  Die vereiste kworum vir enige vergadering van trustees sal die 
meerderheid van die diensdoende trustees wees, mits die houer van 
die vetostem waarna in sub-paragraaf 17.4 verwys word een van 
sodanige teenwoordige meerderheid is. 
 
17.4 Alle besluite en optredes van die trustees sal by wyse van 
meerderheidstem geskied, mits die stem van [Mr Wait] van die 
meerderheidstemme is.”99  
 
(iv) Clause 21, which permitted Mr Wait to determine trustee remuneration in 
his will and to prescribe a formula according to which the income and 
capital beneficiaries would receive trust benefits after his death. 
Significantly, it also stipulated that were Mr Wait to employ his will in this 
manner, the prescripts of the will would be binding and would prevail over 
any decision to the contrary made by the trustees.  
 
 
98  Para 4. 






Against this background, it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that a trust was 
never established on account of Mr Wait reserving “to himself the absolute right to 
control every decision of the trustees”.100 In particular, it was argued on behalf of the 
plaintiff that: 
 
(i) there was no separation of estates between the trust estate and Mr Wait’s 
estate;101 
(ii) the appointed trustees were unable to exercise their fiduciary duties 
independently on account of being subjected to the absolute dictates of 
Mr Wait;102 
(iii) the trust deed did not evince an intention by Mr Wait (as founder) to be 
divested of control over the trust assets in favour of an independent body of 
trustees;103 and 
(iv) the trust deed was “ineffective because its terms did not satisfy the 
requirements for the creation of a valid Trust” as Mr Wait had not 
“dispose[d] of the so-called Trust Estate, in that it was business as 
before”.104 
 
The defendants raised three arguments in reply. First, they relied on English case 
law relating to sham and argued that, since there was no common intention to 
deceive,105 a “piercing” of the veil was not permitted merely on account of a court’s 
sense of equity.106 Secondly, that a disregard of the trust as contended for by the 
plaintiff, would deprive the trust beneficiaries of remedies in terms of the TPCA,107 
 
100  Para 8. 
101  Para 8.1. 
102  Para 8.2. 
103  Para 8.3. 
104  Para 8.4. 
105  Para 9. The case relied on was Snook v West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786. 
106  Adams v Cape Industries PLC [1990] Ch 433. 
107  Para 11. The remedies referred to are those contained in sections 19 and 20 of the 
TPCA which provide that: 
 “19 Failure by trustee to account or perform duties 
 If any trustee fails to comply with a request by the Master in terms of section 16 or to 






and, thirdly, that Mr Wait was never in de jure control of the trust estate.108 In this 
regard, it was argued that, while Mr Wait could veto any decision of the trustees, he 
did not have free reign over decisions that were to be made, as all decisions by the 
trustees required a majority of the body of trustees. Stated otherwise, Mr Wait would 
require the concurrence of at least some of the trustees to take any enforceable 
decisions. 
Van Papendorp AJ, sitting alone, delivered a judgment in favour of the plaintiff. In 
arriving at the judgment, the court emphasised the measure of independence 
afforded to the trustees. Although it was held that “establishing independence on the 
part of a trustee” was not one of the essentialia of the trust, it was of “persuasive” 
value in determining whether these essentialia were present.109 In echoing elements 
of the establishment proposition discussed in Chapter 4, it was held that the degree 
of independence of the trustee-complement, as gleaned from the trust deed, would 
determine whether the founder has a “real intention” to create a trust or whether a 
 
person having an interest in the trust property may apply to the court for an order 
directing the trustee to comply with such request or to perform such duty. 
 20 Removal of trustee 
(1)  A trustee may, on the application of the Master or any person having an interest in 
the trust property, at any time be removed from his office by the court if the court is 
satisfied that such removal will be in the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. 
(2)  A trustee may at any time be removed from his office by the Master- 
   (a)  if he has been convicted in the Republic or elsewhere of any offence of which 
dishonesty is an element or of any other offence for which he has been 
sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine; or 
   (b)  if he fails to give security or additional security, as the case may be, to the 
satisfaction of the Master within two months after having been requested 
thereto or within such further period as is allowed by the Master; or 
   (c)  if his estate is sequestrated or liquidated or placed under judicial management; 
or 
   (d)  if he has been declared by a competent court to be mentally ill or incapable of 
managing his own affairs or if he is by virtue of the Mental Health Act, 1973 
(Act 18 of 1973), detained as a patient in an institution or as a State patient; or 
   (e)  if he fails to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him by or under this 
Act or to comply with any lawful request of the Master. 
(3)  If a trustee authorized to act under section 6 (1) is removed from his office or 
resigns, he shall without delay return his written authority to the Master.” 
108  Para 12. 






trust was simply a “means to conduct his personal affairs and as such [he] intended 
to create a sham”.110 
The court placed significant reliance on the passages of Parker to the effect that it 
is the “separation of ownership (or control) from enjoyment” of the trust assets that is 
the core idea of the trust and that, in appropriate circumstances, courts should be 
prepared to “pierce the veneer of the trust”.111 
On the basis of this authority, and an interpretation of the “control test” as 
formulated in Badenhorst v Badenhorst,112 the court ultimately held that the trust in 
question had never been validly created and that the supposed “trust” assets were 
therefore liable for attachment in satisfaction of the debt owed by Mr Wait.113 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court, in my view correctly, rejected the defence 
raised on behalf of the defendants to the effect that Mr Wait had, de jure, 
relinquished control over the trust estate. Central to this finding was the veto right 
that Mr Wait enjoyed and the fact that his concurrence was required for any decision 
that the trustees were to make. This, the court held, was indicative, that Mr Wait: 
 
“clearly displayed no intention in the Deed of Trust to create a Trust estate separate from 
… his control and to divest himself of the ownership and control of the Trust estate and 
place it in the ownership and control of independent Trustees”.114 
 
Reliance for this conclusion was placed on clause 4 of the trust deed, which 
permitted the serving trustees to appoint successors in their will as this was further 
evidence that Mr Wait never had the intention to “create a [t]rust estate separate 
from his control”.115 In addition, Mr Wait’s resignation as a trustee in 2012 was 
regarded as irrelevant as a novation does not resuscitate an agreement that was 
invalid from the outset.116 
 
110  Para 20. 
111  Para 22. See also Smith (2019) SALJ 560. 
112  2006 2 SA 255 (SCA). The “control tests” and its relevance to the establishment 
proposition are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. See part 4 4. 
113 Paras 33 and 34. 
114  Para 30. 
115  Para 31. 






I agree with the result of the Wait matter, but the reliance placed on the passages 
of Parker and Badenhorst to the effect that a court should, in the appropriate 
circumstances pierce the veneer of the trust, is regrettable. This reliance serves to 
conflate the conceptually distinct principles of sham and abuse. In my view, the Wait 
matter stands to be approached on the basis of the establishment proposition and 
questions of disregarding the trust’s separate estate is not directly relevant to that 
matter. 
Smith’s analysis and critique of the Wait judgment also echo some of the central 
tenets of the establishment proposition. He concurs that, since the intention on the 
part of the founder to establish a trust is one of the requirements of validity, it follows 
that, were a founder not to intend to do so, no trust would be established. 117 
However, and significantly, he highlights an important distinction between holding the 
trust invalid on account of the founder not intending to establish a trust, and failing to 
establish a trust.118 
Smith points out that, having regard to the trust deed alone, it is extremely difficult 
to conclude that Mr Wait did not intend to establish a trust: 
 
“To put it differently, the trust deed alone, and clause 17 thereof in particular, was 
insufficient to conclude that [Mr Wait] had not intended to divest himself of ownership of 
the trust property. On the contrary, the trust deed made it clear that ownership of the trust 
property was to be vested in the three trustees, and the [Mr Wait] would, qua trustee, 
become (or perhaps more correctly ‘remain’), a co-owner thereof. Only an in-depth factual 
analysis with reference, if necessary, to the principles of ownership transfer in the law of 
property could prove otherwise.”119 
 
The more appropriate route was to consider whether, in view of the provisions of 
the trust deed, Mr Wait was successful in establishing a trust. Here, it is submitted, 
the provisions of the establishment proposition and in particular the measure of 
control required to establish a trust find application. 
It will be recalled that the appropriate type of control that is to be considered is 
asset control, and in this sense the focus falls on whether the trustees have sufficient 
 
117  Smith (2019) SALJ 553. 
118  573-575. 






control to determine the fate of the trust assets. 120  The fact that Mr Wait had 
therefore reserved for himself structural control (in the sense that he could appoint 
trustees or determine their remuneration) is in my view not relevant to the question of 
whether a valid trust was established. 
What is relevant is that Mr Wait engineered a trust deed that gave him effective 
asset control. This is not a matter where the trustees were afforded absolute asset 
control, with their powers limited by the provisions of a prescriptive trust deed. In 
Wait, the founder effectively reserved for himself the power to determine the manner 
in which the trust assets were to be employed. This arrangement, in my view, fails 
the establishment proposition test and, irrespective of whether Mr Wait, subjectively, 
intended to establish a trust, by reserving asset control for himself he, objectively, 
failed to do so. 
This application of the establishment proposition also accounts for the same 
outcome where the asset control was not reserved for the founder, but for another. 
Smith postulates the following, more complex, example: 
 
“The facts in Wait provided a comparatively simple matrix within which the court was able 
to reach its finding, because [Mr Wait] was the founder, a trustee and a beneficiary. But 
what if the situation had been slightly more complex? Suppose that the facts were the 
same, except that [Mr Wait’s] father or uncle had been the founder. (This is the typical 
scenario where the founder simply makes a nominal donation (such as R100) to create 
the trust and plays no further role in the trust’s administration.) Suppose, further, that it 
could be proved that the founder had actually transferred this donation to the three 
co-trustees ([Mr Wait], his wife and a third person who was neither a relative nor a 
beneficiary). Assume that again, as typically occurs, the trustees later purchased property 
from [Mr Wait], on loan account. Would the powers reserved for [Mr Wait] by clause 17 of 
the trust deed prevent the trust from coming into existence?”121 
 
Applying the principles of the establishment proposition to these set of facts, 
would lead to the same conclusion. Where the founder transfers assets in trust to a 
set of trustees, but effectively divests the body of trustees of asset control, vesting it 
in a third party, no trust can be established. It does not matter that the third party in 
question is also a trustee. As discussed in Chapter 5, the trustees occupy one, 
 
120  See part 4 5 in Chapter 4. 






unitary office.122 It is the office of trusteeship that imbues the trustees with the power 
to act. Where asset control is reserved for only that one person, it cannot be said 
that this power flows from the office of trusteeship and, consequently, it follows that 
the body of trustees is divested from that power. Where the power so divested is 
asset control, no trust is established. 
Smith arrives at the same conclusion,123 albeit based on the following statement 
by Cameron et al: 
 
“The attempt to create a trust in the strict sense may also fail because the founder fails to 
confer sufficient independence on the intended trustee, makes him or her instead a mere 
agent … or because the intention to vest property in the ‘trustee’ is lacking.”124 
 
Smith’s reliance on the above passage is correct, and the passage is useful 
insofar as it emphasises the founder’s failure to confer sufficient independence on 
the intended trustee. However, it is submitted that the establishment proposition 
provides a sound theoretical basis for holding that no trust is established, by 
underscoring the capacity for independence as a requirement for a trust and 
providing a mechanism against which trust deeds can be measured to determine 
whether the correct type and measure of control is afforded to the trustees.  
 
6 5  Disregarding the trust’s separate estate 
It is now clear that the consideration of the validity of a trust is conceptually entirely 
distinct from whether the trust’s separate estate is to be disregarded. A consideration 
as to whether a court should in the appropriate circumstances disregard the trust’s 
separate estate, proceeds from the premise that all the requirements for the 
establishment of the trust have been met and that there is such a separate estate.  
As highlighted above,125 the establishment of a trust within a civilian context gives 
rise to two separate estates which, in turn, imbues the trust form with the capacity to 
 
122  See part 5 4 2 in Chapter 5. 
123  576. 
124  Cameron et al Honoré 138. 






provide limited liability for the trustees.126 Smith accurately captured the similarity 
between trusts and corporate entities on this score as follows: 
 
“Although it is trite that the South African trust is not a juristic person unless a statute 
clothes it with legal personality for a specific purpose, the trust, like a company or close 
corporation, enjoys perpetual existence and also provides limited liability to its trustees 
and beneficiaries in respect of debts, in a similar fashion to that enjoyed by shareholders 
of companies and members of close corporations.”127 
 
This characteristic resulted therein that trusts are increasingly employed to fill the 
space traditionally occupied by corporate entities. This “newer type” of trust was 
highlighted as a cause for concern in Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) 
Bpk128 when established to “escape the constraints imposed by corporate law”.129  
The core idea of the trust is to separate control from benefit and it is the “rupture 
of the control/enjoyment divide” that invites abuse.130 In this regard, Smith highlights 
that: 
 
“The same motivations that may induce those in control of a company or close 
corporation to misuse or abuse its corporate personality – by relying on the benefits of its 
separate existence without truly and consistently treating it as such – may, therefore, also 
induce trustees of a trust to breach the control/enjoyment divide (by treating trust property 
as their own and to ‘use the trust essentially as their alter ego’, for example), but 
nevertheless to seek refuge behind the existence of the trust when it suits them.”131 
 
In Parker, it was confirmed that the courts have both the power and duty to evolve 
the law of trusts in order to “ensure that trusts function in accordance with principles 
 
126  Gretton (2000) Int Comp LQ 599; KG Reid “Patrimony not equity: the trust in Scotland” 
(2000) 8 Eur Rev Priv L 427; De Waal (2001) Stell LR 67.  
127  BS Smith “Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on ‘veil piercing’ 
and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at 
divorce – Part One” (2016) 41 JJS 68 69. See also BS Smith “Statutory discretion or 
common law power? Some reflections on ‘veil piercing’ and the consideration of (the 
value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property – Part Two” (2017) 42 JJS 1. 
128  2004 3 SA 486 (SCA). 
129  493D-F. 
130  Land Bank v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 29. 






of business efficacy, sound commercial accountability and the reasonable 
expectations of outsiders who deal with them”.132  
To achieve this objective, it may be necessary to hold that, in suitable 
circumstances, the: 
 
“trustees’ conduct invites the inference that the trust form was a mere cover for the 
conduct of business ‘as before’, and that the assets allegedly vesting in trustees in fact 
belong to one or more of the trustees and so may be used in satisfaction of debts to the 
repayment of which the trustees purported to bind the trust.”133 
 
South African courts have increasingly acknowledged this duty to intervene where 
the trust form is abused. 134  However, the theoretical basis which justifies such 
interference remains a question of debate.135  The debate, in particular, revolves 
around the source of a court’s power to intercede in the event of an abuse of the 
trust form and the measure of abuse that would justify such interference.  
 
6 5 1  Source of the court’s power 
While there is no provision in the TPCA that expressly empowers a court to look 
beyond the separation of control from benefit, and thereby disregard a trust’s 
separate estate, Van der Linde has suggested that section 13 of the TPCA may 
allow for a court to do so in particular circumstances.136 This section provides as 
follows:  
 
“13 Power of court to vary trust provisions 
 
If a trust instrument contains any provision which brings about consequences which in the 
opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee and which- 
 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
 
132  Land Bank v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 37. 
133  Para 37.3. 
134  Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC); WT v KT 2015 3 
SA 574 (SCA); REM v VM 2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 
135  Shipley (2016) Merc LJ 508; A van der Linde “Whether trust assets form part of the joint 
estate of parties married in community of property: comments on ‘piercing the veneer’ of 
a trust in divorce proceedings” (2016) 79 THRHR 165. 






(b) prejudices the interests of the beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest, 
 
the court may, on application of the trustee or any person which in the opinion of the court 
has a sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or vary any such provision or make in 
respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby 
particular trust property is substituted for other property, or an order terminating the trust.” 
 
Shipley has raised two strong arguments in opposition to this submission by 
Van der Linde.137  In the first instance, he points out that both the heading and 
wording of section 13 of the TPCA suggest that the court’s powers thereunder are 
limited to orders in respect of the provisions of the trust deed. Therefore, so the 
argument goes, it is not open for a court to rely on the provisions of section 13 to 
make any order it considers just and equitable such as disregarding the separate 
estate of the trust.138  
Secondly, Shipley argues that it is clear from the wording of the provision that it 
only applies where the undesirable consequence is brought about by a problematic 
provision in the trust deed, and then only where the consequences were not 
contemplated or foreseen by the founder.139 
These arguments were echoed in the matter of Harper v Crawford NO 
(“Harper”) 140  where Dlodlo J emphasised that the court’s wide discretion under 
section 13 of the TPCA was contingent upon two jurisdictional facts: 
 
“In order for a court to exercise this statutory power, two jurisdictional facts are required. 
First, the offending provision must bring about consequences which in the opinion of the 
court the founder did not contemplate or foresee. Second, the provision must either 
hamper the achievement of the object of the founder or prejudice the interests of the 
beneficiaries or be in conflict with the public interests. In the event that both requirements 
are met, the court enjoys wider powers under s 13 to vary the provisions than the court 
enjoyed under common law.”141  
 
137  Shipley (2016) Merc LJ 513. 
138  Shipley points out that this interpretation is also in line with the purpose of this section, 
as proposed in the South African Law Commission’s Report on the Review of the Law of 
Trusts (1987) paras 12.1 to 12.9 read with annexure B514 thereof. 
139  513. 
140  2018 1 SA 589 (WCC). See also Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) and 
Gower v Gower 2016 5 SA 225 (SCA) paras 33-34. 







This analysis of section 13 of the TPCA was affirmed by the SCA, in upholding the 
judgment in Harper.142 In particular, the SCA, practically quoting Dlodlo J verbatim, 
reaffirmed that: 
 
“For a court to intervene [in terms of section 13 of the TPCA], two requirements need to 
be met. First, the offending provision must bring about consequences which in the opinion 
of the court the founder did not contemplate or foresee. Second, the provision must either 
hamper the achievement of the object of the founder or prejudice the interests of the 
beneficiaries or be in conflict with the public interest.”143 
 
It is therefore clear that the powers that section 13 of the TPCA confers upon 
courts are specific to only those instances where an undesirable consequence flows 
from the provisions of the trust deed that was not contemplated or foreseen by the 
founder, prejudice the interests of the beneficiaries or is in conflict with the public 
interest. This section, therefore, expands a court’s common-law power to amend a 
trust deed and does not relate to the disregarding of a trust’s separate estate. 
Shipley argues that a court’s power to disregard the separate trust estate stems 
from the common law.144 This proposition accords with the role that South African 
courts play in the development of South African trust law, as highlighted in Crookes v 
Watson145 and Braun v Blann & Botha NNO146 and in line with the duty underscored 
in Parker147 to guard against the abuse of the trust form.  
In my view, the time has come to accept Shipley’s argument that a court’s power 
to disregard the separate estate of a trust stems from the common law and the duty 
to guard against the abuse of the trust form.148 This much also appears from the 
matter of RP v DP149 where it was held that: 
 
 
142  Harvey NO v Crawford NO 2019 2 SA 153 (SCA). 
143  Para 72. 
144  Shipley (2016) Merc LJ 513. 
145  1956 1 SA 277 (AD). 
146  1984 2 SA 850 (A).  
147  2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 37.3. 
148  Cameron et al Honoré 313 support Shipley’s views in this regard. 






“[T]he power of piercing either the corporate or the trust veil is derived from common law 
and not from any general discretion a court may have. It is a function quite separate from, 
for instance, the exercise of discretion in making a redistribution order under s 7 of the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 …”150 
 
What is however altogether unclear, is the type and measure of abuse that would 
justify such interference by a court, as well as the theoretical basis therefor. In what 
follows, I suggest that the fiduciary proposition, as a component of the independence 
duality model, provides the theoretical basis for such judicial intervention and also 
provides guidance regarding the type and measure of abuse that is relevant. 
An important contribution to the debate by Smith in the context of matrimonial 
matters also merits discussion.151 The above analysis, however, requires a brief 
consideration of the relevant case law.  
 
6 5 2  Case analysis 
The locus classicus in connection with disregarding the separate juristic personality 
of juristic persons is Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 
(“Cape Pacific”). 152  In that matter, Smalberger JA explained that, although a 
registered company is a legal person distinct from its members, a court could in the 
appropriate circumstances disregard the company’s separate personality in order to 
impose liability elsewhere for acts purportedly performed on the company’s behalf.153 
In this context, the abuse of the separate juristic personality is viewed as 
determinative. Du Toit et al explain: 
 
“Piercing or lifting the corporate veil in this sense extinguishes the differentiation between 
the company and the person(s) in control thereof and enables the court to impose 
personal liability on someone (such as a company director) who abused the company’s 
legal personality. The Cape Pacific case established, in particular, that a court can, where 
a company’s legal personality is abused through fraud, dishonesty or other improper 
 
150  Para 31. 
151  Smith (2016) JJS 68 93. 
152  1995 4 SA 790 (A). 
153  For an explanation of the principles of Cape Pacific and its application in the trust 






conduct, disregard that company’s separate existence and attribute personal liability to 
the person(s) responsible for that abuse”.154 
 
Jordaan v Jordaan155 and Badenhorst v Badenhorst156 are two early cases that 
dealt with the question of whether a trust estate was to be disregarded. These were 
divorce cases and at issue was whether assets placed in trust were to be taken into 
account in making a redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 
of 1979 (“the Divorce Act”).  
That section is aimed at ameliorating an inequity that may arise in a divorce where 
the parties at the time of their marriage did not have the option of concluding a 
marriage out of community of property with the inclusion of the accrual system, 
which was only introduced by the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 (“the 
Matrimonial Property Act”).157 Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, therefore, empowers a 
court in a marriage concluded prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act 
to order that assets of one party be transferred to the other “as the court may deem 
just”.158 
 
154  142. See also Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 
790 (A) 803H-804D. 
155  2001 3 SA 288 (C). 
156  2006 2 SA 255 (SCA). 
157  The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 introduced a marital regime in terms of which 
spouses who chose to marry out of community of property could nevertheless elect to 
incorporate the so-called “accrual system”. In terms of this marital regime, the growth in 
the parties’ respective estates during the currency of the marriage is taken into account 
at its dissolution. It provides that the party whose estate had shown the least growth is 
entitled to half that of which the other party’s growth had exceeded their own.  
158  Subsections 7(3) to 7(5) provide as follows: 
“(3)  A court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a marriage out of community of 
property- 
(a) entered into before the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, 1984, 
in terms of an antenuptial contract by which community of property, 
community of profit and loss and accrual sharing in any form are excluded; or 
(b) entered into before the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act, 1988, in terms of section 22 (6) of the Black 
Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), as it existed immediately prior to its 







Jordaan entailed a divorce in 2001 where the parties were married out of 
community of property in 1976. The provisions of section 7 of the Divorce Act 
consequently applied. During the intervening years Mr Jordaan, an estate planner, 
amassed a significant estate and proceeded to manage this wealth through various 
trusts (“the Jordaan trusts”).159  
The parties had two children, one of whom was both blind and mentally disabled, 
requiring Mrs Jordaan to forgo employment and devote herself fulltime to the 
children’s care. It was therefore common cause that Mrs Jordaan was entitled to a 
redistribution from Mr Jordaan’s estate in accordance with section 7 of the Divorce 
 
may, subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6), on application by 
one of the parties to that marriage, in the absence of any agreement between 
them regarding the division of their assets, order that such assets, or such part of 
the assets, of the other party as the court may deem just be transferred to the first-
mentioned party. 
(4)  An order under subsection (3) shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied 
that it is equitable and just by reason of the fact that the party in whose favour the 
order is granted, contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or increase of 
the estate of the other party during the subsistence of the marriage, either by the 
rendering of services, or the saving of expenses which would have otherwise have 
been incurred, or in any other manner. 
(5)  In the determination of the assets or part of the assets to be transferred as 
contemplated in subsection (3) the court shall, apart from any direct or indirect 
contribution made by the party concerned to the maintenance or increase of the 
estate of the other party as contemplated in subsection (4), also take into account- 
(a) the existing means and obligations of the parties, including any obligation that 
a husband to a marriage as contemplated in subsection (3) (b) of this section 
may have in terms of section 22 (7) of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 
38 of 1927); 
(b) any donation made by one party to the other during the subsistence of the 
marriage, or which is owing and enforceable in terms of the antenuptial 
contract concerned; 
(c) any order which the court grants under section 9 of this Act or under any other 
law which affects the patrimonial position of the parties; and 
(d) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account.” 






Act.160 However, it remained in dispute whether the court could take account of the 
assets in the Jordaan trusts to determine the extent of the redistribution.161 
In considering this question, Traverso J emphasised the virtually unfettered 
discretion that a court enjoys in making a redistribution order under section 7 of the 
Divorce Act, provided that such redistribution was just and equitable.162  
The court had specific regard to the manner in which Mr Jordaan had managed 
the Jordaan trusts. Relevant in this respect were inter-trust financial transfers; 
distributions to the children and loans to Mr Jordaan, all without evidence of 
authorising trustee resolutions.163 On this basis, the court concluded that the Jordaan 
trusts were Mr Jordaan’s “alter ego”, which conclusion was fortified by evidence 
suggesting that he established one of the trusts shortly prior to the institution of 
divorce proceedings with the aim of sequestering portions of his estate.164  
All of this moved the court to take the estates of the trust into consideration in 
setting the value of the redistribution. The court, however, held that this did not 
amount to a piercing of the “corporate veil”: 
 
“Vir bogenoemde redes kom ek tot die gevolgtrekking dat by die beoordeling van die 
vraag wat die omvang van die herverdelingsbevel moet wees, dit reg en billik is om die 
bates van die trusts in ag te neem. Vanweë hierdie bevinding is dit nie nodig om te besluit 
of dit in die omstandighede nodig is om die ‘corporate veil’ deur te dring nie.”165 
 
In Badenhorst,166 the parties to the divorce action were similarly married out of 
community of property prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act thereby 
also empowering the court to apply section 7 of the Divorce Act.167 Mrs Badenhorst 
accused her husband of placing his assets in a family trust in order to diminish his 
personal estate, thereby diminishing the sum available for any redistribution among 
the spouses.168  
 
160  Para 14. 
161  Para 18. 
162  Para 21. See also Beaumont v Beaumont 1987 1 SA 967 (A) 988H. 
163  Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 3 SA 288 (C) para 29. 
164  Para 33. 
165  Para 34. 
166  Discussed in Chapter 4. 
167  Paras 2-5. 






The trial court held that, for the purpose of making a redistribution order, no regard 
should be had to the value of the assets in the family trust. However, the SCA 
considered it just and equitable that regard should be had to the value of the assets 
held in trust for the purposes of determining the value of the contribution that 
Mr Badenhorst was to make to the estate of his wife.  
In considering under what circumstances a court should take the trust assets into 
account in making a redistribution order, Combrinck AJA emphasised the measure of 
de facto control exercised by one of the parties as determinative: 
 
“The mere fact that the assets vested in the trustees and did not form part of the 
respondent’s estate does not per se exclude them from consideration when determining 
what must be taken into account when making a redistribution order. … To succeed in a 
claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one of the parties to a marriage there 
needs to be evidence that such party controlled the trust and but for the trust would have 
acquired and owned the assets in his own name. Control must be de facto and not 
necessarily de iure.”169 
 
There has been significant debate regarding whether the above conclusion 
amounted to the trust estate being disregarded.170 The dicta in Jordaan to the effect 
that taking account of the value of the trust assets in making a redistribution did not 
require a piercing of the “corporate veil” suggests that Traverso J in that matter did 
not consider her finding to amount to the trust estate being disregarded.  
In Van Zyl v Kaye,171 Binns-Ward J similarly expressed the view that the finding in 
Badenhorst did not amount to a disregard of the trust estate. He stated: 
 
“The effect of the court order was not to hold that the trust was a sham, or to make the 
assets of the trust the property of Mr Badenhorst. The court also did not go behind the 
trust form. The decision in Badenhorst went to the application of ss 7(3) – (5) of the 
 
169  Para 9. See part 4 4 in Chapter 4 for a discussion on the “control test” alluded to in this 
case. For the reasons set out in part 4 4, it is submitted that references to the “control 
test” in Badenhorst is not to be equated with the traditional control test as developed in 
the USA to determine whether a trust was established, aspects of which have been 
applied in the context of the establishment proposition. 
170  Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 4 SA 452 (WCC); SA Hyland & BS Smith “Abuse of the 
trust figure in South Africa: an analysis of a number of recent developments” (2006) 1 
Journal for Estate Planning Law 1; Smith (2016) JJS 68.  






Divorce Act, rather than to any remedy for abuse of the trust form. It was left to 
Mr Badenhorst to decide how to make payment in terms of the court order. The judgment 
did not go against the trust, or render its assets exigible at the instance of Mrs 
Badenhorst.”172 
 
172  Para 24. Binns-Ward J relies for this analysis on dictum in Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. In that case the UK Supreme Court analysed the habit of the 
Family Courts in that jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil by making asset transfer 
orders in terms of s 24(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 173 (which mirrors in 
several respects the provisions of the Divorce Act quoted above). In paragraphs 37 – 38 
of that judgment, the UK Supreme Court held that: 
“'37.  If there is no justification as a matter of general legal principle for piercing the 
corporate veil, I find it impossible to say that a special and wider principle applies 
in matrimonial proceedings by virtue of s 24(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973. The language of this provision is clear. It empowers the court to order one 
party to the marriage to transfer to the other property to which the first-mentioned 
party is entitled, either in possession or reversion. An entitlement is a legal right in 
respect of the property in question. The words in possession or reversion show 
that the right in question is a proprietary right, legal or equitable. This section is 
invoking concepts with an established legal meaning and recognised legal 
incidents under the general law. Courts exercising family jurisdiction do not 
occupy a desert island in which general legal concepts are suspended or mean 
something different. If a right of property exists, it exists in every division of the 
High Court and in every jurisdiction of the county courts. If it does not exist, it does 
not exist anywhere. It is right to add that even where courts exercising family 
jurisdiction have claimed a wider jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil than 
would be recognised under the general law, they have not usually suggested that 
this can be founded on s 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. On the contrary, in 
Nicholas v Nicholas [1984] FLR 285, 288, Cumming-Bruce LJ said that it could 
not.  
38.  This analysis is not affected by s 25(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
Section 25(2)(a) requires the court when exercising the powers under section 24, 
to have regard to the income, earning capacity, property and other financial 
resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the 
foreseeable future: The breadth and inclusiveness of this definition of the relevant 
resources of the parties to the marriage means that the relevant spouse's 
ownership and control of a company and practical ability to extract money or 
money's worth from it are unquestionably relevant to the court's assessment of 
what his resources really are. That may affect the amount of any lump sum or 
periodical payment orders, or the decision what transfers to order of other property 
which unquestionably belongs to the relevant spouse. But it does not follow from 






The position adopted above suggests a clear distinction between disregarding the 
trust estate, thereby making those same assets available to a trustee’s creditors on 
the one hand, and merely having regard to the value of the trust assets in 
determining the sum to be redistributed from the relevant party’s estate on the other.  
Hyland and Smith, however, argue that in having regard to the trust assets in 
dividing matrimonial property the courts, in both Jordaan173 and Badenhorst,174 have 
disregarded the trust estate. 
With regard to Jordaan, the authors convincingly submit that: 
 
“in finding the trust assets to be capable of inclusion, Traverso J did in fact ‘pierce the 
veneer’ as (i) the finding that the trusts were the defendant’s alter ego (in consequence of 
the extensive investigation into the trusts’ dealings) clearly implied that the trust assets 
were being used ‘as before’; and (ii) the facts leading to such a finding could of necessity 
only be established after the veneer had indeed been pierced.”175 
 
Similarly, Smith expresses the view that the court in Badenhorst also proceeded 
to disregard the trust estate.176 He relies on WT v KT177 and the proposition that the 
legal principles pertaining to disregarding the trust estate have “in essence been 
transplanted from the arena of ‘piercing the corporate veil’”.178 On this basis, Smith 
correctly points out that:  
 
“in the company law context, piercing does not of necessity require the assets of a 
company to be held in law to be those of its controllers, but merely that they, in fact, used 
those assets to promote their personal interest as if they were the true owners. In 
addition, ... it is not necessary for the judgment to ‘go against’ the company. Case law 
provides examples of the imposition of liability only against the controllers personally or 
against those persons and the company. It will also be recalled that piercing may take 
place fully or partially. In sum, in my view, even the slightest disregard of the company’s 
separate existence in order to impose liability of this nature will constitute piercing. 
 
assets that those assets are specifically transferrable to the other under section 
24(1)(a).” 
173  Hyland & Smith (2006) Journal for Estate Planning Law 12. 
174 Smith (2016) JJS 84.  
175  Hyland & Smith (2006) Journal for Estate Planning Law 12. 
176  Smith (2016) JJS 74. 
177  2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 






This is no different in the case of a trust.”179 
 
Smith further argues that similarly, where an order is made adverse to the trust’s 
controllers and not directly against the trust estate, this is no reason to hold that the 
trust estate was not disregarded. In a direct reply to the views expressed by 
Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye,180 (to the effect that Badenhorst did not represent a 
disregard of the trust estate on account of it being left to Mr Badenhorst to decide 
how to satisfy the order) Smith argues as follows: 
 
“In Cape Pacific, for example, the original judgment against the company was held ‘in 
substance and effect’ to be against L, with the result that he was ordered ‘to take all such 
steps as may be necessary’ to ensure compliance therewith. This was nevertheless still 
regarded as an imposition of personal liability. In much the same way, the respondent in 
Badenhorst incurred a form of ‘personal liability’ – i.e. by being ordered to pay over an 
amount of money that was more than it would have been if the value of the trust assets 
had not been taken into account – that was appropriate in the context of the facts at hand. 
This order would not have been possible, unless the trust “veil” had been disregarded to 
some extent. It was only because of the respondent’s abuse of the J Trust that this (albeit 
less intrusive) disregard was possible in the first place.”181 
  
It is against this background that Smith suggests that, in the actual exercising of 
the judicial power to disregard a trust’s separate estate in divorce proceedings, a 
court depends not only on its common-law power but also on matrimonial property 
law and divorce law. However, he emphasises that this should not be understood as 
suggesting that the court’s power in this sense is rooted in divorce legislation; for him 
the court’s power remains rooted in common law. This should also not permit “the 
conclusion that considering the value of trust assets as part of the ‘true’ value of a 
divorcing trustee-spouse’s estate does not amount to piercing”.182 
Smith’s submissions on this point are persuasive, especially when regard is had to 
the fact that (as pointed out by him) 183  there could have been no question of 
considering the value of the trust assets had Mr Badenhorst not failed to adhere to 
 
179  Smith (2016) JJS 84. 
180  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
181  Smith (2016) JJS 84. The reference to “Cape Pacific” is to Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 790 (A). 
182  Smith (2016) JJS 92. 






the fundamental principles of trust administration. Against this nexus between abuse 
on the one hand and disregard of the trust estate on the other, Smith’s interpretation 
of Badenhorst is, in my view, to be preferred.184 
However, irrespective of whether the courts in Jordaan and Badenhorst granted 
the relief on the basis of the provisions of the Divorce Act or the common law in 
disregarding the trust estate, what is clear is that an abuse of the trust, and in 
particular a failure to adhere to the fundamental principles of trust administration, 
invites a consideration of whether trust assets are to be taken into account in 
aspects affecting the relevant trustee’s estate.  
In much the same manner, the abuse of the trust appeared to be at the forefront 
of the reasoning in Nedbank v Thorpe,185 an insolvency matter where an application 
was brought for the sequestration of the respondent. At issue was the question of 
whether there was sufficient reason to believe that Mr Thorpe’s sequestration would 
yield an advantage to his creditors.186 
At the provisional stage,187 the applicant bank contended that Mr Thorpe had 
established several family trusts which he used to “insulate his wealth from creditors 
and thereby to frustrate the efforts of his creditors to recover debts owed to them”.188 
Should Mr Thorpe be sequestrated, so the argument went, it would become possible 
to investigate his financial affairs and locate assets in the trusts which in reality 
belonged to him in his personal capacity. The court granted the provisional order, 
 
184  This interpretation of Badenhorst is also supported in RP v DP 2014 6 SA 243 (ECP). 
185  [2008] JOL 22675 (N). A provisional sequestration order was granted, and the order was 
eventually made final. 
186  In terms of ss 10(c) and 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (“the Insolvency Act”), 
a court may not grant a sequestration order unless “there is reason to believe that it will 
be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated”. 
187  The Insolvency Act distinguishes between “provisional” and “final” sequestration: A 
Boraine, JA Kunst & DA Burdette Meskin on Insolvency Law Meskin on Insolvency Law 
(SI 51 2018) 2-18 explain the rationale for the distinction as follows:  
“The reason for this is that not only the interests of the applicant and the debtor, but also 
the interests of all the debtor’s creditors, are affected when a sequestration order is 
granted ... while, therefore, the creditor able to establish a prima facie case for 
sequestration, is to have the benefit of preservation of the debtor’s property, an 
opportunity is to be afforded to the debtor and all his other creditors to be heard in 
relation to the issue of whether a final order of sequestration should be granted.” 






which was confirmed on the return date.189 In arriving at its decision to confirm the 
provisional order, the court held that Mr Thorpe in fact controlled the trusts. The 
impression is inescapable that it foresaw the possibility that the trust’s assets could 
eventually be used to satisfy Mr Thorpe’s creditors.190 
Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC191 presented a further opportunity 
to consider the type of abuse that would merit a disregard of the trust estate. The 
facts were briefly as follows. A close corporation, Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 
(“Hydraberg CC”), and a trust, the Hydraberg Property Trust (“the property trust”) 
sold a going concern, together with the immovable property from which it operated, 
to the trustees of the Monument Trust in terms of a single indivisible agreement (“the 
sale agreement”). A dispute between the parties ensued and at issue was the validity 
of this sale agreement. The respondents contended that the sale agreement was 
invalid for non-compliance with the joint-action rule.192  
Clarke and Bosman, the dramatis personae on the part of Hydraberg CC and two 
of the three trustees of the property trust, effectively side-lined the third trustee, one 
Slabbert, from all administration of the trust and he took no part in concluding the 
sale agreement. Seeking to profit from this state of affairs and avoid the property 
trust’s obligation under the sale agreement, Clarke and Bosman contended that, 
since they alone signed the sale agreement, the trust could not have been bound. 
What compounded matters was that, as soon as Slabbert was removed as trustee 
and another appointed in his stead, Clarke and Bosman caused a resolution to be 
passed by the property trust affirming that the property trust was not a party to the 
sale agreement and that it had not granted Clarke and Bosman authority in writing to 
enter into it. 
This conduct on the part of Clarke and Bosman moved the court to affirm that: 
 
“The facts of the current matter afford a classic example of an abuse of the trust form 
flowing directly from the conduct of Clarke and Bosman in respect of the ownership of the 
fixed property, with no distinction between their responsibilities as trustees and their 
 
189  The final judgment is reported as Nedbank v Thorpe ZAKZPHC 16-09-2009 case no 
7392/2007. 
190  Such an order was made in respect to a different debtor in First Rand Limited t/a First 
National Bank v Britz ZAGPPHC 20-07-2011 case no 54742/09. 
191  2010 5 SA 555 (WCC). 






expectations as beneficiaries. They treat the property as their own, and invoke the 
existence of the trust only when it suits them.”193 
 
The court ultimately considered itself unable to disregard the trust estate on 
account of the provisions of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981.194 However, 
Hydraberg remains of significant assistance in determining the type of abuse that 
would move a court to disregard the trust estate. A hallmark of Clarke and Bosman’s 
conduct is that they simply ignored their fiduciary duty to act independently of their 
own interests in managing the trust estate.  
In Van Zyl v Kaye195 the same court, also per Binns-Ward J, took the opportunity 
to further elucidate the circumstances under which the separate estate of a trust is to 
be disregarded.  
In that matter, the applicants, who were the provisional trustees in the insolvent 
estate of Mr Kaye, applied for an order declaring that two immovable properties, 
which were held by a trust and a private company respectively, be regarded as the 
personal assets of Mr Kaye.196 Against the trust, the applicants requested the court 
to disregard the separate trust estate in terms of its powers under the common law. 
As against the company, the applicants relied on the provisions of section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008.197 
 
193  Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC) para 39. 
194  Section 2 of that Act provides that a party entering into an agreement on behalf of 
another is required to have been authorised thereto in writing. See, however, the 
insightful discussion by Van der Linde, where he argues that mechanisms exist to 
obviate the above legislative difficulty on the facts of Hydraberg: A van der Linde 
“Debasement of the core idea of the trust and the need to protect third parties” (2012) 
75 THRHR 371. 
195  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
196  Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 4 SA 452 (WCC) para 1. 
197  That section codified the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and provides as follows: 
“If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is 
involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or 
any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the 
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may- 
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of 
any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the 
company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or 






After emphasising the distinction between an invalid or “sham” trust on the one 
hand,198 and “disregarding the separate estate” of the trust on the other, the court 
proceeded to coherently articulate the difficulty in formulating a general test for such 
relief as follows: 
 
“Going behind the trust form (or ‘piercing its veneer’, as the concept is sometimes 
described) essentially represents the provision by a court of an equitable remedy to a 
third party affected by an unconscionable abuse of the trust form. It is a remedy that will 
be afforded in suitable or appropriate cases … I suspect that, rather like the position with 
‘piercing of the corporate veil’ in the case of companies, closely defining the applicable 
principles in the cases in which it is afforded or withheld may prove elusive. That is why I 
consider it appropriate to describe it as an equitable remedy in the ordinary, rather than 
technical, sense of the term; one that lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly 
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of the trust form in given 
circumstances. It is a remedy that will generally be given when the trust form is used in a 
dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade liability, or avoid an obligation.”199 
 
This test, therefore, postulates two elements. Firstly, it is required that the trust 
form be used in a dishonest or unconscionable manner, and secondly, that it is used 
to avoid some liability or obligation. While, on the facts of that matter, the court 
concluded that the applicants had “not shown that the Trust was used dishonestly or 
unconscionably to evade liability to them or Kaye’s creditors”,200 the elucidation of 
the test to be applied in disregarding the trust estate is to be welcomed. 
In WT v KT,201 the SCA again considered the basis upon which a trust estate may 
be disregarded in the context of divorce proceedings. That matter concerned a trust 
established prior to the parties’ marriage in community of property.  
The trust assets included the marital home and the shares of several companies 
established by WT in the furtherance of his business interests.202 Faced with an 
 
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a 
declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).” 
For an insightful discussion regarding the above statutory power and a court’s power 
under the common law to pierce the corporate veil, see Nel (2014) Obiter 570. 
198  Also highlighted in part 6 2 above. 
199  Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 4 SA 452 (WCC) para 22 (emphasis added). 
200  Para 30. 
201  2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 






action for divorce, KT did not oppose the decree of divorce sought but contended 
that the trust’s assets should be deemed to have formed part of the joint marital 
estate.203 The court a quo ruled in her favour. 
On appeal, the SCA held that in considering whether to disregard a trust estate 
one needed to look to the principles of corporate law:  
 
“As regards averments pertaining to ‘looking’ behind the veneer of the trust as the alter 
ego of WT, the legal principles in this respect have in essence been transplanted from the 
arena of ‘piercing the corporate veil’. In the latter context courts are empowered to 
disregard the legal fiction of separate corporate personality in suitable or appropriate 
circumstances. Similarly, as Cameron JA noted in this court in Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa v Parker & Others, if the trust form is ‘debased’, justice would dictate that 
the veneer of the trust be pierced in the interests of creditors. By analogous reasoning, 
unconscionable abuse of the trust form through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose 
will justify looking behind the trust form.”204 
 
In applying this principle, the court held that:  
 
“Significantly, the dicta of Cameron JA in Parker, pertaining to the importance of 
maintaining the functional separation between control (by trustees) and enjoyment (by 
beneficiaries) in family trusts, are premised upon the interest of third parties, who 
transacted with the trust.”205  
 
It thereby implied that a fiduciary responsibility would be limited to the 
beneficiaries and third parties who transact with the trust.206 
Since KT was neither a beneficiary of the trust, nor a third party who transacted 
with the trust, the court held that she did not enjoy locus standi to seek the disregard 
of the trust estate.207 In so doing the court elevated the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship between the trustees and the applicant to a pre-requisite for seeking the 
disregard of a trust estate. This position has been met with strong academic and 
judicial criticism.208 
 
203  Para 2. 
204  Para 31. 
205  Para 33. 
206  Para 33. 
207  WT v KT 2015 3 SA 574 (SCA) para 33.  






The strongest critique of this approach was delivered two years later by the same 
court in REM v VM.209 After discussing the above finding in WT v KT, the SCA held 
that:  
 
“[t]here can be no basis in logic or principle for a distinction to be drawn between legal 
standing to advance a claim to pierce the veil of a trust, by a third party who transacts 
with the trust on the one hand, and a spouse who seeks to advance a patrimonial claim, 
on the other. Breach by the trustee of his or her fiduciary duties in administration of the 
trust, is not the determining factor.”210  
 
That matter also related to the circumstances under which a party could seek the 
disregard of the trust estate. At issue was whether assets held in certain trusts were 
to be considered that of REM for the purposes of calculating the parties’ respective 
accrual.  
The evidence suggested that REM had failed to ensure a functional separation 
between control and benefit of certain trusts and indiscriminately caused trust assets 
to be applied for his personal benefit. Swain JA, writing for a unanimous court, 
endorsed the proposition by Binns-Ward J in Van Zyl v Kaye,211 to the effect that 
disregarding the trust estate is an equitable remedy that requires either dishonesty or 
unconscionable use on the one hand and the evasion of some liability or obligation 
on the other.212  
Against this background the court identified that:  
 
“The conduct of [REM] in allegedly transferring personal assets to these trusts, dealing 
with them as if they were assets of these trusts and not properly performing his fiduciary 
duties, all with the object of concealing these assets and thereby defeating the accrual 
claim of the respondent, are the central issues in determining whether the trust veneer 
should be pierced.”213  
  
 
209  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 
210  Para 20. 
211  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
212  REM v VM 2017 3 SA 371 (SCA) para 17. 






The court expressly rejected the conclusion in WT v KT214 that confined standing 
to advance a claim for the disregard of the trust estate to those to whom the trustee 
owes a fiduciary duty, and held that breach “by the trustee of his or her fiduciary 
duties in the administration of the trust, is not the determining factor”.215 The court 
held that:  
 
“In either case, a claim lies against the trust, or the errant trustee, on the basis that the 
unconscionable abuse of the trust form by the trustee, in his or her administration of the 
trust, through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose prejudices the enforcement of the 
obligation owed to the third party, or a spouse. [VM] had to prove that [REM] transferred 
personal assets to these trusts and dealt with them as if they were assets of these trusts 
with the fraudulent or dishonest purpose of avoiding his obligation to properly account to 
[VM] for the accrual of his estate …”216 
 
The inference is clear – the focus in considering whether to disregard the trust 
estate is not on the possible fiduciary breach, but on the unconscionable use of the 
trust form to evade some obligation. 
On this basis, the court ultimately held that, notwithstanding that it appeared that 
REM had dealt with trust assets as his own, there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that he did so for the fraudulent or dishonest purpose of avoiding his 
obligation to properly account for the accrual of his estate. 217  The appeal was 
accordingly upheld and the order a quo substituted.218 
 
6 5 3  What type of abuse? 
It is submitted that the test in Van Zyl v Kaye,219 and endorsed in REM v VM,220 
builds on the principles of the test developed in Cape Pacific v Lubner.221 This much 
appears from the requirement that for a party to succeed with an order disregarding 
the trust estate, some form of unconscionable use of the trust form is required.  
 
214  2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 
215  REM v VM 2017 3 SA 371 (SCA) para 20 (emphasis added). 
216  Para 20. 
217  Para 20. 
218  Para 28. 
219  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
220  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 






This requirement has been criticised as superfluous by Cameron et al as follows: 
 
“However, in our view dishonesty or unconscionability should not necessarily be seen as 
requirements before trustee conduct can be described as trust abuse. A general 
disregard of the functional separation between the ownership (or control) of trust assets 
and its enjoyment and non-compliance with the basic principles of trust administration … 
could also be indicative of trust abuse under appropriate circumstances.”222  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a core element of the trust is the separation between 
control and benefit.223 This element is safeguarded through the “principles of trust 
administration” which are in turn grounded in a trustee’s fiduciary duty, including the 
duty of independence. In this context, the fiduciary proposition is relevant as any 
abuse of the trust form that would permit a disregard of the trust estate, would by 
necessary implication require a breach of a trustee’s fiduciary duty in failing to 
maintain a sufficient degree of independent discretion.  
This is echoed by De Waal who, after analysing Badenhorst,224 Thorpe225 and 
Hydraberg226 suggests that: 
 
“The case analysis in the previous section, in my view, points strongly towards what may 
be called the ‘principles of trust administration’. In South African law, these principles 
have been formulated as follows: (1) the trustee is bound to exercise an independent 
discretion; (2) the trustee must give effect to the trust deed (or instrument), properly 
interpreted; and (3) the trustee must, in the performance of duties and the exercise of 
powers, act with care, diligence and skill. Instead of referring to these ‘principles’, one 
may also call them the core ‘duties’ of a trustee … My submission is that the … cases 
where the courts have considered, or in fact decided, to go behind the trust are indeed 
cases where the trustees have failed in one or more of these duties.”227 
 
In my view, the trustee’s duty to ensure the proper administration of the trust is 
accordingly central to any consideration of whether the trust estate is being abused. 
 
222  Cameron et al Honoré 311. 
223  See part 2 4 in Chapter 2. 
224  Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA). 
225  Nedbank v Thorpe [2008] JOL 22675 (N). 
226  Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC). 






It is submitted that where a trustee ensures compliance with the core duties of trust 
administration, there is no room for such abuse.  
The above begs the question: why would unconscionable abuse or dishonesty be 
a requirement in piercing the corporate veil, but not necessarily in the context of 
disregarding the trust estate? 
The answer lies in the public nature of the trustee office. Where the occupation of 
an office is purely a private law arrangement it may be argued that it is legitimate to 
transcend the divide between control and benefit. For example, there can be no 
objection in principle against a single shareholder also being the sole director of a 
company. However, when that comity of interests is abused to the detriment of third 
parties, it invites the intervention of the courts. 
In contrast, and in view of the public nature of the office of trusteeship, the blurring 
of the lines between control and benefit in the trust context is not permissible. 
Therefore, in the appropriate circumstances a court could disregard the separate 
trust estate where there exists a “disregard of the functional separation between the 
ownership (or control) of trust assets and its enjoyment and non-compliance with the 
basic principles of trust administration” 228  irrespective of whether an element of 
dishonesty accompanies such conduct. 
However, even if my views in this regard are incorrect, and the approach adopted 
in Van Zyl v Kaye229 and REM v VM230  is preferred, I submit that the fiduciary 
proposition still has an important function to fulfil.  
My submission is that the dicta in REM v VM that a fiduciary breach is “not the 
determining factor”231 should not be interpreted to mean that a fiduciary breach is not 
a pre-requisite for a disregard of the trust’s separate estate. In my view, the SCA in 
REM v VM acknowledged a fiduciary breach by a trustee as a pre-requisite for a 
claim to disregard the trust estate but emphasised that the determining factor is 
whether, in addition to such breach, the trustee acted dishonestly or fraudulently in 
an attempt to evade some obligation. 
Stated otherwise, there is in my view no room for the unconscionable use of the 
trust without such use being accompanied by a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty. 
 
228  Cameron et al Honoré 311. 
229  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
230  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 






This much is borne out by the following dicta in REM v VM: 
 
“The respondent had to prove that the appellant transferred personal assets to these 
trusts and dealt with them as if they were assets of these trusts with the fraudulent or 
dishonest purpose of avoiding his obligation to properly account to the respondent for the 
accrual of his estate and thereby evade payment of what was due to the respondent, in 
accordance with her accrual claim. If established, a declaration could be made that the 
trust assets in question are to be used to calculate the accrual of the appellant's estate, 
as well as satisfy any personal liability of the appellant to make payment to the 
respondent. Although the appellant administered the trusts with very little regard for his 
fiduciary duties as a trustee and without proper regard for the essential dichotomy of 
control and enjoyment essential to the nature of a trust, and although such conduct may 
have justified his removal as a trustee or the appointment by the master of an 
independent co-trustee in terms of s 7(2) of the Trust Property Control Act, the evidence 
did not prove that he transferred personal assets to these trusts and dealt with them as if 
they were assets of these trusts, with the fraudulent or dishonest purpose of avoiding his 
obligation to properly account to the respondent for the accrual of his estate.”232 
 
This is, however, not to suggest that, as in WT v KT, 233  a direct fiduciary 
relationship is a pre-requisite for a party to seek an order disregarding the trust 
estate.  
As stated above, the office of trusteeship is a quasi-public office234 and the core 
duties of trust administration form part of the bundle of fiduciary duties owed by a 
particular trustee to that office. Where a trustee fails in those duties, the trust is open 
to abuse of the sort which will permit courts to look beyond the trust estate in order to 
ensure equity. On this construction, any person with an interest in the trust asset 
(which would include a spouse in the position of KT in WT v KT235) would have 
standing to challenge the administration of the trust.  
 
 
232  Para 230 (emphasis added). 
233  2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 
234  Cameron et al Honoré 207. 






6 6  Conclusion 
The separate estate of the trust provides an opportunity for abuse in much the same 
manner as the separate juristic personality of companies is abused. In evaluating 
whether a trust is so abused, a strict distinction must be drawn between a sham 
trust, being a trust that was never established, and the abuse of the trust’s separate 
estate.  
The establishment proposition provides a sound theoretical basis to evaluate 
whether a trust is a sham and is to be preferred over the “sham doctrine”. The 
advantage of the establishment proposition is that it evaluates the intention of the 
founder in establishing a trust, which is a distinct requirement for its establishment. In 
this manner, the complication surrounding the common intention requirement in 
evaluating the obligation establishing the trust is avoided. In addition, the 
establishment proposition advances an objective criterion against which the type and 
measure of control that is to be afforded to trustees are judged.  
The fiduciary proposition also provides the background against which issues of 
the abuse of a trust may be considered. In matters in which a trust’s separate estate 
is abused, it is self-evident that the trustees have failed to comply with their 
obligations of independence in managing the trust estate.  
However, whether such an abuse merits a disregard of the trust estate is a 
separate enquiry. In this regard, it is submitted that the test laid down in Van Zyl v 







CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
7 1  Introduction 
The trust was developed to satisfy a particular societal need,1 namely to protect the 
“weak and safeguard the interests of those who are absent”.2 The result was an 
institution where the founder would place confidence in a trustee to manage assets 
on behalf of another. This “confidence reposed” in trustees, as highlighted by 
Garton, 3  is meaningless where the trustees do not have the capacity to act 
independently and according to their own judgement and is betrayed where the 
trustees fail to exercise their capacity for independence. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that there is a general consensus that trustees are required to act 
independently.4 
However, the debate surrounding the theoretical basis for this principle has given 
rise to two, seemingly contradictory, propositions.5 There are some who view trustee 
independence as a pre-requisite for the establishment of the trust, identified herein 
as “the establishment proposition”,6 and others who contend that it is merely a facet 
of a trustee’s fiduciary duty, identified herein as the “fiduciary proposition”.7 
I have argued that these two propositions are not contradictory at all but, in fact, 
complementary. This argument was advanced through what has been identified as 
the “independence duality model” in which the capacity for independence by trustees 
is a key element of the establishment of a trust and, once established, gives rise to a 
fiduciary duty to exercise such independent capacity.8 
 
1  See part 2 2 2 in Chapter 2. 
2  T Honoré “Trusts” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 849, endorsed in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 19. 
3  J Garton Moffat’s Trust Law 6 ed (2015) 1. See the text to n 1 in Chapter 1. 
4  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and 
Allied Worker’s Union 2008 2 SA 351 (W); Afrisure CC v Watson NO 2009 2 SA 127 
(SCA); MJ de Waal “The liability of co-trustees for breach of trust” (1999) 10 Stell LR 32; 
F du Toit “A trustee’s duty of independence” (2009) 72 THRHR 637. 
5  See part 3 3 in Chapter 3. 
6  See part 3 3 1 in Chapter 3 and the discussion as a whole in Chapter 4. 
7  See part 3 3 2 in Chapter 3 and the discussion as a whole in Chapter 5. 






Chapter 1 identified seven practical examples that illustrate the utility of the 
independence duality model and its constituent parts of the establishment and 
fiduciary propositions. In this concluding chapter, I will revisit these examples, 
drawing from the analysis of the establishment and fiduciary propositions in the 
preceding chapters.  
 
7 2  The independence duality model 
The perception that the establishment and fiduciary propositions are mutually 
exclusive9 is attributable to a failure to recognise a duality in the broader concept of 
trustee independence.  
The recognition of this duality enables a reconciliation of the establishment and 
fiduciary propositions and reveals that each of these propositions offers a sound 
theoretical basis for one distinct component of trustee independence. 
Before it can be said that a trustee acts independently, two elements must be 
present. First, the trustee must be afforded the capacity to act independently and, 
secondly, the trustee must thereafter exercise this capacity. Where the first factor is 
absent, a “trustee” cannot be said to be acting independently and, where 
notwithstanding this capacity for independence, a trustee nevertheless fails to act in 
an independent manner, it can similarly not be said that the trust benefits from 
independent administration by the trustee. 
The proposition is accordingly advanced that, on both a theoretical and a practical 
level, there is a duality in the concept of “trustee independence”, namely, the 
capacity for independent administration being afforded to the trustees, and the 
exercise of that capacity. This, in essence, constitutes the “independence duality 
model”.10  
These two factors are entirely distinct but connected to the broader principle of 
trustee independence and the establishment and fiduciary propositions relate to only 
one aspect in turn. The distinct nature of each of these two elements means that the 
test in respect of establishing the presence of each is also distinct.  
 
9  See part 3 2 in Chapter 3. 






The establishment proposition serves to explain the capacity for independence 
and the fiduciary proposition relates to the question of the exercise of such 
independence.  
The establishment proposition requires an objective evaluation of whether the 
trustee is afforded the capacity for independence at the time of the trust’s 
establishment. In contrast, the fiduciary proposition requires an evaluation of the 
manner in which the trustee had exercised this capacity. It follows that this requires a 
factual analysis on a case by case basis.11  
It is against this background that the establishment and fiduciary propositions can, 
and should, be reconciled and it is argued in this dissertation that it is incorrect to 
label these two propositions as mutually exclusive or otherwise incompatible.12 
As long as the trustees are afforded the capacity for independent administration of 
the trust, it does not matter (in the context of the establishment proposition) that 
there are risks that they may fail to exercise this capacity independently. Once such 
capacity is established, the establishment proposition holds that a valid trust is 
established (on condition that the other requirements for a trust are present). Then 
questions regarding the failure of the trustees to act independently shift to be 
determined with reference to the principles underlying the fiduciary proposition. 
  
7 2 1  The establishment proposition 
It has been argued in this dissertation that, while trustee independence is not 
generally recognised as a requirement for the establishment of a trust,13 it does form 
part of the essentialia of the trust institution.14 
As the discussion on the historical development of the trust institution has shown, 
the trust developed from a need to entrust control over the management of assets to 
 
11  See part 3 4 in Chapter 3.  
12  See part 3 4 1 in Chapter 3. 
13  The recognised requirements to establish a valid trust are: 
(i) an intention on the part of the founder to create a trust; 
(ii) the expression by the founder of the intention to create a trust in a mode suited to 
the creation of a legal obligation; 
(iii) a reasonably certain definition of the trust property; 
(iv) a reasonably certain definition of the trust object; and 
(v) the lawfulness of the trust object.  






another, who was required to assert such control not in their own interest but in that 
of a third party.15 Where this vesting of control in the hands of the trustee is not 
present, in the sense that the trustee is not free to exercise independent control, it 
has been argued that no trust is established because the divestment of control in 
favour of the trustee is an indispensable characteristic of the trust. 
Accordingly, independent control may be (indirectly) incorporated into the 
requirements for the establishment of a trust, as it is an indispensable element of the 
definition (and, indeed the conception) of a trust.16 
The type of control required in the context of a trust is asset control. In other 
words, it is imperative that the trustees have control over the manner in which the 
trust assets are employed. While structural control,17 being the power to amend the 
structure of the trust, such as dismissing trustees, held by another may invite 
manipulation of the manner in which the trustees exercise their asset control, 
structural control is not relevant for the purposes of the establishment proposition.18 
This is because, in view of the independence duality model, trustees have a 
fiduciary duty to exercise independent control over the administration of the trust, 
once a trust is established and they are, by implication, vested with independent 
asset control. 19  For the purposes of determining whether a trust has been 
established, it is irrelevant whether a trustee may in future submit to manipulation on 
the basis of incentives or threats wielded by others, the consequences of which are 
to be considered through the lens of the fiduciary proposition.20 
The measure of asset control to be afforded the trustees in terms of the 
establishment proposition is absolute in the sense that it should be the body of 
trustees alone that has the power to employ the trust assets. This, however, does 
not mean that the trustees’ discretion cannot be curtailed through the trust deed. Due 
to the nature of trusteeship, being a quasi-public office, it is permissible for a founder 
to put assets in trust, but simultaneously to restrict the trustees’ discretion to employ 
 
15  See part 2 2 in Chapter 2. 
16  See part 3 4 1 in Chapter 3. 
17  For a discussion on the distinction between asset control and structural control, see part 
4 2 in Chapter 4. 
18  See part 4 5 in Chapter 4. 
19  See part 3 3 1 in Chapter 3. 






the trust assets.21  This restriction does not translate to the curtailment of asset 
control because it still vests in the trustees alone. It is only the powers of the trustees 
in relation thereto that are restricted. 
Such a restriction is possible precisely due to the nature of trusteeship as an office 
with powers flowing from the provisions of the trust deed.22 
 
7 2 2  The fiduciary proposition 
The fiduciary proposition holds that, once a trust has been established, the trustees 
occupying the office of trusteeship are duty-bound to exercise independent discretion 
in the exercise of their powers.23 This obligation stems from a trustee’s occupation of 
the office of trusteeship and forms part of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. 
Unlike the establishment proposition, the fiduciary proposition is concerned with 
the manner in which the trustees exercise their obligation of independence as 
opposed to whether they are afforded such capacity. It follows that the fiduciary 
proposition focuses on the conduct of the trustees throughout the existence of the 
trustee office. 
This characteristic accounts for the explanation of what has been described as 
“developing non-independence” in a manner that the establishment proposition is 
unable to do. 
The fiduciary proposition emphasises a trustee’s duty of independence as part of 
the fiduciary duty that flows from the office of trusteeship. It is contended herein that, 
as a consequence, a general disregard for the separation of control and benefit, that 
is central to the trust idea, amounts to sufficient dereliction of duty to qualify as an 
abuse that justifies a court to disregard the separate estate of the trustee (or 




21  See part 4 6 in Chapter 4. 
22  For a discussion of trusteeship as an office, see part 2 4 4 in Chapter 2. 
23  See part 3 3 2 in Chapter 3. 






7 3  Application of the theoretical framework to examples 
The examples identified in Chapter 1 serve to illustrate the practical application of 
the independence duality model and its two constituent parts, the establishment and 
fiduciary propositions. They relate primarily to questions regarding whether a trust is 
established (or in the alternative constitutes a so-called “sham”)25 and whether the 
conduct described therein amounts to abuse that may merit a court disregarding the 
separate trust estate.  
For ease of reference, the examples are reproduced below. 
 
7 3 1  Example 1 
Assume an inter vivos trust where the founder does not intend to relinquish full control 
over the trust assets. To achieve this end, he establishes a trust for the benefit of his 
children with three independent trustees and provides them with wide discretionary 
powers. However, he includes a provision in the trust deed to the effect that all decisions 
by the trustees are to be approved by the founder in order to be effective. 
What is the effect of this provision and does this arrangement qualify as trust? 
 
In this example, no trust is established. The impediments to the establishment of a 
trust are two-fold. First, and on a subjective level, the founder does not intend to 
establish a trust. As the discussion of the requirements for validity of a trust 
revealed, 26  the divestment of control in favour of the trustees is an essential 
dimension of the definition of a trust. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the subjective 
understanding of the founder, where he intends to establish an arrangement in which 
control over the assets is retained, that arrangement cannot qualify as a trust.  
Secondly, the founder also fails, objectively, to establish a trust on account of 
retaining asset control over the employment of the trust assets.27 Notwithstanding 
that the trustees are empowered with wide “discretionary powers”, these powers are 
qualified by making them subject to the approval of the founder. 
In so doing, the founder has failed to divest himself of control over the trust 
assets. The discretion afforded to the trustees is rendered nugatory through the 
obligation that all trustee decisions are to be approved by the founder. In this sense, 
 
25  For criticism on this terminology see part 6 3 in Chapter 6. 
26  See part 3 4 1 in Chapter 3. 






the example mirrors the facts of Humansdorp Co-operative Ltd v Wait28 (“Wait”). In 
Wait, the founder was also a trustee where the trust deed provided that trustee 
decisions were to be taken by way of majority vote. Significantly however, it was an 
additional requirement that the founder forms part of the majority in each instance. It 
followed that valid decisions by the body of trustees would always have required the 
concurrence of the founder. 
The position would have been different if the trust deed provided that decisions 
were only to be taken unanimously. In such an instance, full asset control would vest 
in the body of trustees and it would not matter that the founder was also a trustee. 
The consequence would be that, should the founder no longer qualify as trustee for 
any reason, his influence in trustee decisions would similarly cease. 
However, in the example above, the trustees’ decisions are made conditional 
upon the approval of a person who is not a trustee and, accordingly, it cannot be 
said that the trustees have sufficient asset control for the arrangement to qualify as a 
trust. 
 
7 3 2  Example 2 
These examples examine the impact of an over prescriptive trust deed on the one 
hand and a trust deed that affords the founder particularly far-reaching structural 
power on the other, within an otherwise identical factual matrix. This small distinction 
has significant consequences. Hence the example is divided into two examples, 
example 2a and example 2b. 
 
7 3 2 1  Example 2a 
The founder establishes an inter vivos investment trust. The trust deed contains detailed 
and prescriptive provisions to the trustees. They are to invest the trust assets only in 
shares identified in an annexure to the trust deed, and only in the ratio set out therein. 
The trust deed further requires that all proceeds from the investments be immediately 
re-invested in the same shares (and in accordance with the same ratio). It is expressly 
recorded that the trustees have no discretion in the investment of the trust assets and no 
amendment of the trust deed is permitted.  
 
28  Case no 2896/2012, Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Grahamstown, (now 







On the twenty-first anniversary of the trust, the trustees are to immediately liquidate 
the trust assets, pay the proceeds to the founder’s surviving issue per stirpes and 
terminate the trust. 
There is accordingly no requirement that the decisions of the trustees be approved by 
the founder but the trustees’ powers and duties are prescriptive in nature, with no 
discretion on their part. Does this arrangement qualify as a trust?  
 
In this example, the founder retains significant, albeit indirect, control through the 
prescriptive trust deed. However, in contrast to example 1, the arrangement in this 
example does constitute a trust. This is because, notwithstanding the curtailment of 
the trustees’ discretion, full asset control still vests in them.29  
Unlike in example 1, the founder does not have the power, once the trust has 
been established, to determine the manner in which the assets are to be employed. 
Full asset control vests with the body of trustees with only the exercise thereof 
limited by the trust deed. The quasi-public nature of trusteeship as an office, 
therefore provides the theoretical framework that permits a trust such as in this 
example. 
Once the assets are donated into trust, they are sequestered from the founder’s 
estate, thereby establishing the trust estate. The trust deed regulates the powers of 
the trustees (and the trustees remain subject to supervision by the courts and the 
Master). 
It does not matter that the founder may prescribe the manner in which the trustees 
are to deal with the trust assets as he is divested from any further control after the 
establishment of the trust. The significant distinction lies therein that any “control” 
that the founder may exercise in the establishment of the trust, ceases once the trust 
is established. At this point in time the founder no longer has any control to dictate 
the manner in which the trust assets are administered. 
This example accurately illustrates the versatility of the trust institution as there is 
no legal objection to the founder employing the trust deed to determine the manner 
in which assets are to be dealt with after having relinquished control.  
 
 






7 3 2 2  Example 2b 
This example is identical to example 2a, with the only distinction being that the founder 
retains the power to amend the trust deed and, accordingly, the power of investment of 
the trustees.  
 
In example 2b, no trust is established. The example may initially seem complex 
because it appears that asset control remains in the hands of the trustees and that 
only structural control is vested in the founder.  
However, while the power to amend the trust deed may appear to be structural in 
nature, it qualifies as asset control when such power may be used to compel, as 
opposed to influence, the trustees to act in a certain manner.  
Accordingly, were the founder to use such power to amend the manner in which 
the trust assets were to be applied, this would render the “asset control” enjoyed by 
the trustees nugatory and, as a consequence, no valid trust would be established.  
It is accordingly clear that asset control may also be disguised as structural 
control. 
 
7 3 3  Example 3 
A founder establishes an inter vivos trust and appoints three independent trustees. The 
trustees are granted absolute discretion to invest the trust assets as they wish, to pay the 
income from the investments to nominated income beneficiaries and, upon their death, to 
allocate the balance to nominated capital beneficiaries. 
To assist the trustees, the founder furnishes them with a letter of wishes proposing the 
manner of investments to be undertaken. The letter expressly records that the trustees 
are not bound by its content. 
However, the trust deed contains a provision to the effect that the trustees’ 
remuneration is to be determined by the founder on an annual basis, and that the founder 
may dismiss a trustee in writing. 
During the currency of the trust, the founder regularly determines the trustees’ annual 
remuneration in accordance with how closely they followed the suggestions in the letter of 
wishes. On one occasion, and following from the trustees’ refusal to follow any of the 
proposals in the letter of wishes, the founder dismisses the entire board of trustees and 
replaces them with three other persons. 
Can it be said that this arrangement qualifies as a trust? 
 
This example differs from example 2a in that the trustees are afforded full 






the trustees have full asset control over the trust assets thereby, and in accordance 
with the establishment proposition, establishing a trust.  
However, the measure of structural control retained by the founder is significant. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, structural control may be employed to manipulate 
trustees to do as a founder suggests.30 This may be achieved through what has 
been described as the “in terrorem” quality of the structural control retained.31 
In this example, the founder has summarily dismissed recalcitrant trustees and 
rewarded trustees who have adopted his suggestions. However, while a sound 
argument may be made that such conduct compromises the independence of the 
trustees, it does not compromise the validity of the trust.  
This is so because, in terms of the establishment proposition, a trust will be 
established when, at the time of its establishment, the trustees are afforded full asset 
control. 
The trustees’ fiduciary duty requires that they exercise such asset control 
independently, notwithstanding the in terrorem quality of the structural control 
retained by the founder. 
However, when “structural control” enables a founder to dictate or influence the 
manner in which the trust assets are employed, such as in example 2b, the control 
no longer relies on its in terrorem quality, but its innate capacity to control the assets 
of the trust. Such control would therefore also qualify as asset control and result 
therein that no trust is established. 
 
7 3 4  Example 4 
A founder, a successful commercial farmer, donates the family farm and farming 
enterprise to a trust. He appoints five trustees, including himself, his wife, two sons and 
his accountant. The trustees are afforded unlimited discretion in the management of the 
trust assets and the beneficiaries are the founder and his family.  
From the outset it is clear that the other trustees never question the management of 
the trust by the founder. Where resolutions are required, they all submit to his will in 
habitual deference and never bring an independent mind to bear upon the administration 
of the trust.  
Does the conduct of the trustees imperil the existence of the trust? 
 
30  See part 4 5 in Chapter 4. 
31  RDM Flannigan “The control test of principal status applied to business trusts: Part II” 







In this example, the trustees’ conduct does not imperil the existence of the trust. It 
is clear that the trustees are afforded sufficient capacity for independence to meet 
the requirements of the establishment proposition and, provided all other 
requirements were met, there can be no objection to the validity of the trust. 
However, the trustees’ failure to bring an independent mind to bear upon the 
administration of the trust may provide the basis to hold them personally liable for 
any loss suffered by the beneficiaries. As discussed in Chapter 5,32 in Wiid v Wiid 
(“Wiid”)33 trustees were held liable to the beneficiaries for breach of trust on this 
basis.  
Stated otherwise, the basis on which the trustees may be held liable for any loss 
suffered by the beneficiaries is breach of their fiduciary duty. This duty flows from the 
office of trusteeship because it is as a result of the trustees occupying that office that 
they are required to bring an independent mind to bear on the administration of the 
trust.34 
 
7 3 5  Example 5 
Consider the following alternative. The facts are identical to those of example 4, except 
that the trustees do bring an independent mind to bear upon the administration of the 
trust. At first, the trustees engage in robust debate surrounding the management of the 
trust assets and the enterprise as a whole, arriving at a decision (not always by 
consensus). With the passing of time, the founder’s eldest son starts to play an 
increasingly prominent role in the management of the trust estate. 
In time, the position develops where the remaining trustees simply permit the eldest 
son to manage the farm and farming enterprise as he sees fit and the remaining trustees 
come to simply submit to the will of the eldest son in habitual deference.  
What is the effect of this gradual deterioration of trustee independence? 
 
The acknowledgement of the independence duality, and the acceptance of the 
establishment and fiduciary propositions, allow for an explanation of the 
 
32  See part 5 3 in Chapter 5. 
33  NCHC 13-01-2012 case no 1571/2012.  
34  See the discussion of Griessel NO v De Kock 2019 5 SA 396 (SCA) in part 5 3 in 
Chapter 5, where it is emphasised that a trustee’s fiduciary duty is rooted in their 






phenomenon of “developing non-independence”. 35  In the above example, the 
trustees are afforded the capacity for independence within the framework of the 
establishment proposition. Initially, the trustees also exercise this capacity in 
accordance with their fiduciary obligation to do so. 
The establishment proposition is unable to provide a theoretical basis for the 
consequences that follow in the event of developing non-independence. Once a trust 
is validly established it is intellectually incoherent to suggest that this validity may be 
compromised on account of trustees failing to act with the required independence.  
Since the establishment proposition requires an objective assessment at the time 
that the trust is established, it plays no role in determining the consequences of the 
developing non-independence highlighted above. In contrast, this phenomenon may 
be easily explained if it is accepted that there is a duality in trustee independence 
and that the exercise of the capacity for independence is regulated through the 
fiduciary proposition. Once it is accepted that trustees have a fiduciary duty to bring 
an independent mind to bear upon the administration of the trust, it is irrelevant 
whether a breach of this duty occurs at the commencement of the trust or later.  
In accordance with this proposition, the trustees’ failure to properly exercise 
independent discretion in the administration of the trust does not imperil the validity 
of the trust but, as in the previous example, exposes the trustees to a claim for 
breach of trust. The phenomenon of developing non-independence accordingly 
underscores the utility of the independence duality model and its constituent, and 
complimentary, parts.  
 
7 3 6  Example 6 
A founder establishes a trust with the stated purpose of conducting a second-hand car 
sale business. The trustees are the founder, his business partner and an independent 
accountant. The trust deed requires that all the trustees act jointly in the administration of 
the trust. However, in reality, the accountant is never involved in the administration of the 
trust and the remaining trustees conduct the business without any reference to him. 
Effectively he is side-lined. 
At one occasion the two trustees, purporting to act on behalf of the trust, enter into a 
sale agreement of all available trust stock with a third party. When market conditions 
change prior to delivery, it is apparent that the trust could sell the stock to another party at 
a premium. In order to profit from this state of affairs, the two trustees refuse to honour 
 






the first sale agreement, invoking in their defence that the third trustee was not a party 
thereto, rendering the sale agreement void. 
What remedy, if any, does the third party to the first sale agreement have? 
 
Examples 6 and 7 relate to the circumstances under which a court may be invited 
to disregard the separate estate of the trust. As discussed in Chapter 6, this power is 
rooted in the common law36 and stems from the duty of the courts to develop the 
trust law.37 
Example 6 is based on the factual matrix of Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg 
Hydraulics CC (“Hydraberg Hydraulics”),38 save that the object of the sale is movable 
property as opposed to immovable property. 39  The salient features are that the 
founder and business partner (“the trustees”) did not ensure a functional separation 
(and hence independence) between their private interests and their obligations as 
trustees. In addition, the trustees in question seized upon an opportunity to resile 
from the sale agreement on account of their own fiduciary breach. 
On the basis of the test set out in Van Zyl v Kaye,40 and endorsed in REM v VM,41 
the third party would be able to hold the trustees personally liable for the breach of 
the sale agreement if it could prove that (i) the trust form was used in a dishonest or 
unconscionable manner and (ii) in order to avoid some liability.42 
On the facts of example 6, this test would be met. The trustees used the trust in a 
dishonest manner by failing to distinguish between their private interest and their 
obligation as trustees and subsequently capitalised on this dereliction of duty to 
avoid a contractual liability. 
 
36  RP v DP 2014 6 SA 243 (ECP) para 31.  
37  See part 6 5 1 in Chapter 6.  
38  2010 5 SA 555 (WCC). For a discussion of this case see part 6 5 2 in Chapter 6. 
39  This is in order to obviate any debate surrounding the application (if any) of the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. In Hydraberg Hydraulics, the court considered itself 
constrained by section 2 of that Act. That section provides that a party entering into an 
agreement for the sale of immovable property on behalf of another is required to have 
been authorised thereto in writing. There is however debate surrounding whether the 
court was bound in this manner. See A van der Linde “Debasement of the core idea of 
the trust and the need to protect third parties” (2012) 75 THRHR 371. 
40  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
41  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 






This is accordingly a suitable example where the third-party purchaser may 
request the court to disregard the separate estate of the trust and hold the trustees 
personally liable for the breach of contract.  
 
7 3 7  Example 7 
A founder establishes various trusts to house his business, property portfolio, and 
investments. He is also the sole trustee and his children are the beneficiaries. He fails to 
ensure any functional separation between the various trusts and expenses are often 
shared. The maintenance of himself and his family is funded through the various trusts. 
Long after the establishment of the trusts, the founder commences a business venture 
in his personal capacity. Upon the failure of this business venture, his personal creditors 
seek to execute against the trusts.  
Would these creditors enjoy any prospect of success? 
 
This example is based on the facts of REM v VM. 43  The primary distinction 
between this example and example 6 lies therein that the conduct in example 6 may 
be described as “dishonest” or “unconscionable” whereas the founder in example 7 
did not prima facie act in such a manner. Therefore, were the test set out in in Van 
Zyl v Kaye,44 and endorsed in REM v VM,45 be applied to this example, it is unlikely 
that a court would accept the invitation to disregard the trust’s separate estate. 
The question, however, arises whether, in these circumstances, where dishonesty 
or unconscionability is not apparent, the failure by the trustee to ensure a functional 
separation between control and benefit of the trust may nevertheless justify a finding 
disregarding the separate trust estate. It has been argued herein that it could.46 
As a result of the quasi-public nature of the office of trusteeship, it is submitted 
that the conflation of interests and a failure by the trustee to maintain independence 
constitutes sufficient abuse of the trust form to warrant disregarding the separate 
estate of the trust. It is precisely this public, as opposed to private, nature of the trust 
 
43  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). For a discussion of this case, see the text to n 208 in part 6 5 2 in 
Chapter 6. 
44  2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
45  2017 3 SA 371 (SCA). 






that places the trust form on a different footing to juristic persons such as 
companies.47 
Applying this approach, rooted in the fiduciary proposition, the creditors would, in 
my view, enjoy some prospect of success in executing against the various trust 
estates on account of their abuse. 
 
7 4  Conclusion 
The trust developed organically as a result of a human need to ensure the protection 
of those who would otherwise be vulnerable. 48  Central to the trust form is the 
confidence placed in the character of the trustee to execute his obligations with care, 
diligence and skill, and to do so independently. 
The two principal propositions for a trustee’s obligation of independence are 
complimentary: explaining, on the one hand, why a trust would fail for want of 
independence and also, on the other hand, determining the consequences of the 
failure on the part of the trustee who disregards this duty.  
Through the lens of the independence duality model, its two constituent parts, the 
establishment and fiduciary propositions, may be reconciled. This provides a sound 
theoretical basis also to determine questions of sham trusts and abuse of the trust 
form. 
It is accordingly submitted that the recognition of the independence duality model 
would represent a significant development in both understanding the theoretical 
underpinnings of the South African trust and in dealing with practical problems 
related to the validity and the abuse of trusts. 
 
47  See part 6 5 3 in Chapter 6.  
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